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Introduction and summary
This thesis consists of ve essays in the broad eld of political economy. All ve essays
are self-contained and can be read independently of the others, but some of them are closely
related. Chapters one to four analyze di¤erents aspects of scal policy from a political economy
perspective. Chapter one focuses on the reaction of government spending to cyclical uctuations
in economic activity, with special focus on how scal transparency shapes this reaction. Chapter
two shifts attention from scal policy outcomes to the process that underlies them, namely the
government budget process. The chapter studies the causes of delays in the budget adoption
process in U.S. states. The data material collected here is then used in chapters three and four,
which examine the e¤ect of political stalemate over the budget on state electoral outcomes
and state borrowing costs, respectively. Chapter ve focuses on a di¤erent topic, namely how
electoral outcomes are e¤ected by the publication of exit polls on election day.
While related in topics, the chapters di¤er widely methodologically: Chapters one and two
both employ economic theory as well as econometric analysis. Chapters three and four, on
the other hand, are purely empirical, while chapter ve is purely theoretical. In the following,
I provide brief summaries of each of the ve chapters. Detailed descriptions of the chapters
contributions to the existing literature are not included here. For that, I refer to the chapters
themselves.
Chapter 1, Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy (joint with Lasse Holbøll
Westh Nielsen), studies the e¤ect of scal transparency on the cyclical response of scal policy.
The empirical part of Chapter 1 reveals that government spending reacts in an asymmetric
manner to output uctuations by being acyclical in recessions and procyclical in booms. In
the theoretical part of the chapter, we develop a model that can explain this asymmetry by
highlighting the role of scal transparency. The model builds on the political agency model of
Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008)1. In their retrospective voting model, procyclicality
arises from votersattempt to starve the Leviathan. When income increases, voters demand
more government consumption and tax cuts, fearing that the extra revenue that the economic
upturn generates would otherwise go to wasteful spending. The key assumption behind this
result is a complete lack of scal transparency: Politicians are assumed to be able to hide the
true size of the government decit to voters, who are therefore also unable to observe the level of
political rents. By allowing for a positive degree of transparency, such that voters may detect
an excessive decit with some probability, our model generates two new predictions. First,
scal policy becomes asymmetric: departing from a low initial level, an increase in income will
not lead to increased consumption demands. When initial income is high on the other hand, a
1Alesina, A., Campante, F. and Tabellini, G., 2008. Why is scal policy often procyclical? Journal of the
European Economic Association, Vol. 6, No.5: 10061036.
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further increase implies a rise in government spending. Second, the higher the degree of scal
transparency, the stronger the boom must be before scal policy becomes procyclical.
The empirical part of the chapter tests these predictions in detail. The evidence strongly
conrms the asymmetry of scal policy in OECD countries, where government spending is
much more procyclical in good times than in bad times. Our results also indicate that scal
transparency reduces the procyclical bias in good times in OECD countries. For a broad
sample of countries, we nd encouraging results in favor of our hypothesis that scal policy is
less procyclical in good times in countries where voters are better informed.
Chapter 2, Late Budgets (joint with David Dreyer Lassen and Lasse Holbøll Westh
Nielsen), studies the causes of late budgets in the US states. The budget forms the legal
basis of government spending. If a budget is not in place at the beginning of the scal year,
planning as well as current spending are jeopardized and government shutdown may result. We
develop a continuous-time war-of-attrition model of budgeting in a presidential style-democracy
to explain the duration of budget negotiations. We build our model around budget baselines
as reference points for loss averse negotiators. In our model, the two bargaining parties su¤er
costs from not being able to reach a deal. These costs may be political in nature, because the
public dislikes budget delays, or they may be personal, since legislators must spend time and
e¤ort to keep battling over the budget. When a party nds that it can no longer bear the costs
of continued bargaining, it concedes, and the opposing party is free to implement its preferred
policy. We derive the unique symmetric equilibrium of the bargaining game and show that
it implies a number of testable hypotheses. The three main predictions are: One, changes in
scal circumstances, regardless of direction, increase the expected duration of budget stale-
mates; Two, the expected duration is higher in scal downturns than in upswings of similar
magnitudes; And three, divided government increases the expected duration.
We apply the model to data on government budget processes in US states. Using state and
local newspaper sources as well as responses to a survey of state budget o¢ ces administered
for this purpose, we collect data on dates of nal budget enactment and compare these to the
beginning of the state governmentsscal years. Carrying out this comparison for all states
from 1988 to 2007 yields a unique data set on budget lateness.
Our main empirical conclusions support the models predictions: increasing unemployment
leads to a longer budget negotiation process, it increases the risk of exceeding budget deadlines
and it prolongs periods with no budget in place. Falling unemployment also weakly increases
the risk of seeing a late budget, in accordance with our models predictions, but in contrast to
widely held beliefs that more funds automatically make agreeing on a budget easier. Divided
government makes late budgets more likely in all cases. In addition, higher political costs,
present in election years, shorten the duration of late budgets, while higher personal costs for
non-professional legislators lower both the frequency and duration of budget delays. Soft or
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hard deadlines that require the legislature to end its regular session before the end of the scal
year limit the occurrence of late budgets.
Chapter 3, Fiscal Governance and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Late Budgets
(joint with David Dreyer Lassen and Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen), studies the electoral con-
sequences of late budgets for governors and state legislators in the US states. We use our
measure of late budgets, developed in Chapter 2, as an indicator for bad governance. Using
this data, we investigate whether voters react to bad scal governance by penalizing political
actors involved in the budgetary process on election day. We nd that state legislators face
signicant negative electoral consequences of not nishing a budget on time, while governors
are penalized only under unied governments. In general, electoral penalties are larger where
clarity of responsibility, a¤ected by divided government, supermajority requirements and seat
share margins, is higher, consistent with models of retrospective voting.
Chapter 4, The Consequences of Late Budgets for State Borrowing Costs (joint with
David Dreyer Lassen and Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen), studies the impact of late budgets on
government bond spreads in the US states. Using again the data set on late budgets developed
in Chapter 2, we nd robust evidence that late budgets are signicantly associated with higher
state government borrowing costs. Borrowing costs are measured with data on bond yield
spreads on 20-year general obligation debt from the "Chubb Relative Value Survey", which
is available for 36 US states in the period 1988 to 1997. We estimate that a budget delay of
30 days has a long run impact on the yield spread in the order of 2 basis point. States with
su¢ cient liquidity, in the form of either large reserves or a budget surplus in the old scal year,
face small or no costs from late budgets. On the other hand, states running an average-sized
budget decit face an impact of about 9 basis points when the budget is 30 days late. During
election years, the impact of late budgets on yield spreads increases by an order of 4.
Chapter 5, Exit Polls and Voter Turnout (joint with Thomas Jensen), analyzes the e¤ect
of exit polls on voter turnout and election outcomes. We set up a model of elections or
referendums with two alternatives, in which one of the alternatives must receive a certain
number of votes to beat the other. Voting takes place over two stages, and voters choose freely
between voting early, voting late, or abstaining. We compare the outcome of the voting game
under two di¤erent set-ups: In one set-up, nothing is revealed between the two stages of voting,
and the game is then equivalent to a simultaneous voting game. In the other set-up, an exit
poll reveals all early votes before the beginning of stage two. The introduction of an exit poll
inuences the incentive to vote both before and after the poll is published. Intuitively, the
anticipation of the poll creates a wait-and-see e¤ect that discourages early voting, because
voters may prefer to await the result of the poll before they decide whether to vote or not.
But early voting may also be stimulated through a rst-mover e¤ect, since early voters can
now, through the publication of the poll, exert an inuence on potential voters in stage two.
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The total e¤ect on the incentive to vote early is therefore ambiguous. Similarly, the exit polls
e¤ect on the incentive to cast a late vote depends on what the poll reveals. An exit poll that
reveals a close race stimulates late voting, while a poll that reveals the opposite discourages
late voting. The combination of these e¤ects implies that the total e¤ect of introducing an exit
poll on voter turnout is ambiguous.
The fact that exit polls can inuence the incentive to vote before they are even published
is sometimes overlooked in the debate on their desirability, and this can lead to premature
conclusions about the impact of exit polls on election outcomes. The model in this chapter
illustrates that simple comparisons of voter behavior before and after the release of an exit poll
may in some cases lead to an erroneous conclusion that the exit poll changed the outcome of
the election, while the outcome would in fact have been the same if there had been no exit poll.
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Chapter 1
Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal
Policy
Asger Lau Andersen and Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen
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Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy* 
 
Asger Lau Andersen and Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen 
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines why fiscal policy is often procyclical. We introduce the 
concept of fiscal transparency into a model of retrospective voting, in which a 
political agency problem between voters and politicians generates a procyclical bias 
in government spending. The introduction of fiscal transparency generates two new 
predictions: 1) the procyclical bias in fiscal policy arises only in good times; and 2) a 
higher degree of fiscal transparency reduces the bias in good times. We find solid 
empirical support for both predictions using data on both OECD countries and a 
broader set of countries. 
 
 
Keywords: Fiscal Transparency; Fiscal Policy; Procyclicality; the Business Cycle; 
Political Economy 
 
JEL Classification: D72; E32; E62 
1     Introduction 
Fiscal policy is often procyclical: cyclical increases in real income are often accompanied by 
increases in government spending and/or tax cuts.1 Such a policy may amplify fluctuations in real 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
1 Following Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004), we define a procyclical fiscal policy as a policy where 
increases in real output lead to discretionary increases in spending and/or tax cuts. 
* We thank David Dreyer Lassen and Jim Alt for valuable comments and for sharing their data on fiscal 
transparency with us. We also thank Jacob Svensson, Torsten Persson and Mark Hallerberg for sharing their 
data. Finally, we thank seminar participants at the University of Copenhagen, the EEA Milan 2008 conference 
and the Harvard University Political Economy and Macro lunch seminars. 
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output, thereby leading to prolonged recessions in bad times and inflationary pressures in good 
times. Moreover, a procyclical fiscal policy is in conflict with the tax smoothing principle (Barro 
[1979]), which prescribes that tax rates should be unrelated to business cycle fluctuations. Finally, a 
procyclical fiscal policy may lead to excessive volatility in private- and public consumption, thus 
violating the principle of consumption smoothing. Therefore, most economists would agree with 
the view that a procyclical fiscal policy is a harmful policy that adds to macroeconomic instability. 
Nevertheless, procyclical fiscal policies occur frequently in reality.  
The early empirical literature on the cyclicality of fiscal policy found that fiscal policy is 
typically procyclical in developing countries, and especially Latin America, but acyclical in 
developed countries.2 However, a number of studies have also found evidence of procyclicality in 
subcomponents of government spending and in overall discretionary government spending in 
developed countries (see for instance Hallerberg and Strauch (2002), Gali and Perotti (2003) and 
Lane (2003)), suggesting that the problem is not strictly confined to the developing world.  
Several theories have been proposed to explain the occurrence of procyclical fiscal policies. 
Gavin and Perotti (1997) suggest that procyclical fiscal policies in these countries arise because of 
binding borrowing constraints. According to their hypothesis, governments in developing countries 
are likely to become credit constrained in times of economic slowdown, which may force them to 
run a procyclical fiscal policy. Other authors, such as Tornell and Lane (1999), Talvi and Végh 
(2005) and Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008), have proposed political theories to explain 
procyclical fiscal policies in developing countries. Battaglini and Coate (2008) present a real 
business cycle model in which elected representatives attempt to target public spending to their own 
home districts. Their model predicts that government spending increases in booms and decreases in 
recessions, while tax rates fall in booms and increase in recessions. 
A particularly robust finding in the empirical literature is an asymmetry in the reaction of fiscal 
policy to changes in economic activity: fiscal policy is generally more procyclical in good times 
than in bad times.3 None of the above-mentioned theories are able to explain this empirical 
regularity. It is particularly problematic for the borrowing constraints hypothesis, according to 
which we should expect fiscal policy to be procyclical in bad times when the credit constraints are 
most likely to become binding. 
This paper offers a new explanation of the procyclical nature of fiscal policy, highlighting the 
role of fiscal transparency. Our theory departs from the political agency model developed in 
Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) (henceforth ACT). In their retrospective voting model, 
procyclicality arises from voters’ attempt to “starve the Leviathan”. When income increases, voters 
                                                     
2 See for instance Gavin and Perotti (1997), Catão and Sutton (2002) or Talvi and Végh (2005). 
3 See for example Gavin and Perotti (1997), Persson and Tabellini (2003), Hercowitz and Strawczynski 
(2004) or Manasse (2006). 
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demand more government consumption or tax cuts, fearing that the extra revenue that the economic 
upturn generates would otherwise go to wasteful spending. The key assumption behind this result is 
a complete lack of fiscal transparency: politicians are assumed to be able to hide the true size of the 
government deficit to voters, who are therefore also unable to observe the level of political rents. 
It is this restrictive assumption that we relax in our model. Specifically, we allow a positive 
degree of fiscal transparency, such that voters may detect an excessive deficit with some positive 
probability. This generates two new predictions. First, fiscal policy becomes asymmetric: departing 
from a low initial level, an increase in income will not lead to increased consumption demands. 
When initial income is high on the other hand, a further increase implies a rise in government 
spending. The intuition behind this result is that transparency works as a disciplining device that 
reduces the incentive for politicians to cheat. But when the economy is strong, and the potential 
gain from cheating is high, this may not be sufficient to keep the incumbent from running an 
excessive deficit. Voters know this, and the procyclical pattern of fiscal policy driven by voters’ 
attempt to “starve the Leviathan” re-emerges. Thus, the model can explain the stylized fact from the 
empirical literature that fiscal policy is more procyclical in good times than in bad times. This is in 
contrast to ATC, who argue that the observed asymmetry between good and bad times speaks 
against Gavin and Perotti’s borrowing constraints hypothesis, and in favour of their own theory. 
But their model, unlike ours, is in fact unable to account for the asymmetric pattern in fiscal policy. 
The second main prediction from the model is that the higher the degree of fiscal transparency, 
the stronger the boom must be before fiscal policy becomes procyclical. Thus, we expect fiscal 
policy to be less procyclical in high-transparent countries. ATC note that the procyclicality of fiscal 
policy is driven by politicians’ ability to collect rents so fiscal policy should be more procyclical in 
more corrupt countries. However, their model does not explain which institutional factors influence 
the scope for corruption and, hence, the procyclicality of fiscal policy. The model in this paper 
suggests one such candidate, namely the degree of fiscal transparency. It is exactly through a 
reduced incentive to collect rents that fiscal transparency diminishes the procyclicality of fiscal 
policy. 
Fiscal transparency is the extent to which the general public can access truthful information 
about government budget matters. This issue has received increasing attention in recent years. Both 
the OECD and the IMF have implemented Codes of Best Practice for Fiscal Transparency, and 
The IMF and the World Bank publish Reports on Observation of Standards and Codes (ROSC) for 
the Code of Best Practice for Fiscal Transparency on a regular basis for a broad range of countries. 
We are not the first to introduce fiscal transparency into a model of fiscal policy. Milesi-Ferretti 
(2004) analyses the interaction of fiscal transparency and fiscal rules in the determination of fiscal 
policy. Shi and Svensson (2006) and Alt and Lassen (2006a, 2006b) have highlighted the role of 
fiscal transparency in the occurrence of political budget cycles. Fiscal transparency, so the 
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argument goes, reduces the scope for manipulating the budget around election time, since the risk 
that such manipulations are detected is higher. The link described above between fiscal 
transparency and the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy is something that we have not come across 
in the existing literature, however.  
We then turn to the empirical evidence and test our model’s predictions on two panel data sets: a 
sample of OECD countries and a sample of a broader range of countries. The evidence strongly 
confirms the asymmetry of fiscal policy in OECD countries, where government spending is much 
more procyclical in good times than in bad times. We do not find a similar asymmetry in non-
OECD countries. Our results indicate that fiscal transparency reduces the procyclical bias in good 
times in OECD countries, although the data also suggest a puzzling adverse effect in bad times. For 
the broad sample of countries, we find encouraging results in favour of our hypothesis that fiscal 
policy is less procyclical in good times in countries where voters are better informed. 
2     The Model 
We start out by presenting a simplified version of the framework developed in ACT. We then go 
on to present an extended version that incorporates fiscal transparency. 
2.1 The ACT framework 
We consider an economy populated by a rent-seeking incumbent politician in charge of fiscal 
policy and a number of identical voters. For simplicity, we assume that there is only two time 
periods.  The utility function of the representative voter is given by 
1 1
2 1
1
, 1
1 1
t t t
t
c gU
θ θ
β θθ θ
− −
−
=
⎛ ⎞= + <⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠∑ (1) 
 
where tc  and tg  are the per capita levels of private and government consumption in period t, 
respectively, and β  is a discount factor. Private consumption is given by (1 )t t tc yτ= − , where yt 
is  income per capita in period t and τt is the period t tax rate. We ignore uncertainty about future 
income, so that y2 is known at the beginning of period 1. 
The government can issue debt in period 1, with full repayment, including interest, in period 2. 
Government revenue from tax- and debt financing may be spent in two different ways. First, the 
government can provide public consumption from which voters derive utility. Second, resources 
may be spent on political rents. Political rents should be thought of as any kind of activity that 
benefits the incumbent, but not voters. They could represent outright corruption or nepotism, but 
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also for example spending meant to satisfy campaign contributors or interest groups, or opportunity 
costs related to the incumbent spending her time on campaigning, networking or leisure. In this 
broad sense, a low level of rents should be interpreted as “good government”. 
The government budget constraints for the two periods (assuming no initial debt) are 
1 1 1 1
2 2 1 2(1 )
t
t
y g d r
y g d r
τ
τ ρ
⋅ = − +
⋅ = + + +  (2) 
 
where d1 is the budget deficit in period 1, rt is political rents in period t, and ρ is the (constant and 
exogenous) interest rate, which is assumed to satisfy 1(1 )ρ β−+ = . In addition, there is an upper 
limit to the size of the deficit, 0d > , that cannot be exceeded. Up to that point, government debt is 
always repaid in full. 
The political process is modelled as follows: In the first period the incumbent chooses fiscal 
policy and the voters decide whether or not to re-elect her for period 2. After period 2, the 
incumbent has no possibility of re-election. Voters are backward-looking and condition their voting 
strategy on already observed outcomes only. Further, all politicians are assumed to be identical (no 
adverse selection), so elections serve the sole purpose of allowing voters to reward or punish the 
incumbent. 
The incumbent politician is assumed to be purely rent-seeking. In particular, we assume that she 
seeks to maximise the expected present discounted value of political rents in period 1 and period 2. 
Naturally, the incumbent can only collect rents in period 2 if she is re-elected. 
Voters observe the levels of income, taxes, private consumption and government consumption 
before the election. Political rents and the size of the deficit are unobservable until after the 
election, however. This is a key feature of the ACT model. It assumes a complete lack of 
transparency in the budget process; the government can hide information about its borrowing needs 
from the public through various creative accounting techniques, and the voters have no chance of 
observing the true size of the deficit.  
After observing the levels of income in period 1 and period 2, voters formulate demands for the 
observable components of period 1 fiscal policy (government consumption and the tax rate) and 
promise to re-elect the incumbent if these demands are satisfied. The incumbent then has two 
options: She can satisfy voter demands and secure re-election, or she can ignore the demands and 
forego re-election. In the latter case, there is a maximum level of rents, 0r > , that the incumbent 
can extract without being caught and immediately exempt from office. The maximum level r  is 
sufficiently small relative to income, such that (1 )ty d rρ− + ≥  for all 1,2t = . This assumption 
ensures that the incumbent always has the option of extracting maximum rents without driving 
private- or public consumption below zero. 
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The set-up described here simplifies the model in ACT in the following ways: First, ACT 
consider an infinite horizon model in which future income levels are uncertain. Second, they 
consider a more general separable voter utility function than the CRRA specification assumed in 
equation (1). Third, ACT assume that the incumbent government maximises the expected 
discounted utility of rents, where utility in each period is an increasing, strictly concave function of 
rents. Our simplifications make the model more tractable, but the intuition behind the results, 
described below, is essentially unchanged. Fourth and finally, ACT allow the maximum level of 
rents to depend positively on the level of income, so that the restriction is ݎ௧ ൑ ݎҧ ൅ ߛݕ௧. Setting 
ߛ ൌ 0 only has minor implications for our results, so we stick with this simpler version. We solve 
the model with ߛ ൐ 0 in the appendix. 
2.2 Incorporating fiscal transparency 
The innovation we make is to soften the strict assumption that transparency is completely absent 
in the government budget. We assume that a deviation between the true deficit and the officially 
reported deficit is detected with a positive probability p, which is known to everyone. This is an 
important difference compared to ACT who implicitly assume p = 0. Following Alt and Lassen 
(2006b), we interpret p as a measure of the degree of fiscal transparency. 
The introduction of a positive degree of fiscal transparency allows voters to choose reservation 
levels for government consumption, the tax rate, as well as the deficit. Let these reservation levels 
be denoted by g∗ , τ ∗  and d∗ , respectively. The voters’ re-election strategy can then be described 
as 
* * *
1 1 1,
'
re elect if g g and no detection of d d
don t re elect otherwise
τ τ⎧ − ≥ ≥ >⎨ −⎩ (3) 
 
Note that not detecting 1d d
∗>  can either mean that the incumbent did actually obey voter 
demands (so that 1d d
∗≤ ), or that an excessive deficit ( 1d d ∗> ) went undiscovered, which 
happens with probability 1-p. The key point is that voters cannot distinguish these situations from 
each other.4 In comparison with ACT, the inclusion of a reservation level for the government deficit 
is new. The reason is that in their model there is no chance of detecting an excessive deficit, since p 
                                                     
4 This strategy differs from a traditional voting strategy in the literature of retrospective voting models, in 
which voters usually formulate their re-election rule in terms of a reservation utility level. Here, voters instead 
condition re-election directly on fiscal policy variables. Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 4) consistently 
formulate the voters´ strategy in terms of utility. However, in a footnote they note that voters could actually 
do better if they formulate their strategy in terms of policy variables. The same is true in our model. By 
conditioning re-election on the size of the deficit, voters are implicitly choosing a reservation level for utility 
in period 2 also, since the deficit has direct consequences for the level of consumption in period 2. 
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= 0; setting a reservation level for the deficit is therefore pointless. Thus, allowing a positive value 
of p opens up for a more sophisticated voter strategy. 
The incumbent observes voter demands and sets fiscal policy to maximise the expected PDV of 
political rents, subject to (3), the government budget constraint and the restriction td d≤ . The 
incumbent now has three options: she can (i) satisfy the voters’ demands for government 
consumption and the tax rate as well as the size of the deficit and secure herself re-election, (ii) 
satisfy the demand for government consumption and the tax rate only, run an excessive deficit and 
hope that this will go undetected, or (iii) satisfy none of the demands and forego re-election with 
certainty, in which case the restriction ݎଵ ൑ ݎҧ applies.  
The timing of the model is as follows: (I) At the start of period 1 voters observe y1 and y2. They 
then select the reservation values g*, τ* and d* and the strategy in (3) is known by everyone 
hereafter. (II) The incumbent chooses fiscal policy for period 1. (III) Voters observe the size of g1 
and 1τ . If the incumbent has set 1d d ∗>  this becomes known to everyone with probability p. (IV) 
Elections are held and the voters now vote according to their declared strategy in (3). In period 2 
the elected politician chooses fiscal policy and the model ends. 
The question we want to answer is the following: For a given present discounted value of 
income, how does fiscal policy depend on the distribution of income across time periods? To 
answer this question, we assume the following relationship between output in period 1 and period 
2: 
1
2 (1 )
y y
y y
ε
ρ ε
= +
= − +  (4) 
 
where y  is a natural output level (or trend level) and ε is a short term fluctuation. This 
specification allows a comparison between a flat time profile of income (ε = 0) against a fluctuating 
time profile (ε ≠ 0), holding constant the present discounted value of life-time income.5  
Before we go on to consider the outcome in the political equilibrium, it is instructive to consider 
how a benevolent social planner would choose fiscal policy in this set-up. Obviously, the optimal 
policy would include zero political rents, 1 2 0r r= = . Maximising voter utility with respect to g1, 
g2, c1 and c2, subject to (2), (4) and (1 )t t tc yτ= −  gives c1 = c2 = g1 = g2 = ݕത/2. The important 
point to note here is that the shock variable ε is nowhere present in the solution. The optimal 
consumption profile depends only on the present discounted value of income, not on the 
                                                     
5 All results of the model still hold qualitatively if we assume no relation between y1 and y2. But then we 
get an additional effect of an increase in y1 on fiscal policy, namely a wealth effect of higher total discounted 
income. Since this is not what we are interested in, we prefer the specification in (4). 
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distribution across time periods. In this sense, the optimal fiscal policy is acyclical: because of 
voters’ desire for consumption smoothing, private- and government consumption should not vary 
over the business cycle. Instead, the optimal policy implies 1d ε= − , so that all fluctuations in 
output are fully absorbed by the deficit. 
2.3 Equilibrium Strategies 
We start by looking at the optimal strategy for the incumbent, given the voters’ reservation levels 
g*, τ* and d*, using backwards induction. After the election the victorious politician has no re-
election motive, so she will ignore any voter demands set political rents at the maximum value, 
2r r= . We assume that once the incumbent has secured maximum rents, she ensures an optimal 
balance between public and private consumption with the remaining resources in period 2. This 
implies equality between the marginal utilities of public and private consumption, which in our case 
means 2 2g c= . Coupled with the government budget constraint, this implies that 
( )2 2 1(1 )( ) / 2g c y d rρ ε= = − + + − . 
We now look at each of the incumbent’s three options in period 1: in option (i) the incumbent 
satisfies all voter demands and sets 1g g
∗= , 1τ τ ∗=  and 1d d ∗= . Using the government budget 
constraint in (2), this gives us that political rents are * * *1 ( )r y g dτ ε= + − + . In option (i) the 
incumbent is re-elected with certainty, which has a present value of /(1 )r ρ+ . Thus, defining 1V  
as the expected discounted value of political rents in option (i), we get: 
* * *
1 ( ) 1
rV y g dτ ε ρ= + − + + +  (5) 
 
In option (ii) the incumbent does not satisfy the voters’ demand for the size of the deficit. The 
incumbent will in this case set the deficit at its maximum value, d , since this allows more rents to 
be extracted. Re-election now only occurs if the excessive deficit is undiscovered, which happens 
with probability 1 p− . Defining 2V  as the expected discounted value of political rents in option (ii) 
we have 
* *
2 ( ) (1 )1
rV y g d pτ ε ρ= + − + + − +  (6) 
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Finally, the incumbent always has the option of completely disregarding the voters’ demands. In 
this case she will set rents and the deficit at their maximum values in period 1 and forego re-
election. Defining 3V  in the same way as 1V  and 2V : 
3V r=  (7) 
Voters must now choose optimal values of g* , τ*and d* such that the incumbent chooses option 
(i).6 We can then state the problem of the voters as: 
( ) ( )( )
* * *
11 ** *1
, ,
1 2 1 3
(1 )( ) / 2(1 )( )
2
1 1 1
. .
g d
y d ry gMax
s t V V and V V
θθ θ
τ
ρ ετ ε βθ θ θ
−− − − + + −− + + + ⋅− − −
≥ ≥
 
(8) 
 
where we have inserted the expressions for c2 and g2 found above. Using equations (5) - (7) and 
1(1 )ρ β−+ =  we can write the two constraints in this problem as  
* * * * * *
1 2
* * * * * *
1 3
1 1: ( ) ( )
1 1
1: ( ) ( ) (1 )
1
V V y g d r y g d p r p r d d
V V y g d r r y g d r
τ ε τ ε βρ ρ
τ ε τ ε βρ
≥ + − + + ≥ + − + − ⇔ ≥ −+ +
≥ + − + + ≥ ⇔ + − + ≥ −+
 
(9) 
 
It is fairly easy to see that the constraint 1 3V V≥  must be binding in equilibrium. If this constraint 
were satisfied with strict inequality the voters could raise *g  or lower *τ  without violating either of 
the constraints and we must therefore have 1 3V V=  in equilibrium. In contrast, it is of great 
importance to the equilibrium outcome whether the constraint 1 2V V≥  becomes binding or not. 
In the appendix we show that the values of the deficit, consumption and tax rates that solve the 
problem in (8) are given by 
( )
( )( )
( )( )
1
1 2 1 2
2 1
1
11
1
11 1
2
(1 ) / 2
(1 )
1 (1 ) 2( ) 1
1 (1 ) 2( )
c c g g y r
d r
if p r d
y r y
y r y
β
ε β β βε βτ β ε β
τ β β ε
−
−
−−
−− −
= = = = − +
= − − + ⎛ ⎞< − −⎜ ⎟= − − + + +⎝ ⎠
= − − + −
 (I)
 
                                                     
6 It is never optimal for the voters to choose reservation values such that the incumbent chooses option (ii) 
or option (iii). A proof of this claim can be obtained upon request. 
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and 
( )
( )
( )( )
( )( )
1 1
1
2 2
1
1
1
11 1
2
(1 (1 ) ) / 2
( ) (1 ) / 2
1
1 (1 (1 ) ) 2( )
1 ( ) (1 ) 2( )
c g y d p r
c g y d p r
d d p r if p r d
y d p r y
y d p r y
ε β
β ε
ββ ε ββτ ε β ε
τ β ε β ε
−
−
−− −
= = + + − − −
= = − + − −
⎛ ⎞= − ≥ − −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠= − + + − − − +
= − − + − − −
 
(II)
Using the government budget constraint, we then find that political rents are in both of the above 
solutions given by 1 (1 )r rβ= − . If the shock to output in period 1 is sufficiently small, such that 
relative to period 2 the economy is in a recession or a modest boom, the solution in (I) applies. This 
solution is similar to the solution of the social planner: fluctuations in output are transmitted 
directly into the budget surplus, with no effect on the time profile of government consumption. Tax 
rates increase with output in order to smooth private consumption. Thus, fiscal policy is acyclical. 
Compared to the solution of the social planner, the only difference is the lower level of government 
consumption, which is due to a positive level of political rents. This is necessary to keep the 
incumbent from choosing option (iii) above.  
The solution in (II), which applies in case of a high value of ε, is very much different from the 
social planner’s solution, however. Fluctuations in output are not smoothed at all. The tax rate in 
period 1 may go up or down as output increases, depending on the initial level, but private 
consumption increases unambiguously. Government consumption also rises in period 1 as ε 
increases. The lower level of revenue in period 2 then implies that private- and government 
consumption in period 2 falls. The timing of output now matters for the time profile of consumption 
and fiscal policy becomes procyclical. 
So when does which solution apply? Technically, the difference between solution (I)  and 
solution (II) is that the constraint 1 2V V≥  is binding in solution (II), whereas it is satisfied with strict 
inequality in solution (I). On a more intuitive level, the decisive condition on ε reveals an 
interesting prediction: fiscal policy becomes procyclical only when the economy is in a boom. 
Consider a shift in output from period 2 to period 1, i.e. an increase in the shock variable ε.  Ideally, 
this should have no effect on the time profile of consumption, since such a shift does not affect the 
intertemporal government budget constraint. To smooth consumption, voters would therefore prefer 
a smaller deficit in period 1 when ε  increases. This is exactly what happens when the economy is 
in a recession: departing from a low value, a small increase in ε makes voters require a smaller 
budget deficit and unchanged levels of private- and government consumption in exchange for their 
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vote. To secure herself re-election, the incumbent willingly satisfies the voters’ demands and fiscal 
policy becomes acyclical. 
If the economy is in a boom things are different: ideally, voters would now like to run a budget 
surplus in order to smooth consumption over the two time periods. But the high level of revenue 
during a boom provides the incumbent with an alternative that is too tempting to resist: since there 
is a chance an excessive deficit will go undetected, the incumbent will be tempted to drive the 
deficit to its maximum and pocket the bulk of the extraordinarily high revenue. In technical terms, 
the temptation to choose option (ii) instead of option (i) is too big. The constraint 1 2V V≥  now 
becomes binding. Realising this, voters will adjust their demands in such a situation. So when 
output increases further, voters now demand higher levels of consumption instead of a deficit 
reduction. The result is that fiscal policy now reacts strongly to output fluctuations in a procyclical 
manner. In sum, the model predicts that there is an asymmetry in the cyclical behaviour of fiscal 
policy: during recessions fiscal policy is acyclical. During booms, however, the political agency 
problem becomes more severe and fiscal policy becomes procyclical. 
We now focus on the transparency variable p. The condition on ε for the solution in (I) to apply 
can be rewritten as 1( )p d d rβ≥ − , where 1 21 (1 )d rε β β−= − − +  is the solution for the deficit 
given in (I). First, as a benchmark, consider the case p = 0, which reduces the model to the ACT 
framework described in section 2.1. Since d1 is by definition smaller than d , the inequality above 
is never satisfied for p = 0. Thus, we conclude that fiscal policy is always procyclical when fiscal 
transparency is completely absent. However, with a positive value of p the inequality may be 
satisfied. Let 1( (1 ) )p r dε β β β−≡ − + −%  be the maximum value of the shock ε  that is consistent 
with solution (I). A higher value of p increases this critical value, such that for any distribution of ε, 
a higher p increases the probability that solution (I) applies. A higher degree of transparency makes 
procyclical fiscal policy occur less frequently, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. To understand this 
result, remember that fiscal policy becomes procyclical in good times because voters rationally 
adjust their consumption demands upwards, fearing that the incumbent would otherwise waste the 
high level of revenue on political rents and run an excessive deficit. But a higher degree of 
transparency makes it less attractive to run an excessive deficit for the incumbent, since it increases 
the risk of being exposed. Thus, the higher the degree of transparency, the stronger must the boom 
be before the incumbent falls into temptation and runs a maximum deficit. This implies that voters 
will be willing to trust the incumbent with a larger amount of resources before they alter their 
consumption demands. In countries with a high degree of fiscal transparency we should therefore 
expect to see a procyclical reaction of fiscal policy in strong booms only. In countries with a low 
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degree of transparency, on the other hand, procyclical fiscal policy could occur at a much higher 
frequency. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
2.4 Discussion 
The reason that fiscal policy is only procyclical in good times according to our model is that the 
temptation to cheat voters is stronger in booms. This is due to the fact that the amount of available 
resources is higher in booms than in recessions. For this to be a convincing story for developed 
countries we must emphasise the broad interpretation of political rents: when the level of income 
rises the incumbent can deliver the same levels of consumption with less effort, requiring a less 
careful conduct of fiscal policy, and with more room for superfluous spending on “ego-boosting” 
projects etc.  Moreover, the model captures a general mechanism, which we believe is important in 
developed countries, namely that the pressure on the government from outside watchdogs such as 
the media, the opposition, international organisations and various interest groups is plausibly much 
stronger in recessions than in booms. Thus, the major benefit to the incumbent of a strong economy 
is the quiet life: with attention removed from budgetary issues it becomes easier to engage in all the 
activities that we have previously labelled as “extracting rents”. The result, just as in our model, is 
that the temptation to increase rent extraction at the expense of a deficit reduction is higher in 
booms than in recessions. This is exactly what drives the asymmetric cyclical response of fiscal 
policy, since rational voters will then only demand a procyclical pattern in good times, when the 
temptation to cheat would otherwise dominate the fear of not earning re-election. 
3     Empirical Methodology 
We next turn to the data to test the implications of the model presented in the previous section. 
We do this on two different panel data sets: the first data set consists of annual observations for 21 
OECD countries in the period 1989-2003.7 The second data set broadens the sample of countries 
and the time period considered, covering 59 countries in the years 1980-1998. The sample of 
countries corresponds to Persson and Tabellini’s (2003) data set.8   
                                                     
7 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and USA. 
8 The sample period for OECD countries (1989 – 2003) is chosen such that it fits the timing of our fiscal 
transparency measure (we use the transparency index from Alt and Lassen (2006b), see details below), which 
originates from an OECD survey in 1999. In order to lessen any problems of parameter non-constancy, we 
avoid using observations from the Persson –Tabellini dataset from before 1980. 
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To uncover the causal effect from business cycle fluctuations to fiscal policy we regress a fiscal 
indicator variable on a cyclical indicator interacted with variables of interest and a range of control 
variables. Moreover, we include a lag of the dependent variable to take into account any lags in the 
political decision process. We also include time- and country fixed effects. Thus, the baseline 
specification of the fiscal policy equation that we estimate is  
, 0 1 , 1 , , 1, 2,..., , 2,....i t i t i t i tF F v i N t Tα α η λ− ′ ′= + ⋅ + + + + + = =i,t i,tβ Y γ X       (10) 
where Fi,t is our indicator of fiscal policy. Yi,t denotes a vector containing one or more interaction 
terms between the cyclical indicator and some variable of interest. The vector Xi,t denotes a set of 
control variables. We estimate equation (10) using OLS and Within. However, it is well known that 
both these estimators are biased in the presence of a fixed effect and a lagged dependent variable. 
To account for this we also use the GMM system estimator developed in Arellano and Bond (1991), 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In addition, to account for the possible 
reverse causality running from fiscal policy to macroeconomic conditions we always instrument the 
cyclical indicator with its own lags.9 
4      Data 
Indicator of Fiscal Policy: As our measures of fiscal policy we focus on government 
expenditure.10 We consider both cyclically adjusted (excluding interest) as well as unadjusted, 
current disbursements as our fiscal indicator for the OECD sample.11 To allow for comparisons 
across countries we express our fiscal variables relative to trend GDP. We use trend GDP instead of 
actual GDP to avoid ambiguities with the interpretation of the β  coefficients, which occurs when 
dividing the fiscal indicator with a variable that fluctuates over the business cycle.12 For the broader 
sample of countries only unadjusted fiscal data is available and so we use government spending 
relative to GDP from the Persson and Tabellini data set.  
                                                     
9 All estimations are performed using OxMetrics 5.0. 
10 Corresponding results for government surplus and revenue are not reported but are available upon 
request.   
11 All fiscal variables used in the OECD sample are general government budget variables from the OECD 
Economic Outlook (EO) database. 
12 We define a fiscal policy as procyclical if an increase in economic activity leads to a higher level of 
government spending. If expenditure increases with economic activity the expenditure to GDP ratio may 
increase, decrease or stay unchanged when income rises. Thus, any sign of β could be consistent with a 
procyclical policy when expenditure is expressed relative to actual GDP. Dividing with trend GDP solves this 
problem, since trend GDP does not vary over the business cycle. For trend GDP we use OECD’s calculation 
of potential GDP (using the production function method) available in the OECD EO database. For the 
Persson and Tabellini sample potential GDP is not available and so we divide with actual GDP, keeping in 
mind the caveats that arise from doing so. 
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Cyclical Indicator: For the OECD sample we use the output gap (OECD EO database) as our 
cyclical indicator. For the broader sample of countries we use the output gap from the Persson and 
Tabellini data set (based on HP filtering). Our model predicts that the response of fiscal policy to 
economic fluctuations during good times differs from the response in bad times. We therefore 
interact the output gap with dummy variables for good times (positive output gap) and bad times 
(negative output gap). We also include the dummy for positive output gap ( posd ) in the regression 
to control for any level differences in government spending.13  
Fiscal transparency: In addition we also include a measure of fiscal transparency interacted 
with the output gap (in both good and bad times). For our OECD sample we use the fiscal 
transparency index developed in Alt and Lassen (2006b). This index ranges from 0 to 11 where 
each point represents an affirmative answer to a question concerning fiscal transparency sent to all 
budget directors of OECD member countries. The questions are presented in Table 2.14 For the 
broader sample of countries no explicit index for fiscal transparency is available. However, our 
theoretical prior is that a higher degree of fiscal transparency reduces the procyclicality of fiscal 
policy through an improvement of the voters’ ability to monitor the actions of the incumbent. Such 
an improvement of the monitoring technology may come about through other channels than direct 
reforms of the budget procedure. First of all, we expect the media to play a key role in this respect. 
Greater popular access to independent media is likely to enhance the general public’s insight into 
fiscal affairs. Shi and Svensson (2006) develop an indicator to proxy for the share of informed 
voters in the population. The indicator is the product of the number of radios per capita and a 
dummy variable equal to one if the country is classified as having freedom of broadcasting (based 
on information from Freedom House). We use this indicator, which is available for 54 countries in 
our sample in the years 1980-1995. 
Exogenous control variables: The vector  contains the control variables used in our 
benchmark specification, of which many have become standard in cross-sectional and panel data 
studies of fiscal policy. We use the following benchmark control variables: the demographic 
dependency ratio, the sum of exports and imports as a ratio to GDP, the inflation rate, a dummy for 
election year, a measure of trend or structural unemployment, the government debt to GDP ratio in 
the previous year, a dummy for majoritarian electoral system and the natural log of trend real GDP 
per capita. In the broad sample we also include a dummy for democracy and a dummy for 
presidential form of government. By default we include time dummies to control for sample-wide 
                                                     
13 A similar approach is used in Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) and Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
However, these authors do not include the level dummy for positive output gap. 
14 Compared to Alt and Lassens’s index we drop the question shown in column (6) in Table 2 due to 
missing observations for Greece, Portugal and Spain. Further, we also include the question in column (11). 
Note that the index is constant over time. 
i,tX
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exogenous shocks. However, we sometime remove these dummies to restore degrees of freedom. 
For the OECD sample the data for inflation, NAIRU and government debt are from the OECD EO 
database, the dummies for election year and majoritarian systems are taken from the Persson and 
Tabellini data set and the IEFS election guide15. The data for trend income, openness to trade and 
the dependency ratio are from WDI (2005). For the broader sample we use the Persson and 
Tabellini data set as the source except for inflation and trend income, which is taken from WDI 
(2005). Due to lack of data availability trend unemployment and debt are omitted from the 
regressions based on this sample. 
5     Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries 
5.1 Fiscal Policy and Asymmetric Responses to Economic Activity 
Columns (1) to (6) in Table 1 show estimation results for cyclically adjusted government 
spending for the OECD countries. Columns (1)-(3) report the results using a specification where the 
output gap is included without any interaction terms. The coefficient on gap is statistically 
insignificant in all three columns, indicating that government spending is acyclical. This is in line 
with what previous studies have found for the OECD countries (e.g. Talvi and Végh (2005) and 
Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008))16. However, this result comes about from mixing up two 
regimes. Columns (4)-(6) split the output gap into good and bad times and include a dummy for 
positive output gap. The result from doing so is striking. The coefficient on the output gap 
interacted with a dummy for good times ( posgap d⋅ ) is clearly positive and highly significant for all 
estimators considered. The corresponding coefficient for bad times is insignificant and very close to 
zero. Thus, government spending seems to be procyclical in good times and acyclical in bad times, 
which is in line with our model’s predictions.17 Our estimates suggest that, during good times, the 
increase in government spending in reaction to a one percentage point increase in the output gap 
could be as large as one percent of potential GDP. The lowest estimate (GMMSYS) suggests an 
increase of about 0.25 percent of potential GDP. The level dummy posd is negative, 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                     
15 Data for elections after 1998 are taken from the IEFS Election guide. 
16 Previous studies obtaining this result often use cyclically unadjusted variables as well as using 
dependent variables relative to GDP, rather than trend or potential GDP. 
17 Looking at government revenue we do not find the same clear asymmetric response, in fact, revenue 
seems acyclical or counter cyclical in good times. The results for the government surplus are similar to the 
spending results, only weaker, and we therefore conclude that this procyclical result comes from the spending 
side of the government budget. 
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indicating that spending drops a little in level when the output gap becomes positive, however, the 
coefficient is not significant. 18 
In Column (7) we consider the unadjusted current disbursements as the dependent variable. The 
result is the same clear profile as with the adjusted data: government spending is significantly more 
procyclical in good times than in bad times. In columns (8) to (10) we look at subcomponents of 
(unadjusted) government spending. Government consumption is procyclical in good times, and 
more so than in bad times, although the difference is less pronounced than for overall spending. 
Even Social Security Benefits, which we would expect to be heavily influenced by automatic 
stabilisers, display a procyclical behaviour in good times (and countercyclical behaviour in bad 
times).  
5.2 Fiscal Transparency 
The next step of our analysis is to include a measure of fiscal transparency in our econometric 
specification. We start by interacting the output gap in good and bad times with each of the 
dummies used to construct the transparency index in Alt and Lassen (2006b), using one dummy at a 
time.19 The results are summarised in Table 2 below: using the GMMSYS estimator we find that 
most of the fiscal transparency dummies reduce the procyclicality of cyclically adjusted spending in 
good times. Some questions have a very clear significant effect: a legal requirement of an ex post 
comparison between projected and actual expenditures (question [5]) reduces the procyclicality of 
spending in good times, and this effect is significant at the 1% level. The same strong effect appears 
if the government is required to produce actuarial estimates for social security spending (question 
[11]). The first of these results fits particularly nicely with our theoretical priors: large discrepancies 
between projected and actual spending seem like a strong warning sign that the government may be 
trying to hide a large deficit. Thus, a legal requirement of an ex post comparison makes it quite 
likely that “cheating” governments will be exposed. We therefore believe that this question picks up 
the idea behind our model parameter of fiscal transparency, p, quite accurately and the accordance 
with our theoretical priors is encouraging.  
                                                     
18 To test whether our results are affected by the introduction of the EMU, we experimented with including 
an interaction term between a dummy for EMU participation (equal to 1 after 1994) and the output gap in 
good and bad times. The results suggested that the procyclical response in good times is halved from EMU 
membership, but the coefficient on posgap d⋅  was in all cases still positive and significant. The effect of EMU 
participation in bad times was insignificant for OLS and Within, however, GMMSYS suggested that 
spending policies are more countercyclical in bad times in EMU countries.  
19 We present the results for 12 questions on transparency (the dummies are equal to 1 in case of 
transparency). The index used in Alt and Lassen (2006b) includes 11 of these questions, since the question in 
column 11 in  
Table 2 is not included in their original index. 
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Next we move on to consider the aggregation of the dummies in Table 2 into a full index 
(transp11).20 Column (1) in Table 3 show the results for cyclically adjusted government spending, 
while columns (2) use unadjusted spending. In columns (3) through (5) we look at the 
subcomponents of (unadjusted) spending. The coefficient on transp11 interacted with the output gap 
in good times is negative and significant at a 10% level using adjusted government spending, while 
it is negative and significant at the 1% level for unadjusted spending. This is in nice accordance 
with our theory: a back-of-the- envelope calculation (using the results from column (1)) suggests 
that in a country scoring zero on the transparency index, government spending increases by 0.32 
percent of potential GDP in reaction to an increase of 1 percentage point in the output gap during 
good times. The corresponding reaction in a country at the other end of the transparency scale is an 
increase of 0.32 -11·0.029 = 0.00. Thus, going from a complete lack of transparency to full 
disclosure eliminates the procyclical reaction of government spending in good times. 21 
We find similar effects of fiscal transparency in the subcomponents of spending as in aggregate 
spending, although the effect seems to be somewhat weaker for social security benefits 
(insignificant but with the correct sign). In results not reported here (available upon request), we 
also tried to include interaction terms between the output gap and the number of veto players 
(Polcon5 from Henisz (2000) as well as and the degree of “delegation” of powers and “contracts” 
using the variables from Hallerberg et al (2009),  in addition to the interactions with our fiscal 
transparency measure. Our above conclusions are overall robust to the inclusion of these additional 
controls. 
[Table 2 and Table 3 about here] 
So far we have avoided the results for transparency in bad times. The story is not quite as we 
expected: in most estimations we find that the coefficient on the interaction between the output gap 
in bad times and the transparency indices are positive and significant (on a 1% level). This suggests 
that fiscal policy in bad times becomes more procyclical when transparency increases. This does 
not square with our theory. Taken at face value, our results indicate that the countries that have a 
high degree of fiscal transparency are also the countries that have been most prone to running 
procyclical policies during bad times. However, it is likely that the high degree of fiscal 
transparency is caused by the exact same procyclical policies, rather than the other way around. In 
other words, we suspect that the counterintuitive sign arises due to a problem of reverse causality. 
Procyclical fiscal policies during recessions can be extremely damaging and may trigger reforms 
that increase the degree of fiscal transparency. If this is indeed the case, and we estimate an 
equation like (10) with a time invariant measure of fiscal transparency, we may falsely conclude 
                                                     
20 We drop question 6 in all cases due to missing observations. 
21 Our GMMSYS estimations results are robust to using various combinations of lags of the dependent 
variable as instruments. 
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that the causation runs in the opposite direction, that is, that a higher degree of fiscal transparency 
leads to a procyclical fiscal policy during periods of low economic activity. In the lack of obvious 
candidates for instrumental variables we do not attempt to correct this problem. Rather, we advice 
that the potential endogeneity of fiscal transparency should be kept in mind when interpreting our 
results. Note however, that the main driver behind this result seems to be question 3 in Table 2, 
whereas the effect seems much weaker for the other questions. Also note that this type of bias is 
also likely to affect our results for good times. This cannot explain the obtained results, however. 
On the contrary, the presence of such reverse causality in good times would work against our 
theoretical priors and pull the coefficient on 11 postransp gap d⋅ ⋅  in a positive direction. On this 
background, the obtained negative coefficients are even more noteworthy. 
6     Evidence from a Broader Sample of Countries 
We next move on to consider the evidence of asymmetric spending policies and the effect of 
voter information in a broad sample of countries. Having a sample of both developed and 
developing countries enables us examine whether fiscal policy is inherently less procyclical in 
developed countries than in developing countries, as claimed in some studies.22  
6.1 Asymmetries in Fiscal Policy 
In Table 4 we look at the cyclical response for government expenditure. The coefficients on the 
output gap in columns (1)-(3) are all positive, albeit only mildly statistically significant in column 
(2).  
Splitting the output gap variable into positive and negative values as in columns (4)-(7) only 
provides very weak evidence of an asymmetry in the spending pattern – unlike in the OECD 
sample. The coefficient on the output gap in good times is in all columns except (7) higher than the 
coefficient on the output gap in bad times, but in all cases a t-test fails to reject the hypothesis that 
they are in fact equal. 
6.2 OECD Countries versus Non-OECD Countries 
Judging from the results in the previous section, it seems that the results that we obtained for the 
OECD countries do not apply to a more heterogeneous group of countries. We now explore this 
issue in further detail, explicitly distinguishing OECD countries from non-OECD countries. In 
Table 5 columns (1)-(3) we find indications of a procyclical pattern in OECD countries which does 
                                                     
22 See e.g. Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Talvi and Végh (2005). 
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not seem to be present in non-OECD countries. This is in contrast to earlier results in the literature, 
e.g. the results in Talvi and Végh (2005). Note however, that the hypothesis of equal output gap 
coefficients in the spending equation for the two groups of countries is only rejected in column 
(1).23 In columns (4)-(8) we dig deeper into the spending policy differences between OECD and 
non-OECD countries. In addition to separating OECD countries from non-OECD countries we now 
also distinguish good times from bad times. Since the Within estimates in column (5) are very large 
and imprecisely determined, we report results from a Within estimation where the level dummies 
for positive output gaps have been removed in column (6). The GMMSYS estimates in column (7) 
have high standard errors and we therefore also report GMMSYS estimates omitting time dummies 
in column (8). The coefficient on  is positive in all cases and statistically 
significant in all other columns than (5) and (7). The coefficient on , on the 
other  
[Table 4 about here] 
hand, has an alternating sign and is never statistically significant. We are able to reject a null 
hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal against a one-sided alternative (again, with the 
exception of columns (5) and  (7)). Hence, the data suggest that government spending policies are 
procyclical in good times in OECD countries. There is no solid evidence of the same procyclical 
pattern in bad times. This confirms the results from the OECD sample. A similar asymmetry does 
not seem to be present in non-OECD countries. The coefficients on  and 
 are never statistically significant and we fail to reject the hypothesis 
that they are equal in all cases.24 
                                                     
23 Looking at the surplus we find that in OECD countries, the budget surplus in percent of GDP seems to 
be unrelated to the output gap, whereas there is a clear negative relationship between these variables in non-
OECD countries, despite the presence of automatic stabilisers in the dependent variable (note, this difference 
might be due to differences in the size of automatic stabilisers for the two groups, since we expect automatic 
stabilisers to have a stronger effect on overall fiscal policy in the OECD countries). Looking at revenue, we 
find solid evidence of a more procyclical pattern of government revenue in non-OECD countries than in 
OECD countries. Hence the procyclical pattern for the surplus in non-OECD countries stems from the 
revenue side.  
24 The results for the budget surplus are very similar to the ones for spending. We do not find any solid 
evidence of an asymmetric cyclical pattern in government revenue, neither among OECD countries, nor 
among non-OECD countries. It is worth noting, however, that there are weak signs of a negative relationship 
between government revenue and the output gap in bad times in non-OECD countries. Thus, the negative 
relationship between the surplus to GDP ratio and the output gap in this group of countries (see note 23) 
seems to work through the revenue side of the government budget in bad times, rather than the expenditure 
side in good times. 
posgap d OECD⋅ ⋅
(1 )posgap d OECD⋅ − ⋅
posgap d nonOECD⋅ ⋅
(1 )posgap d nonOECD⋅ − ⋅
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6.3 Fiscal Policy and Voter Information 
In Table 5 columns (9) and (10) we interact the Shi and Svensson (2006) indicator, INFO, with 
the output gap in good and bad times to explore the effect of voter information on the cyclicality of 
government spending. INFO is highly correlated with the dummy variable for OECD countries, 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.54. Thus, to obtain reliable estimates of the effect of increased 
media access we must control for OECD membership, since we have seen that the cyclical pattern 
of fiscal pattern is very different in OECD countries than in non-OECD countries.25 This involves a 
great number of interaction terms with the output gap.  At the same time, the inclusion of INFO 
means that the number of observations available for analysis falls. Combining these two things, we 
fear that we may be stretching the data too far and we therefore choose to omit time dummies in 
order to restore degrees of freedom. The OLS estimates in column (9) and the GMMSYS estimates 
in column (10) both suggest that high-information countries run less procyclical spending policies 
in good times. The effect of a higher value of INFO is quite large and statistically significant at the 
five percent level in both cases. There does not seem to be a similar effect in bad times, at least not 
of the same  
[Table 5 about here] 
magnitude. Further, the positive coefficients on  indicate that low-
information countries among the non-OECD members also run procyclical spending policies in 
good times.26 
A final note concerns the role of voter information versus the role of corruption. Alesina, 
Campante and Tabellini (2008) find evidence that fiscal policy is more procyclical in countries with 
widespread corruption. In column (11) of Table 5 we confirm this finding, using the same control 
of corruption measure as Alesina, Campante and Tabellini.27 However, the results in column (12) 
show that the significant sign on the control of corruption measure vanishes when we also control 
for voter information. The effect of INFO is largely unaffected by the inclusion of control of 
corruption and still significant in good times. These observations are consistent with the argument 
of this paper: a higher degree of voter information reduces the scope for corruption and thereby also 
reduces the degree of procyclicality. 
                                                     
25 We have also tried running estimations with INFO included without controlling for OECD membership. 
The results were similar to the results in section 6.2, with INFO playing the same role as OECD did in section 
6.2. We suspect that this merely reflects the strong correlation between INFO and OECD, rather than a true 
causal effect of INFO. 
26 As a robustness check we included terms of trade as exogenous variable as done in e.g. Gavin and 
Perotti (1997). All our main results were roughly unaffected. 
27 See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) for details on the World Bank corruption measure.  
posgap d nonOECD⋅ ⋅
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7     Interpreting the Results 
Panel A in Figure 2 illustrates the impact of output fluctuations on the level of government 
spending in a typical OECD country, based on the coefficients reported in Table 1. The figure is 
constructed such that an output gap equal to zero corresponds to a neutral effect on government 
spending. The picture drawn here is in many ways reminiscent of Figure 1, which illustrated the 
profile of government spending according to the model that we presented in section 2: fiscal policy 
is more or less acyclical when the output gap is negative, but reacts procyclically to changes in 
income when the output gap is positive. Panel A shows a level drop in government spending at a 
zero output gap in OECD countries, which we do not model theoretically, but this is quite small and 
statistically insignificant.28 We interpret the similarity between the two figures as evidence in 
favour of our theory of fiscal policy.  
The asymmetric spending pattern found for the group of OECD member states does not apply 
directly to a broader sample of countries. The econometric analyses in section 6 shed some light on 
the differences between the highly developed group of OECD countries versus the heterogeneous 
group of non-OECD countries. The results are illustrated in panel B in Figure 2. For the OECD 
countries, we confirm the results from section 5: fiscal policy is procyclical in good times but not in 
bad times. The picture is slightly more blurred in the group of non-OECD countries, where 
government spending does not appear to react to fluctuations in output.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
This difference leads us to believe that we need two different explanations for the cyclical 
characteristics in fiscal policy, depending on which group of countries we are considering. The 
model presented in this paper can explain the observed pattern of government spending in OECD 
countries. An interesting question is then why the same spending pattern appears to be absent (or at 
least not very strong) among the non-OECD countries in good times. A natural point to make here 
is that the average quality of democracy among the OECD countries is higher than in the remainder 
of countries in the broad sample of countries. Unless the populations in less democratic countries 
have some alternative means of holding the incumbent accountable (such as revolts or strikes), we 
expect spending pressures to have limited impact on actual spending policies in countries where the 
political accountability mechanism imposed by the electoral process is not as strong as in mature 
democracies. 
                                                     
28 In estimations not reported, we tested out the level difference between good and bad times. Doing so 
pulls the positive coefficient in good times closer to zero. However, the coefficients are still large, positive 
and clearly significant. 
  
28 
 
8     Conclusions 
Procyclical fiscal policies occur in OECD countries as well as in less advanced economies. 
However, the exact way in which the procyclical patterns occur differs between these groups of 
countries. In OECD countries we find a strong asymmetry between good and bad times. A 
procyclical fiscal policy is a phenomenon that is typically associated with times of economic 
prosperity in these advanced economies. During times of economic slowdown, on the other hand, 
fiscal policy is typically acyclical or countercyclical. Matters are different in less advanced 
economies where we do not find a similar asymmetry.  
This paper offers a novel explanation of these observations by highlighting the role of fiscal 
transparency: a lack of fiscal transparency gives scope for rent seeking behaviour in fiscal 
policymaking. In times of economic slowdown or moderate economic activity, voters can restrain 
such rent seeking behaviour by conditioning re-election of the politicians holding office on observed 
performance. However, when the economy is booming it becomes easier for politicians to extract 
rents. The abundance of resources provides the incumbent with a temptation that is too great to 
resist. Fully aware of this change in circumstances, voters increase their consumption demands in 
good times. Voters not only tolerate, but actually demand a seemingly suboptimal procyclical fiscal 
policy in good times. These demands are not a result of irrational or myopic thinking. Rather, the 
strategy of the voters ensures a second-best solution to the fiscal policy problem. This argument can 
explain why fiscal policy is more procyclical in good times than in bad times in advanced 
economies. 
Our model of fiscal policy also generates an original auxiliary prediction: the procyclical bias in 
good times should be less severe in countries where fiscal transparency is high, since a transparent 
budget practice alleviates the moral hazard problem between voters and politicians by improving 
voters’ ability to monitor the actions of their elected representatives. We find empirical evidence in 
support of this prediction in OECD countries as well as in a broader sample of countries: better 
access to information about government policies, either via a high degree of fiscal transparency or 
through a free an active press, does reduce the procyclical bias in government spending in good 
times.  
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10     Appendix 
In this appendix we present the solution to the voters’ problem. We allow for the possibility that 
the maximum level of rents in option (iii) depends positively on the level of income, so that 
t tr r yγ≤ + , where 0γ ≥ . Rent collection in period 2 now becomes 2 2r r yγ= + , and 
consumption in period 2 is given by ( )2 2 2 1½ (1 ) (1 )g c y d rγ ρ= = − − + − .  
Turning to period 1, the expected discounted values of political rents in the three options become 
* * * 1
1 1 2(1 ) ( )V y g d r yτ ρ γ−= − + + + + , * * 12 1 2(1 )(1 ) ( )V y g d p r yτ ρ γ−= − + + − + +  and 
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3 1V r yγ= + , respectively. The voters’ problem is then to choose values of *g , *τ  and *d  so as 
to maximize their utility given in (1), subject  to the constraints 1 2V V≥ , 1 3V V≥ , *d d≤  and the 
expressions for 2c  and 2g  given above. Rearranging the two incentive constraints and using 
(1 ) 1β ρ+ = , we can write the Lagrangian for this problem as 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1* 1 **1
1 2
* * * * *
1 2 2 1 1 2 3
(1 ) ½((1 ) )
2
1 1 1
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
y y d rgL
d d p r y g d y r y y d d
θ θθτ γ ββθ θ θ
λ β γ λ τ β γ β λ
− −−−− − − −= + + ⋅− − −
− − − + − − − + − + − − −
 
 
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are then given by 
 
( )
( )
*
1 2*
*
2*
2 1 2 3*
0 (1 )
0
0
L y
L g
g
L c
d
θ
θ
θ
τ λτ
λ
λ λ λ
−
−
−
∂ = ⇔ − =∂
∂ = ⇔ =∂
∂ = ⇔ = + +∂
 
 
 
and the complementary slackness conditions are 
*
1 2 1
* * *
2 1 1 2 2
*
3 3
( ) 0 , 0
(1 ) ( ) 0 , 0
0, 0
d d p r y
g d y r y y
d d
λ β γ λ
λ τ β γ β λ
λ λ
⎡ ⎤− − + = ≥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − + − + − = ≥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− = ≥⎣ ⎦
 
 
We are mainly interested in situations where the constraint *d d≤  is unbinding. A binding 
borrowing constraint would give rise to a procyclical fiscal policy as originally described by Gavin 
and Perotti (1997). Since that is not our focus in this paper, we assume for now that  *d d<  in 
optimum and that 3λ  is zero. We shall later derive a condition on the time profile of output that 
ensures that this is satisfied. 
As explained in the text, the constraint 1 3V V≥  must be satisfied with equality in optimum, so 
that * * * 1 1 2(1 ) ( ) 0g d y r y yτ β γ β− − + − + − = . Thus, we are left with two possible cases: 
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Case 1): 1 0λ =  (the constraint 1 2V V≥  is unbinding). Combining the Kuhn-Tucker first-order 
conditions with the complementary slackness conditions then gives * *1 2(1 ) y g cτ− = = . Using 
(1 )t t tc yτ= − , 1 3V V=  and the expressions for 2c  and 2g  given above, we then get 
the solution candidate 
( ) ( )
( )
1*
2 1 2
* 1
1 2
* 1 2
1
1 (1 )( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 ) / 2
(1 )1
2(1 )
d y y r y
g y y r
y y r
y
β β γ β γ
β γ β
γ βτ β
−
−
= + − − − +
= + − + −
− + −= − +
 (A.1) 
The solution candidates for political rents and consumption in period 2 can then be found by 
substituting these expressions into the government budget constraint and 
( )2 2 2 1½ (1 ) (1 )g c y d rγ ρ= = − − + − . For (A.1) to be a solution candidate, we must at the same 
time ensure that the constraint 1 2V V≥  is indeed satisfied. This implies that (A.1) is only a solution 
candidate if 
( )* 2 1 2 21 1( ) (1 ) ( )1d d p r y y y p r y d
ββ γ β β γγ β
⎛ ⎞+≥ − + ⇔ ≤ + + − + −⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠  (A.2)
Case 2): 1 0λ >  (the constraint 1 2V V≥  is binding). We now have 1 2V V= , 1 3V V=  and 
* *
1(1 ) y gτ− = , where the latter equation follows from the first-order conditions. This is three 
equations in the three unknowns, *g , *τ and *d . Solving these three equations yields the solution 
candidate 
( )
*
2
*
1 2
* 1 2
1
( )
(1 ) (1 (1 ) ) (1 ) / 2
(1 ) (1 (1 ) ) (1 )1
2
d d p r y
g y d p r p y
y d p r p y
y
β γ
γ β γ β
γ β γ βτ
= − +
= − + − − − + −
− + − − − + −= −
 
(A.3) 
Political rents and period 2 consumption levels can again be found from the government budget 
constraint and the expression ( )2 2 2 1(1 ) (1 ) / 2g c y d rγ ρ= = − − + − . 
We must now determine which of the two candidates is the actual solution. First, note that if the 
condition in (A.2) is not satisfied case 1) does not deliver any solution candidate. Hence, in this 
situation case 2) gives a unique solution candidate and, given the concavity of the objective 
function, this must then be the solution. On the other hand, if (A.2) is in fact satisfied, then the 
solution candidate in case 1) is the actual solution. This can be seen by noting that government 
  
33 
 
consumption in case 1) is in each period a weighted average of the case 2) levels of government 
consumption in period 1 and period 2. The same is true for private consumption. The concavity of 
the utility function then implies that the case 1) candidate yields higher utility than the case 2) 
candidate. 
To sum up, whenever the condition in (A.2) is satisfied, the solution to the voters’ problem is 
given by the expressions in (A.1). Whenever (A.2) is not satisfied, the solution is given by the 
expressions in (A.3). Setting 0γ =  and using the formulations for 1y  and 2y  given in (4), we then 
get the solution presented in the text. The main difference between the solution with 0γ =  and the 
more general case presented here is that a change in the time profile of output that leaves the 
present discounted value of total output unchanged is no longer neutral for consumption in case 1) 
when 0γ > . A PDV-neutral shift of output towards period 1 now lowers both types of 
consumption in both periods. The reason is that such a shift makes option (iii) more attractive to 
the incumbent, because more rents could now be collected in period 1. At the same time, fewer 
rents can be collected in period 2, which lowers the value of re-election to the incumbent. To keep 
the incumbent from choosing option (iii) voters must therefore moderate their demands for 
consumption. This effect vanishes when 0γ = . 
The main results of the model still hold with 0γ > , however: When output is low there is full 
consumption smoothing and marginal increases in period 1 output are spread out equally over the 
two periods via a lower budget deficit. When period 1 output becomes sufficiently high, however, 
further increases are transmitted into higher consumption in period 1 only, consumption smoothing 
breaks down and fiscal policy becomes procyclical. A higher degree of fiscal transparency allows 
a higher level of period 1 output before consumption smoothing breaks down, and thus reduces the 
procyclical bias in good times. 
It remains to make sure that the upper bound on the deficit is not violated in equilibrium. It is 
clear from (A.3) that *d d≤  is always satisfied in case 2). From (A.1) we can find the appropriate 
condition in case 1) as ( )1 11 2(1 ) (1 (1 )) (1 )y y r dγ γ β β β β− −≥ − − + − − + .  
Note that this cut-off is always below the cut-off value given in (A.2) as long as 0p > . We 
implicitly assume that the condition here is always satisfied. A violation of this condition would 
imply a binding credit constraint in period 1. Fiscal policy would be procyclical, but for reasons 
that are entirely different than the ones that we focus on in this paper. 
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Figure 1. The reaction of government consumption to a positive output shock 
 
 
Figure 2: The impact of output fluctuations on government spending 
 
A: OECD sample - Profile of  Gov. Spending B: Broad Sample- Profile of  Gov. Spending 
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Notes:   
(1)  The graphs in Panel A are based on estimation results from Table 1, columns(4)-(6) 
(2) The graphs in Panel B are based on estimation results from Table 5, column (8) 
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Table 1: Asymmetric Response of the Spending Side of the Government Budget, OECD countries 1989-2003 
 
Notes:   
(1) *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
(2) The following control variables are included in all columns: lagged dependent variable, inflation rate, NAIRU, public debt in previous year, 
election year dummy, log of trend income, sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP and demographic dependency ratio. A time 
invariant dummy for majoritarian electoral system is included in columns (1) and (4).  
(3) For OLS and Within estimations all output gap variables are instrumented with their one time lagged level value. 
(4) GMMSYS uses level lags from 2 to 12 of the lagged dependent variable in its differenced equation. In this equation the output gap variables 
are instrumented using their own two times lagged level values. For the level equation of GMMSYS the lagged dependent variable as well 
as the output gap variables are instrumented by their own one time lagged differenced values. 
(5) In no case, except for Social Security Benefits, did the m2 test for no second order autocorrelation in the differenced equation reject. Since 
the m3 test for no third order autocorrelation did not reject we used the level lags 3 to 12 as instruments of the lagged dependent variable 
for Social Security Benefits. 
(6) Columns (7) to (10) only show results using the GMMSYS estimator, however, the results using OSL and Within are roughly the same and 
are thus omitted. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variab le: Cur. Dis. / pot GDP Cons / pot. GDP Wage Cons. / pot GDP Soc.Sec. / pot GDP
Estimation method: OLS-IV Within-IV GMMSYS OLS-IV Within-IV GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS
0.053 0.018 0.019
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
0.799*** 0.990*** 0.2678*** 0.200*** 0.135*** 0.125*** 0.078*
 (0.25) (0.38) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
0.036 -0.069 0.023 -0.021 0.082*** 0.067*** -0.092***
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
-1.478 -1.48 -0.428 -0.241 -0.255 -0.156** -0.220**
(0.73) (0.93) (0.22) (0.19) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11)
Time dummies: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of observations 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 244 257
- - -
- - -
gap i,t
----- Cyc. Adj. Current Disbursements excl. interest as percentage of potential GDP -----
- - -
- - -- - - -
,
pos
i td
,
pos
i tgap d⋅
,(1 )
pos
i tgap d⋅ −
  
 
Table 2: Interacting the output gap with single fiscal transparency dummies, OECD countries 1989-2003 
 
Notes:  
(1) *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
(2) GMMSYS uses level lags from 2 to 12 of the lagged dependent variable in its differenced equation.  In the difference equation the 
output gap variables are instrumented using their own two times lagged level values. For the level equation of GMMSYS the 
lagged dependent variable as well as the output gap variables are instrumented by their own one time lagged differenced values.  
(3) The m2 test was performed for all estimations and in no case was the validity of the instruments rejected. 
Dependent Variable:
Estimation method: 
GMMSYS
Time dummies:
Controls
No of observations 257 257 257 257257 223 257 257257 257 257 257
Yes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes Yes
+
* *** * *
+ + - ++ + - +
Sign on transparency 
dummy interacted 
with negative output 
gap
+ + +
-
** *** *** *** *
- + + -+ - - +
Sign on transparency 
dummy interacted 
with positive output 
gap
- - -
Whether the 
budget 
discusses the 
impact that 
variations in the 
key economic 
assumptions 
would have on 
the budget 
outturn (yes = 
transparent)
Whether the 
government 
regularly 
produces a 
report on the 
long term (10-
40 years) 
outlook for 
public finances 
as a whole (yes 
= transparent)
Whether the 
government is 
required to 
make regular 
actuarial 
estimates for 
social security 
programs (yes 
= transparent)
Whether the 
government is 
required to 
report 
contingent 
liabilities on a 
regular basis 
(yes = 
transparent)
(12)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cyc. Adj. Cur. Dis. excl. interests / pot. GDP ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accrual 
accounting (yes 
= transparent)
Whether the 
government 
generally 
presents more 
than one 
supplementary 
budget to the 
legislature in 
each fiscal year 
(no = 
transparent)
Whether non-
financial 
performance 
data is routinely 
included in the 
budget 
documentation 
presented to 
the legislature 
(yes = 
transparent)
Whether there 
is a legal 
requirement 
that the budget 
documentation 
contain a 
projection of 
expenditure 
beyond the next 
fiscal year (yes 
= transparent)
Whether it is a 
legal require-
ment that the 
budget include 
an ex post 
comparison 
between 
projected 
expenditure in 
future years 
and the actual 
expenditures in 
those years 
(yes = 
transparent)
Whether the in-
year financial 
reports are 
audited (yes = 
transparent)
Whether 
special reports 
on the fiscal 
outlook are 
released prior 
to an election 
(yes = 
transparent)
Whether the 
economic 
assumptions 
used in the 
budget are 
subject to 
independent 
review (yes = 
transparent)
(8) (9) (10) (11)(4) (5) (6) (7)(1) (2) (3)
  
 
Table 3: Interacting the output gap with transparency, OECD countries 1989-2003 
 
Notes:   
(1) See notes (1) to (5) in Table 2.  
(2) transp11 is the aggregation of the dummies in Table 2 (except for question 6). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
                                                                         
Dependent Variable:
Cyc Adj 
Cur Disb / 
pot. GDP 
Cur Disb / 
pot. GDP
Cons / pot. 
GDP
Wage cons 
/ pot. GDP
Soc Sec / 
pot. GDP
Estimation method: GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS
0.322*** 0.373*** 0.248*** 0.196*** 0.157*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08)
-0.289*** -0.325*** -0.163*** -0.079*** -0.114*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06)
-0.029* -0.055*** -0.030*** -0.021*** -0.019
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
0.066*** 0.065*** 0.050*** 0.031*** 0.006
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.219 -0.081 -0.172 -0.158*** -0.197**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.05) (0.04)
Time dummies:   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
Control variables included   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
No of observations   257   257   257   257   257
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Table 4: Central government expenditure and the output gap, Persson and Tabellini country sample, 1980-98 
 
Notes:   
(1) *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
(2) The following control variables are included in all columns: lagged dependent variable, inflation rate, election year dummy, log of trend 
income, sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP and demographic dependency ratio. The OLS estimations include time invariant 
dummy variables for the electoral system and democracy which limits the sample size. 
(3) For OLS and Within estimations all output gap variables are instrumented with their one time lagged level value. 
(4) GMMSYS uses level lags from 2 to 12 of the lagged dependent variable in its differenced equation. In this equation the output gap 
variables are instrumented using their own two times lagged level values. For the level equation of GMMSYS the lagged dependent 
variable as well as the output gap variables are instrumented by their own one time lagged differenced values. 
(5) The m2 test was performed in each of the GMM estimations and in no case was the validity of the instruments rejected. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variab le
Estimation method OLS-IV Within-IV GMMSYS OLS-IV OLS-IV Within-IV GMMSYS
0.275 0.284* 0.050
(0.170)  (0.156) (0.057)   
0.574 0.558* 0.902 0.013
(0.455)  (0.292) (0.673)  (0.113)
0.318 0.064 0.164 0.135
(0.382)  (0.190)  (0.629)  (0.141)
-1.377 -2.103 -0.156
(2.188)  (3.225)  (0.374)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control variab les included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 934 939 939 934 934 939 939
- - -
     ------------------------  Central government expenditure in percent of GDP  ----------------------------
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Table 5:  Expenditure reactions in OECD versus non-OECD countries and effect of voter information, Persson and Tabellini country sample 1980-98 
 
Notes:   
(1) See Table 4.  
(2) Test for nonOECD vs. OECD  and gap·d pos vs. gap·(1-d pos)  are all one-sided t-tests. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variab le
Estimation method OLS-IV Within-IV GMMSYS OLS-IV Within-IV Within-IV GMMSYS GMMSYS OLS-IV GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS
0.689*** 0.429** 0.009 - - - - - - - - -
(0.194) (0.219) (0.118)
0.139 0.235 0.028 - - - - - - - - -
(0.192)  (0.185) (0.059)
- - - 2.724*** 5.582 1.797*** 0.231 0.337** 2.835*** 0.685* 0.507*** 0.718*
(0.93) (5.11) (0.65) (0.18)  (0.17) (1.06) (0.37) (0.16) (0.38)
- - - 1.005 4.206 -1.424 -0.03 -0.359 0.965 -0.376 -0.185 -0.413
(0.76) (6.82) (0.91) (0.20)  (0.23) (1.28) (0.31) (0.20) (0.28)
- - - -5.571* -18.98 - -0.547 -0.407 -4.038 -0.066 -0.291 0.3963
(2.98) (22.66) (0.61)  (0.54) (3.65) (0.55) (0.48) (0.51)
- - - 0.252 0.639 0.514 -0.014 0.030 0.504 0.251* -0.018 0.150
(0.44) (0.75) (0.54) (0.17)  (0.15) (0.50) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
- - - 0.402 -0.416 -0.111 -0.014 0.032 0.266 0.099 0.075 0.083
(0.39) (0.96) (0.51) (0.15)  (0.16) (0.49) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
- - - -1.427 0.562 - 0.392 -0.142 -1.180 -0.028 0.022 0.268
(2.56) (4.89) (0.80)  (0.78) (3.23) (0.71) (0.62) (0.62)
- - - - - - - - -0.937** -0.597** - -0.558**
(0.48) (0.25) (0.26)
- - - - - - - - -0.197 -0.170 - -0.077
(0.65) (0.24) (0.23)
- - - - - - - - - - -0.141** -0.094
(0.07) (0.07)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Control variab les included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 934 939 939 934 939 939 939 939 768 768 891 743
OECD i  = nonOECD i 2.052 0.693 -0.148 - - - - - - - - -
[0.020]** [0.244] [0.559]
- - - 2.605 0.486 2.175 1.152 2.637 - - - -
[0.00]*** [0.31] [0.01]** [0.12] [0.00]***
- - - -0.354 1.004 0.631 -0.003 0.009 - - - -
[0.64] [0.16] [0.26] [0.50] [0.50]
gap i,t  OECD i
gap i,t  nonOECD i
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Central gov. expenditure in % of GDP  ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The budget forms the legal basis of government spending. If a budget is not in place at
the beginning of the scal year, planning as well as current spending are jeopardized and
government shutdown may result. This paper develops a continuous-time war-of-attrition
model of budgeting in a presidential style-democracy to explain the duration of budget
negotiations. We build our model around budget baselines as reference points for loss
averse negotiators. We derive three testable hypotheses: there are more late budgets, and
they are more late, when scal circumstances change; when such changes are negative rather
than positive; and when there is divided government. We test the hypotheses of the model
using a unique data set of late budgets for US state governments, based on dates of budget
approval collected from news reports and a survey of state budget o¢ cers for the period
1988-2007. For this period, we nd 23 % of budgets to be late. The results provide strong
support for the hypotheses of the model.
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1 Introduction
In the Summer of 2009, the state of California captured national headlines by failing to enact a
budget before the beginning of the scal year. In fact, the situation in California was so severe
that the state could not meet its obligations and began issuing IOUs to cover payments to local
governments, private contractors, and taxpayers. After 24 days of negotiations beyond the
scal year deadline between Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the Democratic-
controlled state legislature, a budget was approved. California is not alone in nishing its
budget late: in 2009, eleven states failed to approve a budget before the beginning of the scal
year,1 and in our entire sample, which covers the 48 continental states in the years 1988-2007,
23% of all budgets were approved after the scal year deadline. Delayed appropriations are
even more common at the federal level: Meyers (1997) reports that in the period 1977-97, 68
percent of all federal appropriation bills were enacted after the beginning of the scal year.
In state governments in the United States, as across all political arenas and at all levels
of government, the government budget provides the legal foundation for government spending.
If a budget is not approved and enacted by the beginning of the scal year, the legal basis
for government spending is jeopardized, and the consequences can range from a continuation
of operations based on last years budget to partial government shutdown, depending on both
specic constitutional provisions and the overall institutional framework.
Late budgets are an important object of study for three reasons: Economic costs, as a
measure of legislative productivity, and as a measure of good governance. We address each in
turn. First, when state governments are unable to enact a full budget before the beginning of
a new scal year, they often resort to passing temporary budget bills that allow appropriations
for state government operations for a limited time only.2 Passing a temporary budget bill is not
always possible, however, in some cases because of state laws,3 and in other cases because of
political conict among state lawmakers. In the absence of a budget, many state governments
nd themselves in unknown legal territory. As a result, the consequences of budget delays
vary considerably across states, and sometimes even from year to year within the same state.
Some state governments stop paying their employees or withhold payments to state vendors
and contractors, providers of Medicaid, school districts and local governments. In the most
extreme cases, the state government shuts down all so-called "non-essential" services until a
new budget is in place. In addition, the mere threat of a late budget means that state agencies,
1These are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware (by one day), Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
2At the level of the federal government in the US, such bills are very common and known as "continuing
resolutions." When such resolutions fail, the result may be government shutdown, witnessed most recently for
the case of the US federal government in 1996; see Meyers (1997) for an account.
3For an overview of procedures when the state budget is not passed by the beginning of the scal year, see
the National Conference of State Legislatures: http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=12616
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school boards and local government must spend time developing plans for what to do if a
stalemate extends beyond the end of the scal year, whcih complicates planning and may lead
to distorted decisions, such as hiring stops and hoarding of funds.4
Finally, state government creditworthiness may su¤er.5 In on-going, companion work (An-
dersen, Lassen and Nielsen, 2010), we investigate the consequences of late budgets for, among
other things, state borrowing costs. We nd that late budgets are associated with higher state
bond yields, as measured by the Chubb Relative Value Survey.6 Combining these estimates
with state debt stocks, we nd late budgets to be associated with substantial per capita interest
rate premiums. In short, late state budgets have signicant economic consequences within as
well as beyond state governments.
Second, our measure of budget negotiation duration provides a replicable, and easily ex-
tendable, measure of legislative gridlock, dened as the inability of the legislative and executive
branches to pass major legislation, at the state level. While a major part of the literature on
legislative gridlock has focsued on the US federal government (e.g. Mayhew, 1991; Binder,
1999), the logic behind the models and arguments applies to veto player democracies every-
where (Tsebelis, 2002). There is no generally agreed-upon measure of legislative gridlock (see,
e.g., Chiou and Rothenberg, 2008), but the budget arguably is the most important piece of
legislation for any executive and legislature. As recognized by Mayhew (1991), and emphasized
by Fiorina (1996) and Binder (1999), a true measure of gridlock should take into consideration
both the supply and demand for legislation; while low legislative output could reect high levels
of gridlock, it could equally well reect both a lack of demand for such output and a lack of
supply due to less frequent introduction of bills in periods where chances of passage are lower.
Our measure corrects for endogeneity both on the supply and the demand side, as the budgets
(re-)appearance on the legislative agenda is exogenously given.7
Third, timely budgets can, more generally, be viewed as a measure of good governance. In
his analysis of the e¤ects of social capital and the civic community on governance outcomes,
Putnam (1993) includes as one of his twelve indicators of institutional performance budget
4 In Maine in 1991, 10,000 state government workers were sent home without pay and all non-essential services
were closed. The budget was 18 days late. In Illinois, delays in payments from the state government creates
problems of liquidity for counties (County copes with cash ow", Lincoln Courier, April 8, 2010). In Michigan,
late state budgets a¤ect sta¢ ng and tuition decisions at schools and universities (Citizens Research Council of
Michigan: Late Budgets in Michigan, August 2009).
5On July 6, 2009, a few days after the beginning of the scal year, Fitch Ratings dropped Californias bond
rating to BBB, down from A minus (Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2009: Big Banks dont want Californias IOUs).
6The measure is based on a survey, carried out by the Chubb Corporation, of sell-side bond traders who
are asked to rate the relative yield on a 20 year general obligation bond for a state i compared with a similar
bond issued by New Jersey. See Lowry and Alt (2001) and Poterba and Rueben (2001) for more on the Chubb
Relative Survey and Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen (2010) for the analysis.
7Obviously, by restricting ourselves to studying budgets as a venue for gridlock, we leave out many important
policy areas; however, little agreement exists in the literature (Chiou and Rothenberg, 2008) on how to measure
major bills.
43
promptness, dened as the (lack of) delay relative to the beginning of the scal year of the
approval of the budget by the regional councils. Putnam (1993, p. 65-67) argues that budget
promptness is a measure of a governments essential internal a¤airswhich, in turn, is one
component of an evaluation of good government.8 Our rich panel data set allows us to include
measures of social capital alongside economic and political explanatory variables to assess their
relative importance in explaining late budgets.
A nal reason for studying late budgets is methodological in nature: Empirical analyses
of budget outcomes and scal stabilizations are almost always based on models of political
bargaining, often involving a number of veto players, but the analyses are rarely based on data
on the actual bargaining process. As such, studies based on real-world data linking institutions
to outcomes by way of bargaining are essentially estimating reduced form-relationships by
stipulating an unobserved bargaining process, weakening the link between the proposed theory
and the empirical results. In contrast, our approach makes the bargaining process the center
of the analysis with the aim of evaluating directly the hypoteses about the bargaining solution
derived from the theoretical model.
We model the political bargaining proces as a war of attrition in the spirit of Alesina and
Drazen (1991), but we focus on the time to reach an agreement on the annual budget rather
than the delay in implementing crises-induced reforms. In our model, the two bargaining
parties su¤er costs from not being able to reach a deal. These costs may be political of nature,
because the public dislikes budget delays, or they may be personal, since legislators must spend
time and e¤ort to keep battling over the budget. When a party nds that it can no longer bear
the costs of continued bargaining, it concedes, and the opposing party is free to implement
its preferred policy. We derive the unique symmetric equilibrium of the bargaining game and
show that it implies a number of testable hypotheses. The three main predictions are: One,
changes in scal circumstances, regardless of direction, increase the expected duration of budget
stalemates; Two, the expected duration is higher in scal downturns than in upswings of similar
magnitudes; And three, divided government increases the expected duration.
Our modeling approach is based on the key assumption that bargaining over a government
budget is carried out with reference to a budget baseline. Budget baselines generally fall in
two categories: (1) nominal spending the previous year; or (2) current serviceswhich is the
provision of services nanced by the previous years spending. In US state governments, which
form the focus of our empirical analysis, Crain and Crain (1998) report that in the 1990s
34 states used last years spending level as baseline while the remaining 16 used a current
services baseline. While the determination of baselines themselves is also subject to political
8This sentiment is echoed among policy makers; for example, Scott Pattison, the current executive director
of the National Association of State Budget O¢ cers, notes that "a well-managed state would never, ever"
have a late budget (quoted from "Mischief After Midnight", governing.com, June 2009. Available online at
http://www.governing.com/article/mischief-after-midnight).
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manoeuvring and debate, a baseline remains, given the baseline regime, a common reference
point against which all changes being bargained over are compared; as noted by Schick (2007, p.
67) in the context of the US federal government budget, [o]nce a baseline has been constructed,
any variance from it due to legislation is measured as a policy change.
We combine the notion of a formalized reference point in the form of a budget baseline with
the behavioural assumption that budget negotiators have political preferences and that they
are loss averse over changes from the baseline, making the preferences a variant of Tversky and
Kahneman (1991). It is well documented that public responses to negative economic informa-
tion is greater than responses to positive information (Soroka, 2006), that negative attitudes
towards candidates have a greater impact on voting behavior than do positive attitudes (Ker-
nell, 1977), and that negative economic trends penalize incumbents while they reap few benets
from positive trends (Bloom and Price, 1975; Nannestad and Paldam, 1997). These observa-
tions are in accord with the di¤erential valuation of negative and positive political outcomes
reported in Quattrone and Tversky (1988), suggesting that voters exhibit loss aversion over
goods, services and transfers obtained from the public sector. We do not model the relation-
ship between voters and politicians; instead, we directly assume politicians to be loss averse,
which can either simply reect loss averse voters or reect the fact that politicians themselves
are subject to the same processes of preference formation as are voters. Loss aversion implies
a status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), or - in our model - more precisely, a
bias towards the baseline budget. This means that the opposing parties in our model nd it
relatively easy to agree on keeping the budget unchanged in years when scal conditions are
stable. When exposed to large changes in scal circumstances, however, their innate di¤erences
in policy preferences make the parties disagree over how to adapt to such changes, and long
stalemates become more likely. Because of loss aversion, this is more pronounced when scal
conditions change for the worse than when they improve.
We apply the model to data on US state government budget processes. Using state and
local newspaper sources as well as responses to a survey of state budget o¢ ces administered
for this purpose, we collect data on dates of nal budget enactment and compare these to the
beginning of the state governmentsscal years. Carrying out this comparison for all states
for every year since 1988 yields a replicable measure of budget lateness (as well as legislative
gridlock and governance).9
We nd that adverse changes in economic conditions, measured by the increase in unem-
ployment, substantially increases the duration of the budget negotiations: a one percentage
point increase in unemployment rate relative to the previous year increases the expected du-
9The Government Performnace Project at Pew Center of the States provides overall assessments of government
performance to produce an index of same. This index was employed by Knack (2002) in his cross-state analysis of
the e¤ects of social capital on governance. Budget timelinessis one of many factors included in this assessment,
but it is not reported separately nor is it based on hard data.
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ration of the budget negotiations by about a week in our preferred specication. Similarly,
divided government substantially increases both the risk of experiencing a late budget and
its duration, the latter by about two weeks. On the other hand, budget negotiations are, on
average, between one and two weeks shorter in election years.
The paper is structured as follows: The next subsection presents related literature, section
2 presents our theoretical model, and section 3 describes the collection and construction of
data. Section 4 describes the empirical specication and section 5 reports results. We provide
a discussion and some concluding remarks in the nal section.
1.1 Related literature
Our study of late budgets relates to a number of di¤erent literatures, in addition to the leg-
islative gridlock and good governance literature already mentioned. First, it is related to the
political reform literature, in particular the literature on scal adjustments in the face of large,
external shocks. This is evident not only from the descendancy of the model from the Alesina-
Drazen framework, but also from the fact that budget lateness, as will become evident from
the empirical analysis, is crucially related to an adverse economic environment and specic
political factors. However, the theoretical and empirical literatures on scal adjustments are
not concerned with annual budgets per se, but with scal imbalances over the medium- and
long-term, and have as a key parameter the economic costs of continuing conict.10 In contrast,
we set up a framework to cover all budgets, in normal times and economic crises alike, based
on political costs of bargaining rather than economic costs, and provide empirical evidence to
match the theory closely.
Second, our study is a part of the large literature on the e¤ects of political, economic
and institutional determinants of government budget outcomes. In this literature, government
budget outcomes, i.e. realized revenue and spending patterns, are related to partisan di¤erences
(Alt and Lowry, 2000), budget institutions (Poterba, 1994; Alt and Lowry, 1994; Poterba and
von Hagen, 1999) and political institutions (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2007). While most
theoretical work in this literature explicitly recognizes the bargaining nature of government
budgeting and policy determination, direct empirical tests based on quantitative data of the
theoretical claims regarding the bargaining process are, to our knowledge, non-existent.
Third, our paper is related to the concept of incrementalism as well as to the general public
administration literature on budgeting. Incrementalism in budgeting is traditionally associ-
ated with Wildavskys (1964) observations that government budgets are not re-calculated from
scratch every year but that they are rather, due to information processing costs, based, by-
and-large, on the previous years budget. Our approach, based on budget baselines as points
10 In a recent contribution to this literature, Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi (2006) provide an investigation of
the determinants of scal balance stabilizations across countries.
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of departure for budget negotiations, is not derived from incrementalism; if anything, as noted
by Schick (1980, p. 217), the adoption of the current services baseline institutionalized incre-
mentalism.11 The role of the status quo and agenda control in models of policy determination
was rst recognized by Romer and Rosenthal (1978).
Fourth, the paper is closely related to a small literature studying bargaining in positive
analyses of political and policy processes. Bargaining models are frequently employed in the
positive political economy literature, but, as noted above, most empirical studies go on to
evaluate economic and political outcomes directly, rather than studying the bargaining process
by which exogenous circumstances are translated into outcomes. Analyses linking formal bar-
gaining models to data on the bargaining process are rare outside of laboratory experiments,
but notable exceptions exist: Merlo (1997) and Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2005) exam-
ine government formation in Italy and parliamentary democracies, respectively, based on the
stochastic bargaining model proposed by Merlo and Wilson (1995). The duration of the gov-
ernment formation phase can be interpreted as a measure of the intensity of the conict, as
can the duration of the budget negotiation phase.
2 A Stylized Model of Budget Delays
We consider a government with two players, A and B, who must agree to pass a budget. The
players could be thought of as the executive vs. the legislature, or as majority leaders from
di¤erent chambers within the legislature. Each player has veto power, so that no one player
can pass a budget without the consent of the other player.
The government faces a given amount of revenue, y, which can be spent on two di¤erent
types of publicly provided goods, g1 and g2. There is a balanced budget constraint in place,
so any budget plan must satisfy g1 + g2 = y. All variables are measured in units per capita.
The players derive utility from both types of spending, but they disagree on the preferred
composition of total spending. An alternative interpretation is that g1 and g2 are public- and
private consumption, respectively, and that y is the tax base, assumed for simplicity to be equal
to income per capita. The tax rate is then equal to g1=y. In this interpretation, the conict
between the two players is over the size of the budget, rather than the composititon. Which of
these two alternative interpretations is the appropriate one depends on the relevant context in
which we wish to apply the models predictions. However, for consistency, we stick to the rst
interpretation in the following exposition.
The political game resembles the set-up in Alesina and Drazen (1991): The two players
engage in a war of attrition, during which the budget adoption is delayed. Delaying agreement
11The debate over incrementalism and alternative public administration models of budgeting cannot be done
justice here. For a critique of incrementalism, and an alternative budgetary theory, see Meyers (1996).
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is costly to both players. First, budget delays imply a political cost to those responsible, since
voters disapprove. And second, there is a personal cost of delay to the players involved, since
they must spend time and resources on negotiating, lobbying and servicing the press as long
as the adoption phase continues.
There may also be actual budgetary costs associated with delays. As explained above,
government agencies must spend time and e¤ort to deal with the delayed appropriations and
the possibility of shutdown of services, and this may divert resources away from provision of
public goods and services. This would suggest a negative relationship between the duration of
the delay and y in our model. However, to keep things simple we focus on the rst two types
of costs of delay and let y be constant over time.
The war of attrition ends when one of the players "concedes". We model our political conict
as a "winner-takes-all" game: once a player has conceded, the other player is free to choose
whatever composition of spending he prefers. Thus, as in Alesina and Drazens model, players
can only "win" or "lose". Endogenously determined compromises reached during negotiations
are ruled out, which is of course a major simplication.12
The players have reference-dependent preferences, so that budget outcomes (g1; g2) are
evaluated relative to a budget baseline, (gb1; g
b
2). To be specic, we assume that their preferences
over government spending can be represented by the utility functions
uA(g1; g2jgb1; gb2) =   v(g1   gb1) + v(g2   gb2) (1)
uB(g1; g2jgb1; gb2) = v(g1   gb1) +   v(g2   gb2)
where
v(x) =

x if x  0
x if x < 0
and  >  > 1
The parameter  captures that each player prefers spending on one type of good over the
other, other things equal, but they disagree on which of the two goods is preferable. With
 > 1, player A has a preference for spending on good 1, while player B prefers spending on
good 2. The players evaluate budget outcomes in terms of deviations from the baseline, using
the value function v(). The value function is everywhere increasing and has a kink at zero, as
suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1991).13 This implies that the players are loss-averse:
They dislike negative deviations from the baseline more than they like equal-sized positive
deviations.
12Hsieh (2000) provides an extension of a simplied Alesina-Drazen framework where the payo¤ distribution
at stabilization is determined endogenously in a formal bargaining process.
13Tversky and Kahneman also argued that in order to explain observed attitudes towards risk, the value
function must be concave in the positive domain and convex in the negative domain. This feature of the value
function is known as diminishing sensitivity. Since we are not explicitly interested in explaining attitudes towards
risk, we abstract from this feature and settle for the simpler, linear version adopted here.
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To see what our specication of preferences implies for budget outcomes, dene yb  gb1+gb2.
We label this the baseline revenue level. When y > yb the players face an opportunity to raise
spending on both types of goods over the baseline levels. Since  > 1, player A gets higher
marginal utility from raising g1 than from raising g2 whenever g2  gb2. Hence, player A would
never raise spending on good 2 above the baseline level. On the other hand, the assumption
 >  implies that player A does not wish to drive g2 below its baseline level. Player A thus
prefers the bundle (gb1+ y  yb; gb2) to all other feasible combinations of g1 and g2 when y > yb.
Correspondingly, the marginal benet to player A from raising g1 at the expense of g2 is positive
when g1 < gb1 and g2 < g
b
2, but negative when g1  gb1 and g2 < gb2. If given the opportunity,
player A will therefore choose the bundle (gb1; g
b
2   yb + y) when y < yb. Of course, player Bs
preferences imply the same choices, only with the goods reversed.
In words, whenever the players are given an opportunity to raise overall spending, they
will prefer to increase spending on their preferred good only, while leaving spending on the
other good unchanged. And whenever faced with a need to cut overall spending, the players
will prefer to keep spending on their preferred good unchanged, letting spending on the least
preferred good carry the entire burden of adjustment.
The assumption  >  is crucial for these results. Without this assumption, both players
would always prefer to spend the entire revenue on their own preferred good, irrespective of
the sign of y   yb. The interpretation is that the players are so averse to losses that they are
willing to sacrice increases in spending on their most preferred good in order to avoid even the
smallest cuts in spending on their least preferred good. Of course, this is an extreme prediction.
However, we believe that it does capture an important feature of scal policy: Spending cuts
carry a greater weight in the minds of citizens, in the public debate, and therefore also in the
minds of policymakers, than spending increases. Fiscal policymakers are therefore inclined to
avoid spending cuts, even at substantial opportunity costs.
The costs from a stalemate over the budget are individual-specic and linearly increasing in
the time until a concession occurs. Time is continuous and we normalize the start of the budget
adoption phase to t = 0. If a concession occurs at time t = T , the players incur disutility
Di = iT ; i = A;B (2)
The parameter i captures how costly delays are to player i. We assume that A and B
are independent and drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on an interval (; ]. As in
Alesina and Drazen (1991), we assume that i is private information to player i. The other
player does not observe the realized value of i but knows the distribution from which it is
drawn.
Total utility is given by the utility from the budget outcome minus the disutility from a
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delayed agreement. If player i ultimately wins the war of attrition at time t = T , his total
utility may then be written as
UWi (T ) = u
W  Di(T ) =

(y   yb)  iT if y  yb
 (yb   y)  iT if y < yb (3)
while the total utility of losing at time T is
ULi (T ) = u
L  Di(T ) =

(y   yb)  iT if y  yb
 (yb   y)  iT if y < yb (4)
The gain from winning is then straightforwardly computed as
UWi (T )  ULi (T ) = uW   uL =

(   1)(y   yb) if y  yb
(   1)(yb   y) if y < yb (5)
Note that the gain from winning is always positive, equal for both players and independent
of the time of concession. It is increasing in
y   yb, the absolute value of the deviation of
total revenue from its baseline. Note further that for a given value of
y   yb, the gain from
winning is higher if y < yb than if y  yb: because of loss aversion, the stakes are higher when
revenue drops below the baseline level than when it is above it.
Each player must now choose an optimal concession time Ti. This is the date on which
player i concedes and allows his opponent to choose her preferred spending plan, conditional
on the opponent not having conceded already. We assume that players choose Ti so as to
maximize their expected total utility. Expected utility depends on the utilities that the player
gets from winning and losing, respectively, as well as the probability of winning. Player i
wins whenever his chosen concession time exceeds that of his opponent. Let H(t) denote the
cumulative distribution function of the opponents optimal concession date, with associated
density function h(t).14 H(t) is of course endogenous, but it is exogenous as seen from the
point view of player i, since player i can in no way inuence his opponents choice of concession
time. Integrating over the opponents concession time, we can then express the expected utility
14As emphasized below, we concentrate on equilibria where each players concession time is a di¤erentiable
function of his type. This implies that H(t) is di¤erentiable, and that the density function h(t) does in fact
exist.
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of player i as a function of Ti as
EUi(Ti) =
TiZ
0
UWi (t)h(t)dt+
1Z
Ti
ULi (Ti)h(t)dt (6)
=
TiZ
0
UWi (t)h(t)dt+ (1 H(Ti))ULi (Ti)
If a positive, nite optimal concession time exists, it must then satisfy the rst-order con-
dition
dEUi(Ti)
dTi
=

UWi (Ti)  ULi (Ti)

h(Ti)  (1 H(Ti))i = 0 (7)
where we have used that @ULi (Ti)=@Ti =  i . Recall that the term in brackets is the gain from
winning, which does not depend on Ti. We may therefore write this term as uW   uL. We can
then rewrite the rst-order condition as
[uW   uL] h(Ti)
1 H(Ti) = i (8)
This representation of the rst-order condition has an intuitive interpretation: The left-hand
side is equal to the expected marginal benet of waiting one more instant to concede. This is
equal to the probability that the opponent will concede "within the next instant", conditional
on the fact that he has not already conceded, times the gain that follows if the opponent does
actually concede. The left hand side is equal to the marginal cost of postponing concession.
At the optimal concession time, the marginal benet and the marginal cost exactly balance.
We now look for a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each players optimal
concession time Ti is a di¤erentiable function of his type, Ti = T (i). In the appendix we
show that there exists a unique such equilibrium. The equilibrium function T (i) satises the
di¤erential equation
T 0(i) =  [uW   uL](i(i   )) 1 (9)
and the boundary condition
T () = 0 (10)
Combining equations (9) and (10) then gives the following explicit solution for T (i):
T (i) =

uW   uL 1

ln

i(   )
(i   )

(11)
The equilibrium distribution of concession times, H, is of course related to this solu-
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tion. More precisely, we may back out the equilibrium distribution by noting that H(t) =
Prob [T (j) < t] = Prob

j > T
 1(t)

, where T 1 is the inverse function to T .15
To understand the mechanisms of the game in the symmetric equilibrium, recall that when
deciding whether to concede or keep ghting, the players weigh the expected marginal benets
of a further delay against the marginal costs, i. The marginal benet consists of the conditional
probability that the opponent will concede "within the next instant", times the gain from
winning that follows if he actually does so. In the beginning of the conict, this marginal benet
can be shown to be exactly , implying that no player with i <  will concede immediately.
However, since opponents with high costs from delays will concede faster, the passage of time
without a concession makes players adjust their beliefs about their opponents costs downwards.
With the specic distributional assumption we have made about costs, it also implies that the
conditional probability that the opponent will concede within the next instant falls.16 Thus,
the marginal expected benet of postponing concession decreases over time, and after a certain
time it becomes so low that equation (9) exactly holds. This is the optimal time for player i
to capitulate and accept defeat.
A budget agreement is reached as soon as one of the players concedes. The date when this
happens is given by
T agree = min fT (A);T (B)g
Of course, T agree is a random variable. Using equations (11) and (5), and the fact that A and
B are independent and both uniformly distributed on (; ], we show in the appendix that the
expected date of agreement is
ET agree =

(   1)(y   yb)
 if y  yb
(   1)(yb   y)
 if y < yb (12)
where 
        (ln()  ln()) (   ) 2.
2.1 Predictions from the model
A number of predictions are immediately apparent from equation (12). First, large deviations
in revenue from the baseline level increase the expected time until concession. Since baseline
budgets are strongly linked to the previous budget, it follows that we should expect changes in
scal circumstances relative to the previous year, whether to the better or worse, to increase
the expected duration of budget stalemates. The intuition is that in years when revenue is
15The appendix also proves that the function T is strictly decreasing, so that the inverse function does exists.
16This conditional probability is equal to the hazard rate, h(T )=(1 H(T )). The assumption that the is are
uniformly distributed ensures that this rate is decreasing in T .
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stable, reference dependence and loss aversion imply that both players prefer to keep spending
levels unchanged. This consensus between players, which arises despite their innate di¤erences
in preferences, means that there is little at stake in the conict over the budget, and both
players will therefore prefer to concede quickly, rather than dragging the stalemate to a length
and incur the political costs associated with the delay. In contrast, in the face of large changes
in scal conditions, the players disagree on how to adapt to those changes. This increases
the stakes in the budget conict, and the opposing parties will be more willing to prolong the
stalemate in the hope of getting their preferred outcome.
Second, negative deviations from the baseline have a stronger impact on the expected
time of concession than positive deviations of the same size. Hence, the model suggests that
we should observe longer budget delays during scal downturns than during upswings. This
prediction follows directly from the assumption of loss aversion: since players dislike spending
cuts more than they like spending increases, it becomes extra important for them to control
the budget in years where revenue has dropped. Loosely formulated, "avoiding to lose" is a
stronger motivation to keep ghting than "hoping to win".
Based on the rst two predictions, we should expect to see longer and more frequent budget
delays in states where revenue is highly volatile. On the other hand, it is the need for spending
to adapt to changes in revenue, not the change in revenue in itself, which leads to delays in
our model. Going slightly outside the model, we would therefore expect scal institutions that
facilitate smoothing of uctuations over time to dampen the impact of revenue volatility.
A third prediction relates to the parameter . The larger  is, the stronger are the players
relative preferences for their favored types of spending, and the deeper is their disagreement
over how to react to a change in revenue from the reference level.  = 1 corresponds to a com-
plete consensus on the budget, in which case the model predicts immediate agreement always.
Naturally, signicant discrepancies between the policy preferences of the players involved in the
budget process are much more likely when there is divided partisan control of the government
than when all players belong to the same party. Thus, we expect budget stalemates to be
longer and more frequent when the two chambers in the legislature are controlled by di¤erent
parties, or when the legislature is controlled by the opposite party of the executive.
Finally, the expected date of concession is inversely proportional to the scale of the interval
(; ]. That is, multiplying  and  with a positive constant k implies that ET agree is multiplied
with k 1. Similarly, adding a positive constant to both  and  lowers ET agree.17 Hence, a
shift to the right in the distribution of the marginal costs of delay leads to shorter expected
stalemates. We therefore expect to see shorter delays when the political and personal costs to
17To see this, totally di¤erentiate equation (12) with respect to  and  and set d = d. This gives
dET agree=d =  [UW   UL](   ) 2( 

  ln( 

)   1) < 0. The term in the parentheses is positive since
ln(x) < x  1 for all x 6= 1.
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politicians of late budgets are high. This may for example be the case in election years: First,
electoral success is likely to depend on recent performance, so the political costs of delays are
extra high in such years. And second, legislators face an extra personal opportunity cost of
spending time on battling over the budget in election years, since they cannot devote their time
to campaigning for re-election until the budget is done. Institutional arrangements may also
inuence the political and personal costs of budget delays, an issue that we address further in
the empirical analyses below.
3 Dening and measuring late budgets
Budget processes vary considerably across US states. This complicates cross-state comparisons
of budget timeliness somewhat, since there is no obvious, universal denition of when, and by
how much, a budget is late. For any meaningful measure of budget lateness, one must identify
two points in time, namely 1) the date by which the budget is supposed to be enacted; and
2) the date on which it is actually enacted. To begin with the former, many state legislatures
face a deadline to pass the budget that is prior to the end of the scal year. For example,
the California state constitution requires that the legislature pass the budget bill before June
15, whereas the scal year starts on July 1st. Other state legislatures face constitutional or
statutory deadlines for ending their regular sessions. Whether such deadlines also constitute an
e¤ective deadline for passing the state budget varies from state to state, however, and is often
a question of interpretation. Moreover, while violations of pre-scal year deadlines are often
met with harsh criticism in news media, most of the political and economic costs of a budget
stalemate that we discussed in the introduction do not become relevant until the stalemate
approaches the end of the scal year. Most notably, government shutdowns can only happen if
the impasse extends into the new scal year. In our view, therefore, the ultimate deadline for
enacting a state budget will always be the end of the scal year.
Turning to the date of actual budget enactment, two natural candidates come to mind: the
date of nal legislative approval and the date of nal enactment. Final legislative approval is
achieved when the new budget has been passed in both chambers of the legislature in its nal
form. Final enactment is the event that formally makes the new budget become law. In most
cases, this happens when the governor signs the budget, but important exceptions exist: For
example, if the governor vetoes the entire budget, the legislature can in most states override
the veto by some super majority vote in both chambers, and the budget then becomes law
without the governors signature. In such cases we interpret the date of the legislative override
as the date of nal enactment. Furthermore, some states have a deadline for gubernatorial
action, and the governor may sometimes let the budget become law without actively signing it
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by letting this deadline expire. In these cases we use the date on which the deadline expired.18
For convenience, however, we shall henceforth simply refer to the date of nal enactment as
the date the budget was signed into law.
It is not obvious which of the two events most accurately captures the end of budget
negotiations. Sometimes, all conict is e¤ectively resolved when the budget has been passed by
both legislative chambers, and the governors signature appears to be a mere formality. This
speaks for using the date of legislative passage as the indicator of actual budget enactment.
In other cases, however, the conict over the budget is far from resolved with the legislative
passage. Many governors actively use their power to veto the budget - or the threat to do so
- to inuence the nal budget outcome. In such cases, the nal budget enactment, i.e. the
signing into law, is the appropriate indicator for the end of budget negotiations. Since this is
also what formally marks the end of the budget adoption process, we prefer the date when the
budget is signed into law as our indicator of budget enactment.19
Thus, our preferred measure denes a late budget as a budget that has been signed into
law after the end of the scal year, and we measure the length of the delay as the number
of days from the end of the old scal year to the date of nal enactment. We have also
experimented with two other measures, however, namely 1) the number of days from the state-
specic deadline for legislative passage of the budget to the date of actual legislative passage,
and 2) the number of days from the end of the old scal year to the date of legislative passage.
3.1 Budget enactment data
The data for the budget enactment dates were collected from three sources: (i) State leg-
islatureswebsites; (ii) Archived newspaper articles; and (iii) a survey sent to state budget
o¢ cers. Some state legislatureswebsites have detailed information on the status and histories
of all bills enacted in previous legislative sessions, including the budget bill(s). However, most
state legislaturesbill tracking tools only cover the most recent legislative sessions, if any. We
therefore supplemented with information from archived newspaper articles accessed via Newsli-
brary.com.20 Finally, we also sent a survey to state budget o¢ cers asking them to conrm the
18Another exception is Maryland, where the governor cannot veto the budget, which means that the budget
becomes law once it has been passed by both chambers in the legislature. Consequently, nal legislative passage
and nal budget enactment coincide in Maryland.
19Our measurement is further complicated by the fact that some states do not pass a single, all-encompassing
budget bill. Instead, their budgets consist of several individual appropriation bills. In such cases we do not
consider the budget fully enacted until the last appropriation bill for state operations has been enacted. Also,
state governments sometimes react to unexpected developments in state government nances by passing within-
scal year supplementary appropriation bills. We do not view such supplementary budget bills as part of the
budget adoption process that we are interested in, however, and we therefore restrict our attention to the budgets
as originally enacted.
20Newslibrary.com is an online newspaper archive that covers more than 2,500 news sources across the United
States. We also used The New York Times online archive on several occasions to access relevant news articles.
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data we had collected ourselves as well as provide us with the information that we had not been
able to nd via any of the other sources. Out of 48 states (we exclude Alaska and Hawaii), 19
responded to our survey. When overlapping, the data they reported were virtually identical to
the data we collected ourselves.21
In the survey, as well as in our own information search, we asked the following questions
for each legislative session in which a budget was adopted:
1. When did the regular session of the legislature start?
2. When was the executive budget proposal submitted to the legislature?
3. When was the deadline for the legislature to pass the budget?
4. When did the legislature pass the budget?
5. When was the budget signed into law?
Our main dependent variable, days_late, is constructed as the di¤erence between the answer
to question 5 and the last day of the old scal year. Note that this variable is uncensored,
so that both positive and negative values occur. For example, a value of days_late equal to
-5 means that the budget was signed into law ve days before the end of the scal year. We
also construct a binary variable, late_budget; that takes the value one if days_late is strictly
positive, and zero otherwise. In addition, we construct a censored variable, days_late_cens,
that sets all negative values equal to zero. Our two alternative measures, days_delayed; and,
days_delayed_FY , are constructed as the di¤erence between the answer to question 4 and i)
the answer to question 3, and ii) the last day of the old scal year, respectively. Binary and
censored versions of these variables are constructed in a similar way. Table 1 shows descriptive
statistics for all dependent variables.
<Table 1 about here [Descriptive statistics of dependent variables]>
For the years 1988-2007 we have recorded 167 cases where the budget was signed into law
after the beginning of the new scal year. This amounts to 23 percent of the budgets for which
we have data.22 Figure 1 gives a detailed picture of the distribution of days_late. There is
a clear e¤ect of the scal year deadline, as can be seen from the spike at zero. This spike
reects the great number of budgets that are enacted on the last day of the old scal year. The
21The instructions for the survey are available from the authors upon request. Table A1 in the appendix gives
details on the source of information on late budgets for each state.
22190 budgets (26%) received legislative passage after the legislatures state-specic deadline, while 119 (17%)
were nally passed by the legislature after the beginning of the new scal year.
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budgets that were signed into law after the beginning of the new scal year (days_late > 0)
were on average 31 days late. The variation is large, however, ranging from one day to almost
six months with a standard deviation of 36 days. 13 percent of the late budgets were signed
into law on the rst day of the scal year, while 33 percent were more than one month late.
<Figure 1 about here. [No. of days from end of scal year to nal budget enactment]>
Figure 2 illustrates the occurrences of late budgets over time. In addition to our preferred
denition of a late budget, the gure also displays the number of budgets that were passed by
the legislature after the state-specic deadline for legislative passage. Such delays are generally
much more common than delays that extend into the new scal year. For both measures,
budgets delays were frequent in the early 1990s and in the beginning of the new century. The
late 1990s were a period with relatively few late budgets.23
<Figure 2 about here. [The number late budgets over time, 48 states]>
Figure 3 illustrates the relative frequencies of late budgets for each of the 48 states in our
data set, using our preferred denition of a late budget (days_late > 0). In comparison, Figure
4 does the same for one of our alternative denitions (days_delayed > 0). Most states have
experienced at least once that the state legislature didnt live up to its deadline for budget
passage, while 22 states have experienced a budget enacted after the beginning of the new
scal year in the time period considered here. New York, North Carolina, California, Oregon
and Wisconsin score high on both measures of budget lateness, while Southeastern, Plains- and
Rocky Mountain states dominate the group that have never experienced any late budgets.
In what follows, we report results for our preferred denition of late budgets only. Table
A3 in the appendix reports results for our main explanatory variables of interest using the two
alternative denitions. A full set of results that parallel those reported below are available from
the authors upon request. In short, all of our main conclusions are highly robust to plausible
alternative denitions of a late budget.
<Figure 3 about here.[No. of budgets enacted after beginning of scal year, relative to total no.
of enacted budgets 1988-2007]>
<Figure 4 about here:[No. of budgets passed after legislatures deadline, relative to total no. of
enacted budgets 1988-2007]>
23Note that odd years generally have more late budgets than even years. This is due to the fact that almost
all states with biennial budgeting pass new two-year budgets in odd years, so more budgets are enacted in odd
years than in even years. Relative to the total number of budgets being enacted, there is no di¤erence between
odd years and even years.
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4 Explanatory variables
This section describes the set of explanatory variables in our empirical analyses. More detailed
descriptions of all variables, including their sources, can be found in table A1 in the appendix.
A key prediction of the model is that a shock to the scal climate (as compared to the
previous year) should lead to a delay in the budget adoption, with the delay being longer, the
greater the shock is. To test this prediction, we include di¤erent measures of changes in the scal
climate in our estimations. Our preferred measure is the change in the state unemployment rate
compared to the previous year. An important advantage of this measure over other candidates
is that unemployment statistics are typically available with a much shorter time lag than,
say, growth rates in state GDP. Thus, the state unemployment rate is likely to reect the
information available to policymakers at the time of budget adoption more accurately than
other measures of the business cycle. Furthermore, Scheppach (2009, p. 1) notes that "the
trough in state revenue generally coincides with the peak in unemployment". Finally, the
change in the state unemployment has the nice property that there is a natural distinction
between positive shocks to the scal climate (decreases) and negative shocks (increases).24 We
also consider an alternative measure that focuses more directly on scal conditions, namely the
revenue schock measure developed in Poterba (1994) and Poterba and Rueben (2001).
As explained above, we expect divided control over the state government to produce longer
and more frequent budget delays. We therefore include a dummy variable that takes the
value one if either i) both chambers in the legislature are controlled by another party than
the governors (split branch), or ii) the two chambers are controlled by di¤erent parties (split
legislature):We shall later look more into the di¤erence between these two types of divided
government.
An additional prediction of the model is that the greater the cost politicians incur during
delays, the shorter is the expected delay. As mentioned in section 2, we expect such costs to be
higher in election years than in non-election years. We also consider measures that plausibly
correlate with the opportunity cost of budget stalemates for the politicians involved: Part-
time legislators often have well-paid civil occupations in addition to their political o¢ ce, and
they typically receive only a modest compensation (and perhaps none at all if the deadline is
exceeded) for spending time at the state assembly. Hence, part-time legislators have a much
greater opportunity cost of delaying agreement than full-time legislators, who have no or limited
outside occupation. We therefore include a variable that characterizes the state legislature on
a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 corresponds to a part time "citizen legislature, while 5 corresponds to
a full-time professional legislature. Our prior is that delays are both longer and more frequent
24No equally natural distinction exists for another potential measure, namely the growth rate in real state
GDP; what constitutes a negative shock in this case? A negative growth rate? A below-average growth rate?
Or a drop in the growth rate relative to last year? In our opinion, there is no obvious answer to this question.
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in full-time legislatures.
In a similar spirit, we also include dummy variables for whether the legislature is required
(by constitution or statute) to end its regular session before a certain deadline. Where such
deadlines are present, a failure to pass the budget before the deadline means that the legis-
lature must go into overtime session, or that a special session must be called. This increases
the salience of budget impasses, and we therefore expect the political costs of proctracted ne-
gotiations to be higher in states that have such deadlines. We distinguish between two types
of legislative session deadlines: Hard deadlines require the regular session to end by a certain,
clearly specied date, with no room for extension. Soft deadlines are deadlines that either do
not specify a certain calendar date by which the regular session must end (for example, the
Georgia constitution limits the regular session to 40 legislative days, but it does not require
these legislative days to be consecutive), or gives the legislature some leeway to extend the
session beyond the deadline (for example, the Arkansas legislature can, and frequently does,
extend its 60-days deadline by a two-thirds vote in both chambers).
Finally, states di¤er widely in the consequences that can arise in the event of a late budget.
To capture some of these di¤erences, we include a dummy for whether entering a new scal
year without a budget in place could lead to a shutdown of state government activities. Unfor-
tunately for our purposes, the reliability of this information is impaired by the fact that many
states have never experienced a late budget, and their state laws do not address the issue. The
true consequences of a late budget are therefore unknown in these states.
In addition to the above categories of variables that test our main predictions, we explore
the impact of a range of institutional, political, cultural and demographic factors: We con-
sider various institutions related to the budget, such as whether there any super majoritarian
requirements for passing the budget (as is the case in California). Balanced budget rules are
another potentially important institution. Conditional on the state of the economy, how much
scal adjustment is needed is likely to depend on the strictness of these rules, but also on the
cash available in the general fund and the stabilization fund, both of which we control for.
We also control for the party a¢ liation of the governor, whether the governor faces a binding
term limit, the length of the governors incumbency, and whether the current budget adoption
process is the rst to be handled by the incumbent governor.
Knack (2002) argues that a range of cultural and demographic variables might inuence
government performance, including the timeliness of the budget. We therefore control for the
e¤ect of the state population size, the proportion of non-working aged people, the proportion
of blacks and the proportion of college graduates in the population. Knack (2002) also docu-
ments that certain types of social capital, such as civic reciprocity, are determinants of good
governance, and so we proxy for this by including the Census 1990 mail response rate as an
explanatory variable.
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Finally, we run all regressions both with and without state xed e¤ects. Unfortunately, some
of the control variables mentioned above are time invariant and must therefore be dropped when
state xed e¤ects are included. Five-year interval time dummies are included to account for
nation-wide trends across time.25
5 Results
5.1 Binary response models
We start out with the simplest of our measures of budget lateness, the binary variable late_budget.
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 2 present results from some basic estimations in which we have only
included our two main explanatory variables of interest: The change in the state unemployment
rate and a dummy variable for divided government. We use a pooled probit estimator as well
as the xed e¤ect logit estimator.26
In columns (1) and (2) we simply include the change in the unemployment rate, without
distinguishing positive changes from negative changes. The change in the unemployment rate
and divided control of the government are both associated with more frequent occurrences of
late budgets. However, these specications impose a linear e¤ect of changes in the unemploy-
ment rate, in the sense that decreases in the unemployment rate are restricted to have the same
impact as increases, but with the sign reversed. Columns (3) and (4) relax this restriction by
explicitly separating positive changes in the unemployment rate from negative changes. More
precisely, the variable unempl_increase is equal to the change in the unemployment rate if
the change is positive, and takes the value zero in all other cases. The variable unempl_drop
is equal to the absolute value of the change in the unemployment rate if the change is negative,
and otherwise zero.27 This reveals an important non-linearity: As expected, increases in the
unemployment rate are associated with higher probabilities of observing budget delays, relative
to a stable unemployment rate. In contrast, a drop in the unemployment rate does not appear
to lower the probability of budget delays. If anything, delays are more likely when the state
unemployment rate drops below the level from the previous year, as our model would predict.
25 In general, we wish to include time dummies to capture heterogeneity across time. But since economic
conditions are highly correlated across states, it may be di¢ cult to disentangle the e¤ect of national trends
from the e¤ect of changes in scal climates. This means that precise estimation of the coe¢ cients on the
unemployment variables may be di¢ cult if we also include yearly time dummies. As a compromise, we therefore
use dummies for 5-year periods to capture national trends, rather than yearly dummy variables. Using yearly
time dummies yields similar coe¢ cient estimates but with substantially higher standard errors on the cyclical
variables.
26The Fixed E¤ect logit can only be estimated for the 20 states that have have some variation in the dependent
variable (not all 0s or 1s).
27With these denitions, the restriction imposed in columns (1) and (2) is that the coe¢ cient on
unempl_increase is equal to minus one times the coe¢ cient on unempl_drop.
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But as the model also predicts, the impact of a drop in the unemployment rate appears to be
weaker than the impact of a similar-sized increase: The coe¢ cients on drops in the unemploy-
ment rate are always smaller than the coe¢ cients on increases, although the di¤erences are not
statistically signicant.
To illustrate the magnitude of the e¤ects, we calculate the marginal e¤ects of the explana-
tory variables in the probit estimations. Columns (3) suggest that, compared to a zero change,
a one percentage-point increase in the state unemployment rate increases the likelihood that
the state budget will not be signed into law before the new scal year by 7.8%-points. The
corresponding number for a one percentage-point drop in the unemployment rate is 6.2%-
points. Compared to a unied government, divided control of the state government raises the
probability of a late budget by 14.8%-points.
<Table 2 about here. [Binary response models, 1988-2007]>
Columns (5) to (7) include a full set of control variables, as described in the previous section.
Adding control variables does not change the main results: Divided government signicantly
increases the probability of a late budget, and so do increases in the unemployment rate. Drops
in the unemployment rate also appear to increase the probability of late budgets. The estimated
e¤ect is signicant on a 5% level when using the pooled probit estimator, but not quite so when
we use the xed e¤ect logit estimator (the p-value is 0:14). The coe¢ cient on unemp_drop is
in all cases smaller than the coe¢ cient on unemp_increase, but the di¤erences are again not
statistically signicant.
Turning to the control variables, we nd no e¤ect of election years in either of the columns,
in contrast to our priors. In column (5) we omit state xed e¤ects to estimate the e¤ect of a
range of time-invariant state characteristics. As expected, we nd a strongly signicant neg-
ative impact of deadlines that limit the length of the legislatures regular session. Somewhat
surprisingly, the results suggest that "soft" deadlines have a stronger impact than "hard" dead-
lines. At a p-value of 0.12, the di¤erence is borderline statistically signicant. Less surprisingly,
the coe¢ cient on shut_down shows that late budgets are less common in states where they
may result in shutdowns of state government activities.28 Also in line with our expectations
is the negative and signicant coe¢ cient on census_reponse_rate, which suggests that late
budgets are indeed less common in states with a high level of social capital. Our results for
super majority requirements (not reported) do not suggest in any way that such requirements
28Although in line with our theoretical priors, we would advise caution in interpreting this particular result:
Many of those states that list shutdown as a likely (or even unavoidable) outcome of a late budget have never
actually experienced a late budget in recent times. While this could of course reect a causal relationship from
budget procedures to outcomes, the causality could also run in the opposite direction. States that have never
experienced late budgets can "a¤ord" to warn of dire consequences in case of a highly hypothetical budget
delay. Experience suggests, however, that once faced with an actual budget stalemate, state governments have
a tendency to soften the rhetoric and be innovative in their e¤orts to avoid very harsh consequences.
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increase the frequency of late budgets. This is a consistent nding throughout our empirical
analyses.29 Finally, in contrast to our priors, the results in column (5) do not provide any
evidence that full-time legislatures are more prone to producing late budgets than part-time
legislatures. This could of course reect that there is in fact no causal e¤ect, but it could
also be caused by a problem of multicollinearity. In particular, full_time_legislature and
population are highly correlated, both individually insignicant, but jointly signicant at a
10% level (p-value of 0.07). In column (6) we therefore leave out population. This produces
the expected positive and signicant coe¢ cient on full_time_legislature.
5.2 Linear regression models
The results in this section exploit the full variation in our measure of budget lateness. This
allows us to study the length of budget stalemates, rather than the frequency. As in the
previous section, we start out with some parsimonious specications. Columns (1) and (2)
in Table 3 report basic xed e¤ects estimations with the change in the unemployment rate
(separated into drops and increases in column (2)) and a dummy for divided government as
the only explanatory variables. The results are in line with those from the previous section:
Divided government is strongly associated with longer budget negotiations. The change in
the unemployment rate, when included in its simplest form, is also positively related to our
measures of budget lateness. But as in the previous section, distinguishing positive changes
from negative changes suggests that the relationship is non-linear: A rise in the unemployment
rate increases the expected length of the budget adoption process, as can be seen from the
positive and signicant coe¢ cient on unempl_increase. The coe¢ cient on unempl_drop,
on the other hand, is imprecisely estimated, and there is no solid evidence that a falling
unemployment rate has any impact on the length of budget negotiations. These results suggest
that economic slowdowns have a greater impact on the duration of budget negotiations than
economic upswings. In terms of magnitude, the estimates indicate that a 1 percentage-point
rise in the unemployment rate postpones nal enactment by about a week.
<Table 3 about here. [Linear regression models, 1988-2007]>
In columns (3) to (5) we include our full set of control variables. This produces even larger
coe¢ cients on unempl_increase. The coe¢ cient is signicant at the 1% level in all columns.
In contrast, the estimated coe¢ cients on unempl_drop are small and statistically insignicant
across all columns. 30 Divided government again has a large and highly signicant e¤ect on the
29We do not elaborate further on this but a full set of estimation results, including estimated coe¢ cients for
super majority requirements, can be obtained from the authors upon request.
30Unlike the results in the previous section, the coe¢ cients on unempl_increase and unempl_drop are
now signicantly di¤erent at a 1% level across all columns. In contrast, the hypothesis that the coe¢ cient
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expected length of the budget process. Compared to a unied government, our results show
that the expected length of the budget process is about two weeks longer (using the xed e¤ect
estimate) when the state government is under divided control.
Unlike in the previous section, we now nd a signicant e¤ect of election years. As expected,
budget negotiations are shorter in election years than in non-election years. The di¤erence
is estimated to be between one and two weeks. The rst budget adoption process under a
new governor appears to nish a little later than in other years. Rookie governors sign the
budget about a week later than governors who have led at least one budget negotiation process,
although the di¤erence is not statistically signicant when state xed e¤ects are included.
Turning to the time-invariant variables, we again nd highly signicant e¤ects of deadlines
that limit the length of the legislative session. State budgets tend to be signed into law 2-3
weeks earlier in states where a delay would trigger a shutdown of non-essential services than in
states where such shutdowns cannot happen. There is some evidence that higher social capital
is associated with shorter delays, but the results are now not signicant. Finally, parallelling
the results from the previous section, we nd a positive but statistically insignicant coe¢ cient
on full_time_leg when we also control for state population size. The coe¢ cient becomes
much bigger and statistically signicant when population is excluded, as shown in column (4).
5.3 Censored models
A potential issue with our dependent variable days_late is the manner in which negative values
are treated. To illustrate, governors usually sign the budget quickly after receiving it from the
legislature. Days_late will then record a negative value if this happens before the end of the
scal year. But some governors sometimes choose to postpone signing the budget until the last
day of the scal year for ceremonial reasons only. In such cases, the postponed enactment is not
due to a budget stalemate, but days_late records a zero, rather than a negative value. Thus,
the variation in days_late that is within the negative domain may just reect unimportant,
idiosyncratic noise.
In order to deal with this issue, we left-censor our dependent variables at zero in this section.
By censoring the data we can view budget negotiations as a process that either leads to a timely
budget or a delay of some (stochastic) duration. Zero or negative values of days_late then
indicate a corner solution outcome, while strictly positive observations reect interior solution
outcomes. In Table 4 we use the Tobit model as well as the Honore (1992) semi-parametric
panel Tobit estimator with xed e¤ects on the left-censored version, days_late_cens; of our
dependent variable.
on unempl_increase is equal to minus one times the coe¢ cient on unempl_drop (the restriction imposed in
column (1)) is now only rejected at the 10% level in column (5).
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<Table 4 about here. Censored outcomes, 1988-2007>
The results broadly conrm our previous ndings. Starting with the Tobit estimates in
columns (1) and (2), the estimated e¤ect of an increase in the unemployment rate has the
usual positive sign and is signicant at a 5% level. As in the linear regressions, the coe¢ cient
on unempl_drop is negative, but numerically small and statistically insignicant. As usual,
the coe¢ cient estimate on divided_gov is positive and highly signicant. The results for the
time-invariant variables also resemble the results in the previous sections: Legislative session
deadlines reduce the expected duration of budget delays, and so do "shut down" provisions and
higher levels of social capital, as proxied by the Census response rate. As usual, the coe¢ cient
on full_time_legislature is positive but insignicant when population is included, but it
becomes signicant at a 10% level when population is omitted, as shown in column (2). The
coe¢ cient estimates produced by the Tobit xed e¤ect estimator in column (3) have the same
sign as the Tobit estimates, but they generally lack precision. The p-value for unempl_increase
is 0.15.31
5.4 Fiscal institutions and economic uctuations
If uctuations in economic activity cause delays in the adoption of state budgets, then we
should expect scal institutions that inuence policymakersability to smooth such uctuations
to a¤ect the relationship between economic conditions and the occurrence of delays. In this
section we examine the interaction between two such institutions, balanced budget rules and
budget stabillization funds, and the change in the state unemployment rate. Recall the intuition
from our model: A change in the amount of available resources relative to the baseline, whether
positive or negative, increases the stakes in budget negotiations and produces longer delays.
Following this logic, we should expect budget stabilization funds that ease smoothing by forcing
extra saving in good years while providing back-up resources in bad years to alleviate the impact
of economic uctuations.
The case of balanced rules is slightly more complicated. On the one hand, balanced budget
rules may hinder smoothing in bad times and could therefore exacerbate the e¤ect of scal
deteriorations. On the other hand, strict rules may promote scal discipline in good years
and therefore dampen the e¤ect of rising revenues. All states except Vermont have some kind
of balanced budget requirement, but the strictness of these requirements varies considerably.
Below we consider two variables that have been used in the literature to characterize the
31The estimated coe¢ cient on divided_gov is insignicant in column (3). However, if we distinguish split-
branch governments from split-legislature governments - an issue that we address further in the next section -
we nd a signicant e¤ect of split legislatures, and a considerably smaller and statistically insignicant e¤ect of
split-branch governments.
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strictness of balanced budget rules: Whether the state is allowed to carry over a decit into
the next scal year, and whether the governor has line-item veto power over the budget. 32
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 we split our sample between "carry-over" states and
"no carry-over" states and estimate the probability of having a late budget using the FE logit
estimator. A rising unemployment rate has a signicant e¤ect on the probability of late budget
in states that have a "No carry-over" provision in place, whereas there is no such e¤ect in
states that allow decits to be carried over. In column (3) we use days_late as the dependent
variable. Rather than splitting the sample, we instead interact a dummy for "no carry-over"
with the unemployment variables unempl_increase and unempl_drop. The results from this
approach do not provide support for the results in columns (1) and (2), since the coe¢ cients
on the interaction terms are insignicant and have the wrong signs. In conclusion, we nd only
weak evidence that a "no carry-over" provision exacerbates the e¤ect of scal deteriorations. In
column (4) we interact the unemployment variables with a dummy for governor line-item veto
power. This produces a large and signicant coe¢ cient on unemp_fall, but a signicant and
even larger negative coe¢ cient on the associated interaction term. Our interpretation of these
results is that the inux of revenue that follows a drop in unemployment intensies the conict
over the budget, as our model predicts, but that governors equipped with line-item veto power
can curb the spending pressure that the extra revenue generates, thereby neutralizing its e¤ect
on the conict level and the length of the budget negotiations.
Columns (5) through (7) in Table 5 focus on the impact of budget stabilization funds.
stab_fundi;t is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the state had a stabilization fund in
year t. In column (5) we interact this variable with unempl_increase and unempl_drop. The
results suggest a remarkable e¤ect of budget stabilization funds. In the absence of a stabilization
fund, a drop in the unemployment rate has a strong positive impact on the expected duration
of a late budget. When present, budget stabilization funds appear to neutralize this e¤ect. On
the other hand, the results in column (5) do not suggest that the introduction of stabilization
funds has done anything to alleviate the impact of rising unemployment rates on the length of
budget negotiations.
Columns (6) and (7) investigate how the impact of a stabilization fund depends on the
specic rules that govern deposits into- and withdrawals from the fund. Wagner and Elder
(2005) characterize the strictness of deposit and withdrawal rules on a 1 to 4 scale, where
higher values correspond to less discretion and stricter rules. For both deposit and withdrawal
rules, we create dummy variables for each of the four steps on the scale. We then interact
our unemployment variables with stab_fundi;t and with each of these dummies. Column (6)
focuses on deposit rules, while column (7) does the same for withdrawal rules. The results
show that the negative coe¢ cient on the interaction between unempl_drop and stab_fundi;t
32See for example Alt and Lowry (1994), Bohn and Inman (1996) or Fatás and Mihov (2006).
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found in column (5) is mainly driven by states in the upper categories on Wagner and Elders
scale. In particular, stabilization funds are e¤ective in states where deposits into the fund
are required in the event of a budget surplus (depos_rule2 = 1) or given by a mathemat-
ical formula (depos_rule4 = 1), and where withdrawals from the fund are only allowed in
the event of a budget decit (withdraw_rule2 = 1) or a supermajority legislative approval
(withdraw_rule3 = 1). Budget stabilization funds appear to be least e¤ective at preventing
budget delays in states where deposits and withdrawals are made by legislative appropriation
(depos_rule1 = 1 and withdraw_rule1 = 1).
<Table 5 about here. [Economic conditions and scal rules, 1988-2007]>
5.5 Alternative indicators of scal conditions and divided government
Table 6 investigates our main results in greater depth. First, we use the revenue shock variable
constructed by Poterba (1994) and Poterba and Rueben (2001) as an alternative indicator
of changes in state scal conditions. Poterba and Rueben measure revenue shocks as the
percentage deviation of actual general fund revenues from original projections, with a correction
for the impact of tax changes enacted during the scal year. Their variable thus captures any
unforeseen developments in general fund revenue collections since the enactment of the previous
budget. Following our usual strategy, we let positive shocks and negative shocks (measured in
absolute values) enter separately. The results broadly conrm our previous ndings: Negative
revenue shocks raise the probability of a late budget signicantly, judging from the probit
estimates in column (1). The xed e¤ects regression in column (2) produces a positive but
marginally insignicant coe¢ cient on negative revenue shocks (p-value of 0.107). For positive
shocks, we get a positive and weakly signicant coe¢ cient in the probit estimation in column
(1), but an insignicant coe¢ cient in the other columns.
Second, columns (5)-(8) take a closer look at our divided government variable. Here we
distinguish situations in which the governor faces a united legislature controlled by the op-
posite party (split branch) from situations in which the two chambers in the legislature are
controlled by di¤erent parties (split legislature). Across all columns, we nd an economically
and statistically strong e¤ect of split legislatures. In comparison, the estimated e¤ect of split
branch governments is smaller across all columns and statistically signicant in only two out
of four columns. 33These results suggest that partisan conicts within state legislatures play a
more prominent role in the explanation of budget stalemates than do conicts between di¤erent
branches of state government.
33We also tried interacting the divided government variables with a measure of political polarization, but none
of the interaction terms came out signicant and were therefore omitted.
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<Table 6 about here. [Robustness of economic indicators and divided government, 1988-2007]>
6 Concluding remarks
The government budget is the legal basis for government spending and a prime venue for
political conict. Occasionally, this leads to prolonged budget negotiations, beyond both state
specic deadlines and the beginning of the scal year. We have collected and systematized data
on budget negotiation durations for US state governments for the period 1988-2007. We use this
data to test a war-of-attrition model of bargaining between politicians from di¤erent branches of
government; the politicians are loss averse with respect to deviations from budgetary baselines
as references points, and the model generates a number of testable hypotheses that we take to
the budget negotiation data.
Our main empirical conclusions support the hypotheses of the model: increasing unemploy-
ment leads to a longer budget negotiation process, it increases the risk of exceeding budget
deadlines and it prolongs periods with no budget in place. Falling unemployment also weakly
increases the risk of seeing a late budget, in accordance with our models predictions, but in
contrast to widely held beliefs that more funds automatically make agreeing on a budget easier.
Divided government makes late budgets more likely in all cases. In addition, higher political
costs, present in election years, decrease the duration of late budgets, while higher personal
costs, for non-professional legislators, decrease both the risk of late budgets as well as their
duration. Soft or hard deadlines that require the legislature to end its regular session before
the end of the scal year limit the occurence of late budgets.
While the e¤ects of balanced budget institutions are somewhat weak, gubernatorial line-
item veto powers limit negotiations during good times as do stabilization funds with strict
deposit rules. The results for withdrawals from stabilization funds in times of increasing un-
employment are less clear cut, possibly owing to our lack of controlling for whether funds are
actually present to be withdrawn; in the most recent episode of late budgets, several states
entered hard times with very low levels of rainy-day savings. Finally, using late budgets as
a measure of good governance, higher social capital does seem to be associated with better
governance, conrming the ndings of Putnam (1993) and Knack (2002).
Finally, why do some states never experience late budgets? Our results suggest that gov-
ernment shutdown provisions and the use of soft or hard deadlines that limit the length of
the regular session are important determinants of the presences of late budgets. In contrast,
super-majority requirements, often mentioned as a contributing factor to the late budgets of
California, do not show up signicantly in our results. However, California have no soft or
hard deadlines for ending the regular session of the legislature and no government shutdown
provisions, which suggests that there are many institutional possibilities available to reformers
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of the California budget process and across governments.34
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7 Appendix
7.1 The symmetric Nash Equilibrium
This part of the appendix shows that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the
war of attrition model studied in the main text. We continue in two steps.
The rst step is to realize that in any symmetric equilibrium, the playerschosen concession
times must be a strictly decreasing function of their respective marginal costs of delay.
Lemma 1 Let (T (A); T (B)) be a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the war of attri-
tion game studied in section 2, where T : (; ] ! [0;1) is a di¤erentiable function. T must
then satisfy T 0(i) < 0.
Proof. 35Let EU(Ti; i) denote the expected utility for a player with marginal cost i who
chooses concession time Ti. Further, let T (0i) and T (
00
i ) denote the chosen concession times of
players with marginal costs 0i and 
00
i , respectively. Equilibrium then requires that
EU(T (0i); 
0
i)  EU(T (00i ); 0i)
and
EU(T (00i ); 
00
i )  EU(T (0i); 00i )
Adding these two inequalities and rearranging yields
EU(T (0i); 
0
i)  EU(T (0i); 00i )  EU(T (00i ); 0i)  EU(T (00i ); 00i ) (A1)
By equations 3, 4 and 6, EU(Ti; i) is given by
EU(Ti; i) = (1 H(Ti))(uL   iTi) +H(Ti)uW  
TiZ
0
t  h(t)dt
Substituting this into the inequality in A1 then gives, after some rearranging,
(00i   0i)

G(T (0i)) G(T (00i ))
  0 (A2)
where
G(x)  (1 H(x))x+
xZ
0
t  h(t)dt
35This proof draws heavily on Example 6.3 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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Notice now that G0(x) =  h(x)x + 1   H(x) + xh(x) = 1   H(x)  0. Combined with the
inequality in A2, this means that if 0i < 
00
i , then we must have T (
0
i)  T (00i ), so T 0(i)  0.
To see that equilibrium concession times must be strictly decreasing in the marginal cost
of delay, consider the following argument: If T were not strictly decreasing, there would exist
some closed interval X  (; ] and some t  0, such that T (j) = t for all j 2 X. This would
then imply that prob(T (j) = t) > 0. Consider now a player i with i 2 X: Symmetry would
require this player to set Ti = T (i) = t. However, given that prob(T (j) = t) > 0, player i
would never choose Ti = t. She would do better setting Ti just above t, because this would
increase the probability of winning "discontinuously", while only increasing the cost from delay
innitesimally. Hence, T (i) would not be a best response to itself, so (T (A); T (B)) could
not be a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The next step uses Lemma 1 to prove existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let T : (; ] ! [0;1) be a di¤erentiable function. (T (A); T (B)) is a sym-
metric Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if T (i) satises
T 0(i) =  

uW   uL i(i   ) 1 for all i 2 (; ] (A3)
and
T () = 0 (A4)
Proof. We show the "only if" part of the proof rst, since the "if" part then follows
straightforwardly afterwards.
"Only if ":
If (TA; TB) = (T (A); T (B)) is a Nash equilibrium, it must satisfy for i; j = A;B ; i 6= j:
EU(T (i); i)  EU( ~T ; i) for all ~T  0 and for all i 2 (; ], given Tj = T (j)
Any interior solution to the utility maximazation problem must satisfy the rst-order condition
dEU(T (i))
dTi
= 0. That is, if T (i) > 0, the derivative of expected utility with respect to Ti must
be zero at Ti = T (i).
Now recall that
dEU(Ti; i)
dTi
= (uW   uL)h(Ti)  (1 H(Ti))i (A5)
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where H is the cdf of Tj , the opponents concession time, and h is the associated density
function. Let T 1(Ti) be the inverse to T , so that T 1(T (i)) = i. T 1 is then dened on the
interval [T (); lim! T ()). Use that Tj = T (j). For Ti 2 [T (); lim! T ()) we can then
write H(Ti) as
H(Ti) = prob(T (j) < Ti) = prob(j > T
 1(Ti)) = 1  T
 1(Ti)  
    (A6)
while H(Ti) = 0 for Ti < T () and H(Ti) = 1 for Ti  lim! T (). In this derivation of
H(Ti), we have used that T 0() < 0, and the fact that j is uniformly distributed on (; ].
Di¤erentiating with respect to Ti then gives us that for Ti 2 [T (); lim! T ()):
h(Ti) =   1
   
1
T 0(T 1(Ti))
(A7)
while h(Ti) = 0 for all other Ti. Inserting (A6) and (A7) into (A5) and evaluating at Ti = T (i)
then gives
dEU(T (i))
dTi
=  (uW   uL) 1
   
1
T 0(i)
  i   
    i = 0,
T 0(i) =  (uW   uL)(i(i   )) 1 (A8)
To summarize, we have now established that if (T (A); T (B)) is a Nash equilibrium, it must
be the case for all i 2 (; ] that T (i) > 0 ) T 0(i) =  (uW   uL)(i(i   )) 1. Note now
that we must have T (i) > 0 for all i 2 (; ): This follows from T 0(i) < 0 and and the
requirement T (i)  0 for all i 2 (; ]. Combined with the result above, this implies that
T (i) must satisfy equation (A3).
The last step is now to prove the boundary condition T () = 0. To do this, let T0(i) denote
the function that satises equation (A3) and T0() = 0. Consider then another function T1(i)
that satises (A3) with T1() > 0. We can then write this function as T1(i) = T0(i) + T1().
Assume that the opponent plays according to Tj = T1(j); and imagine now the choice problem
facing a player i with i = : If he plays according to Ti = T1(i), it means that he will be
waiting T1() time units before conceding. Since there is zero probability that the opponent
will concede in this time interval, this implies a certain utility loss of iT1(), with no chance
of winning the battle over the budget. Clearly, it would then be better for player i to concede
immediately and avoid the costs of the delay. Thus, T1(i) is not a best reply to itself for all
possible values of i, and so it cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
"If ":
Assume that player j chooses Tj = T (j), where T satises (A3) and (A4). Integrating
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equation (A3) over i and using (A4) to solve for the additive constant then gives
T (i) = [u
W   uL]1


ln

i
i   

  ln


   

from which it is clear that T () = 0 and lim! T () = 1. The inverse function T 1(Ti) is
therefore dened for all Ti  0, so from (A6) and (A7) we get that for all Ti  0:
H(Ti) = 1  T
 1(Ti)  
    ; h(Ti) =  
1
   
1
T 0(T 1(Ti))
Now use that T 0(T 1(Ti)) 1 =  [uW   uL] 1(T 1(Ti)(T 1(Ti)  )) 1 to get
h(Ti) =
1
   
T 1(Ti)(T 1(Ti)  )
[uW   uL]
The rst-order condition for player i then becomes
1
   T
 1(Ti)(T 1(Ti)  ) = T
 1(Ti)  
    i ,
T 1(Ti) = i ()
Ti = T (i)
To nd the second-order derivative, note that
h0(Ti) =
1
   
(2T 1(Ti)  )
[uW   uL]
1
T 0(T 1(Ti))
=  (2T
 1(Ti)  )
[uW   uL] h(Ti)
so the second-order derivative is
d2EUi(Ti)
dT 2i
= [uW   uL]h0(Ti) + h(Ti)i
= ( 2T 1(Ti) +  + i)h(Ti)
Now use the result from the rst-order condition that T 1(Ti) = i to get:
d2EUi(Ti)
dT 2i
jTi=T (i) =  (i   )h(Ti) < 0
Hence, marginal utility is zero at Ti = T (i), and the second-order derivative is negative at
this point. This shows that Ti = T (i) is a local utility maximum point. Further, since there
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are no other extremum points, dEU(Ti)=dTi must be positive for all Ti < T (i) and negative
for all Ti > T (i). It then follows that Ti = T (i) is also a global maximum point. Hence, T ()
is a best response to itself, so (TA; TB) = (T (A); T (B)) is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
7.2 Proof of equation 12
Let A(t) be the cumulative distribution function for T agree. We can then derive A(t) by noting
that
A(t) = prob(T agree < t) = 1  prob(T (A) > t)  prob(T (B) > t)
= 1  prob(A < T 1(t))  prob(B < T 1(t))
= 1 

T 1(t)  
   
2
where we have used that A and B are independent and both uniformly distributed on (; ].
Let a(t) denote the associated density function of T agree. We then get that the expected time
of budget agreement is
ET agree =
lim! T ()Z
T ()
t  a(t)dt
=
lim! T ()Z
T ()
  2t  (T 1(t)  )  (   ) 2 T 0(T 1(t)) 1 dt
=
Z

2T ()  (   )(   ) 2d
=
[uW   uL]
(   )2
Z

2 ln

(   )
(   )

(   )d
=
[uW   uL]
(   )2

(2   2) ln((   ))  (   )2 ln((   )) + 

= [uW   uL]
 
      ln()  ln()  
   2
!
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where we have used the substitution t = T () to change variables in the integration.36 Substi-
tuting in for [uW   uL] from equation (5) then gives equation (12).
36For the last equation, we have used lHôpitals rule by noting that (   )2 ln((   )) = ln((   ))=((  
) 2), so
lim
!

(   )2 ln((   )) = lim
!

(   ) 1=( 2(   ) 3) = lim
!

  
2
(   )2

= 0
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7.3 Figures and tables
Figure 1: No. of days from end of scal year to nal budget enactment, 1988-2007
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Figure 2: The number of late budgets over time, 48 states
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Figure 3: No. of budgets enacted after beginning of scal year relative to total
no. of enacted budgets, 1988-2007
Figure 4: No. of budgets passed after legislatures deadline relative to total
no. of enacted budgets 1988-2007
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Table 1. Summary statistics(1)
Variable Obs(2) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
late_budget 736 0.23 0.42 0 1
days_late 734 ‐29.86 49.99 ‐172 176
days_late_cens 734 6.92 21.45 0 176
delayed_budget 720 0.26 0.44 0 1
days_delayed 720 ‐9.97 43.19 ‐115 175
days_delayed_cens 720 9.63 24.18 0 175
delayed_budget_FY 720 0.17 0.37 0 1
days_delayed_FY 720 ‐42.60 52.07 ‐178 175
days_delayed_cens_FY 720 5.26 19.14 0 175
Notes: 
(1) The total number of observations may vary betwen the different forms of the dependent variable. This is due to a few cases where we know 
that the budget was signed into law after the beginning of the new fiscal year, but where we do not know the exact date on which this 
happened. 
(2) The total number of enacted budgets in the period 1988 to 2007 is 808.
Table 2. Binary response models, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.117 0.335*
(0.090) (0.181)
0 560*** 0 963*** 0 494** 0 487** 0 901**
Budget signed into law after end of fiscal year
,i tElex
iFull time legislature_ _
iShut down_
iCensus response rate_ _
i tDivided gov ,_
i tUnempl drop ,_
i tUnempl increase ,_
i tUnempl change ,_
iDeadline soft_
i tDeadline hard ,_
i tPopulation ,
. . . . .
(0.140) (0.323) (0.218) (0.220) (0.403)
0.446** 0.558 0.334** 0.333** 0.770
(0.187) (0.430) (0.162) (0.163) (0.519)
0.656*** 0.957*** 0.685*** 1.026*** 0.635*** 0.616*** 0.846**
(0.184) (0.332) (0.178) (0.334) (0.188) (0.190) (0.369)
‐0.121 ‐0.116 0.031
(0.178) (0.177) (0.397)
0.011 ‐0.339
(0.029) (0.327)
0.130 0.175*
(0.170) (0.092)
‐1.185*** ‐1.174***
(0 287) (0 299). .
‐0.079** ‐0.081**
(0.036) (0.036)
‐2.829*** ‐2.768***
(0.678) (0.628)
‐1.756*** ‐1.755***
(0.285) (0.291)
Estimator Pooled 
probit
FE logit Pooled 
probit
FE logit Pooled 
probit
Pooled 
probit
FE logit
Time dummies No No No No 5‐Year 5‐Year 5‐Year
Control variables No No No No Yes Yes Yes
P[y=1|div. gov.] ‐ P[y=1|uni. gov.] (5), (8) 18.6% Na 14.8% Na 24.5% 23.9% Na
Marginal effect of ΔUNR > 0  (6), (8) 2.4% Na 7.8% Na 19.6% 19.3% Na
Marginal effect of ΔUNR < 0  (7), (8) ‐2.4% Na 6.2% Na 13.2% 13.1% Na
Observations 732 320 732 320 732 732 320
Notes: 
(1) Std. errors in parantheses. Cluster std. errors are used in the pooled probit estimations
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(3) A constant is included in all estimations.
(5) R t th i i th b bilit f l t b d t h th i di id d t i t d f ifi d t
(4) Also included in columns (5), (6) and (7) are: endbalance, kids and aged as well as dem_gov, term_limited, new_gov and gov_experience. Columns (5) and (6) also 
includes the following time‐invariant variables: No_carry, supermajority, proportion_black and proportion_college. 
  epor s  e  ncrease  n  e pro a y o  a  a e  u ge  w en  ere  s  v e  governmen   ns ea  o  un e  governmen
(6) Reports the impact on the probability of a late budget of a marginal increase in the state unemployment rate
(7) Reports the impact on the probability of a late budget of a marginal drop in the state unemployment rate
(8) All marginal effects on P[y=1] are evaluated at a unified government and  a zero change in the unemployment rate. The additional controls in columns (5), (6) and (7) 
are evaluated at their averages except for the dummies for election, democratic gov., lame duck, new governor, No_carry, super majority rule, shut down provision and 
deadlines, which are set to zero.
Table 3. Linear regression models, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5.152***
(1.695)
6.932*** 10.818*** 10.629*** 8.763***
(2.454) (3.244) (3.247) (2.544)
‐2.898 ‐1.606 ‐2.41 ‐0.264
(3.575) (3.856) (3.812) (3.251)
12.791*** 12.857*** 24.452*** 22.594*** 13.511***
(3.347) (3.331) (4.099) (4.014) (3.600)
‐13.050*** ‐12.807*** ‐8.532***
(3.126) (3.166) (2.726)
8.444** 7.757* 5.157
(4.016) (4.040) (3.779)
1.292* 0.826
(0.749) (1.515)  
0.485 4.713*
(4.047) (2.711)
‐18.650** ‐17.798**
(7.638) (7.879)
‐1.079 ‐1.247
(0.908) (0.897)
‐39.090*** ‐35.899***
(12.884) (13.357)
*** ***
No. of days from end of fiscal year to signed into law
,i tElex
iFull time legislature_ _
iShut down_
iCensus response rate_ _
i tDivided gov ,_
i tUnempl drop ,_
i tUnempl increase ,_
i tUnempl change ,_
i tNew gov ,_
i tPopulation ,
iDeadline soft_
i tDeadline hard ,_ ‐44.441 ‐43.819
(9.173) (9.614)
Estimator FE FE OLS OLS FE
Time dummies No No 5‐Year 5‐Year 5‐Year
Control variables No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 730 730 730 730 730
Notes: 
(1) Robust std. errors in parantheses. Cluster std. errors are used in the OLS estimations
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(3) A constant is included in all estimations.
(4) Also included in columns (3), (4) and (5) are: endbalance, kids and aged as well as dem_gov, term_limited and gov_experience. Columns (3) and 
(4) also includes the following time‐invariant variables: No_carry, supermajority, proportion_black and proportion_college. 
Table 4. Censored outcomes, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3)
13.446** 13.472** 10.629
(5.703) (5.706) (7.404)
‐3.232 ‐3.255 ‐24.578
(6.563) (6.565) (22.818)
18.654*** 18.415*** 23.922
(6.028) (5.986) (19.068)
‐9.276 ‐9.21 ‐19.943**
(6.083) (6.084) (7.956)
0.348 ‐2.831
(1.139) (3.396)
7.671 9.119*
(6.831) (5.006)
‐42.661*** ‐42.630***
(13.101) (13.217)
‐2.405* ‐2.506**
(1.266) (1.236)
‐83.084*** ‐81.843***
(21.197) (20.810)
‐51.559*** ‐51.456***
(11.236) (11.283)
Estimator Tobit Tobit Panel Tobit
Time dummies 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year
Controls variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 730 730 730
Censored no. of days from end of fiscal 
year to signed into law
i tDivided Gov ,_
iShut down_
iFull time legislature_ _
iCensus response rate_ _
i tUnempl drop ,_
i tUnempl increase ,_
i tPopulation ,
iDeadline soft_
i tDeadline hard ,_
i tElex ,
Notes: 
(1) Std. errors in paranthesis.
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(3) A constant is included in all estimations.
(4) Also included are: endbalance, kids and aged as well as dem_gov, term_limited, new_gov and 
gov_experience. Columns (1) and (2) also includes the following time‐invariant variables: No_carry, 
supermajority, proportion_black and proportion_college. 
Table 5. Economic Fluctuations and Fiscal Rules, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(4) (7)(5)
0.788 1.422* 8.786** 11.312** 11.108 10.612 10.828
(0.596) (0.735) (3.896) (5.258) (10.004) (9.729) (9.808)
1.002 0.451 ‐4.845 13.336** 17.631** 17.664** 18.462**
(0.698) (0.961) (6.258) (6.480) (7.309) (6.985) (6.891)
0.926* 0.891 13.425*** 13.642*** 13.652*** 13.542*** 13.815***
(0.488) (0.722) (3.634) (3.616) (3.530) (3.524) (3.538)
‐0.064
(4.689)
9.174
(7.405)
‐3.021
(5.626)
‐15.356**
(7.540)
7.778 8.089 7.964
(8.395) (7.940) (7.914)
‐3.071
(11.068)
‐21.491**
(9.070)
‐4.314 0.615
(10.811) (11.771)
0.061 ‐9.115
(11.359) (10.508)
Budget signed into law after 
end of fiscal year
No. of days from end of fiscal year to signed into law
i tDivided gov ,_
i tUnempl drop ,_
i tUnempl increase ,_
i t iUnempl increase no carry,_ _×
i t iUnempl drop no carry,_ _×
i t i tUnempl increase stab fund, ,_ _×
i t i tUnempl drop stab fund, ,_ _×
i tUnempl drop J rule,_ _ 1×
i tUnempl drop J rule,_ _ 2×
i tUnempl drop J rule,_ _ 3×
i tUnempl drop J rule,_ _ 4×
i tUnempl increase J rule,_ _ 1×
i tUnempl increase J rule,_ _ 2×
i tUnempl increase J rule,_ _ 3×
i tUnempl increase J rule,_ _ 4×
i t iUnempl increase line item veto,_ _ _×
i t iUnempl increase line item veto,_ _ _×
i tStab fund ,_
‐4.039 ‐0.286
(11.424) (14.419)
‐9.588 0.794
(12.631) (10.476)
‐12.412 ‐17.061*
(7.890) (9.143)
‐22.599** ‐22.426**
(10.020) (9.056)
‐11.182 ‐40.662***
(9.578) (11.412)
‐34.356** ‐32.203
(14.706) (21.866)
Estimator FE logit FE logit FE FE FE FE FE
Time dummies 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample
Carry‐over states No carry‐over 
states Full Full Full Full Full
Observations 173 147 730 730 730 730 730
Number of States  11 9 48 48 48 48 48
Notes: 
(1) Std. errors in paranthesis. Robust std. errors are used in columns (3) ‐ (7)
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively. 
(4) J=Deposit 
(5) J=Withdraw
(3) Same control variables included as in standard fixed effect specification
Table 6. Alternative indicators of fiscal conditions and divided government, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.180*** 0.616 1.306* 0.956
(0.058) (0.375) (0.672) (0.865)
0.053* ‐0.078 0.471 0.452
(0.030) (0.134) (0.381) (0.489)
0.887** 8.523*** 12.614** 9.931
(0.398) (2.655) (5.683) (6.998)
0.783 ‐0.421 ‐4.116 ‐25.469
(0.526) (3.180) (6.565) (23.044)
0.783** 13.529*** 18.535*** 23.946
(0.377) (3.579) (6.110) (20.255)
0.66 12.190*** 11.891* 12.133
(0.428) (4.253) (6.945) (21.413)
1.204*** 14.251*** 22.923*** 27.864*
(0.448) (3.797) (6.987) (15.455)
Estimator FE logit FE Tobit Panel Tobit FE logit FE Tobit Panel Tobit
Time dummies 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year 5 year
Days_late_censLate_budget   Days_late Days_late_cens Late_budget   Days_late
i tRev_shock_neg ,
i tRev_shock_pos ,
i tSplit branch ,_
i tSplit legislature ,_
i tUnemp increase ,_
i tUnemp drop ,_
i tDivided gov ,_
  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 319 727 727 727 320 730 730 730
Notes: 
(1) Std. errors in parantheses.  Robust Std. errors in column (2) and (6)
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(3) A constant is included in all estimations.
(4) Same control variables as in standard specification included in all columns.
Table A1. Late budgets data by state
Information on late budget 
available for 1
Responded to survey Number of late 
budgets observed
Alabama 1989, 1991‐2007 No 0
Alaska ‐ ‐ ‐
Arizona 1988‐90 , 1991‐2007 Yes 1
Arkansas 1988‐2007 No 0
California 1988‐2007 Yes 16
Colorado 1988‐89, 1991, 1993‐2007 No 0
Connecticut 1988‐2007 Yes 3
Delaware 1992‐2007 No 11
Florida 1988‐2007 Yes 1
Georgia 1988‐92, 1993 , 1994‐2007 Yes 0
Hawaii ‐ ‐ ‐
Idaho 1988‐97 , 1998‐2007 Yes 0
Illinois 1988‐2007 Yes 10
Indiana 1988‐2007 No 0
Iowa 1992‐2007 No 0
Kansas 1989‐91, 1993, 1997‐2007 No 0
Kentucky 1988‐2007 No 0
Louisiana 1988‐2007 No 17
Maine 1991‐2007 Yes 1
Maryland 1991‐2007 No 0
Massachusetts 1988‐2007 Yes 15
Michigan 1988‐98, 1991, 1995‐2007 No 5
Minnesota 1988‐2007 No 1
Mississippi 1997‐2007 Yes 0
Missouri 1988‐2007 No 0
Montana 1999‐2007 No 0
Nebraska 1997‐2007 No 0
Nevada 1991‐2007 No 2
New Hampshire 1991‐2007 No 3
New Jersey 1988‐2007 No 5
New Mexico 1988‐94 , 1995‐2007 Yes 0
New York 1988‐2007 No 20
North Carolina 1988‐2007 No 17
North Dakota 1988‐2007 Yes 0
Ohio 1988‐2007 No 3
Oklahoma 1993‐2007 No 0
Oregon 1988‐90, 1992‐2007 No 8
Pennsylvania 1988‐2007 Yes 9
Rhode Island 1988‐2000 , 2001‐2007 Yes 7
South Carolina 1988‐2007 Yes 0
South Dakota 1996‐2007 No 0
Tennessee 1995‐2007 No 0
Texas 1988‐2007 No 0
Utah 1989‐2007 No 0
Vermont 1988‐2007 No 0
Virginia 1988‐2007 Yes 0
Washington 1988‐2007 Yes 0
West Virginia 1988‐92 , 1993‐2007 Yes 0
Wisconsin 1988‐2007 Yes 10
Wyoming 1998‐2007 No 0
1  Normal font indicates that authors' own data collection is the only source of information. Italics indicate that the survey 
sent to state budget offices is the only source of information. Bold indicates that information is available from both sources. 
Table A2. Variable definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
days_late i,t Number of days from end of fiscal year to budget signed into law Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
days_delayed i,t Number of days from legislative deadline to legislative budget 
passage
Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
days_delayed_FY i,t Number of days from end of fiscal year to legislative budget 
passage
Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
late_budget i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if budget was signed into law after end 
of fiscal year
Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
delayed_budget i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if budget was passed by legislature 
after legislative deadline
Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
delayed_FY_budget i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if budget was passed by legislature 
after end of fiscal year
Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
days_late_cens i,t  = days_late i,t  if days_late i,t  > 0, otherwise zero Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
days_delayed_cens i,t  = days_delayed i,t  if days_delayed i,t  > 0, otherwise zero Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
days_delayed_FY_cens i,t  = days_delayed_FY i,t  if days_delayed_FY i,t  > 0, otherwise zero Own data collection, survey 
sent to state budget offices
Unempl_change i,t Change in unemployment rate since previous year Bureau of Labor Statistics
Unempl_increase i,t  = Unempl_change i,t  if Unempl_change i,t  > 0, otherwise zero Bureau of Labor Statistics
Unempl_fall i,t  = ‐1 x Unempl_change i,t  if Unempl_change i,t  < 0, otherwise zero Bureau of Labor Statistics
Divided_gov i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if either  i)  both legislative chambers 
controlled by other party than governor's, or ii)  two chambers 
controlled by different parties 
http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/jo
urnal_datasets/klarner.shtml
Elex i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 in years with a gubernatorial election Book of the States, various 
editions.
Population i,t State population (in millions of people) U.S. Census Bureau
Full_time_legislature i 1 to 5 scale for full‐ vs. part‐time legislatures, where 1 corresponds 
to a part‐time "citizen" legislature, and 5 corresponds to a full‐
time professional legislature 
National Conference of State 
Legislatures
Shut_down i Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state law dictates a shutdown of 
state government activities in the event of a late budget
National Conference of State 
Legislatures
Census_response_rate i Response rate in the 1990 U.S. Census U.S. Census Bureau
Deadline_soft i Dummy variable equal to 1 if 1) the legislature is mandated by 
constitution or statute to end its regular session at a date prior to 
the end of the fiscal year, and 2) the deadline is  either  not clearly 
specified in calendar terms or the legislature has leeway to extend 
it.
State legislatures' websites
Table A2. Variable definitions and sources (continued)
Deadline_hard i Dummy variable equal to 1 if 1) the legislature is mandated by 
constitution or statute to end its regular session at a date prior to 
the end of the fiscal year, and 2) the deadline is clearly specified in 
calendar terms and  the legislature has no leeway to extend it.
State legislatures' websites
Endbalance i,t End‐of‐year balances in the general fund and stabilization fund, as 
projected in executive budget proposal. Measured in percent of 
proposed general fund expenditure
National Association of State 
Budget Officers: The Fiscal 
Survey of States , various 
editions
Kids i,t Percentage of population aged 5 to 17 U.S. Census Bureau
Aged i,t Percentage of population aged 65 or older U.S. Census Bureau
Dem_gov i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the governor is a Democrat http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/jo
urnal_datasets/klarner.shtml
Gov_experience i,t Number of years since the incumbent governor took office Authors' own calculations based 
on information from the 
National Governors Association
New_gov i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the the current budget adoption 
process is the first to be led by the incumbent governor
Authors' own calculations based 
on information from the c
Term_limited i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the governor is subject to a binding 
term limit
National Governors Association
No_carry i Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state law does not allow a 
budget deficit to be carried over to the next fiscal year 
Bohn and Inman (1996)
Line_item_veto i Dummy variable equal to 1 if the the governor has line item veto 
powers
Bohn and Inman (1996)
Supermajority i Dummy variable equal to 1 if a supermajority vote is required to 
pass each budget
National Conference of State 
Legislatures
Proportion_black i Average proportion of black people in the population in the period 
1978 to 1997
U.S. Census Bureau
Proportion_college i Average proportion of college graduates in the population in the 
period 1990 to 1999
U.S. Census Bureau
Rev_shock i,t Percentage deviation of actual general fund revenue from original 
projections, net of the effect of within‐year tax changes
Data provided by Kim Rueben. 
See Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Rev_shock_neg i,t  = ‐1 x Rev_shock i,t  if Rev_shock i,t  < 0, otherwise zero Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Rev_shock_neg i,t  =  Rev_shock i,t  if Rev_shock i,t  > 0, otherwise zero Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Split_branch i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if both legislative chambers are 
controlled by another party than the governor's 
http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/jo
urnal_datasets/klarner.shtml
Split_legislature i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the two legislative chambers are 
controlled by different parties 
http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/jo
urnal_datasets/klarner.shtml
Stab_fund i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state has a budget stabilization 
fund in year t
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Deposit_rule1 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if deposits into stabilization fund are 
made by legislative appropriation
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Table A2. Variable definitions and sources (continued)
Deposit_rule2 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if deposits into stabilization fund are 
required in the event of a budget surplus
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Deposit_rule3 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if deposits into stabilization fund are 
required when revenue growth is positive
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Deposit_rule4 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if deposits into stabilization fund 
follow a mathematical formula
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Withdraw_rule1 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if withdrawals from stabilization fund 
are made by legislative appropriation
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Withdraw_rule2 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if withdrawals from stabilization fund 
are allowed in the event of a budget deficit
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Withdraw_rule3 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if withdrawals from stabilization fund 
require a supermajority legislative approval
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Withdraw_rule4 i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if withdrawals from stabilization fund 
follow a mathematical formula
Wagner and Elder (2005), Fatás 
and Mihov (2006)
Table A3. Alternative late budget definitions, 1988‐2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.612* 10.794*** 16.454** 22.235*** 0.453 10.255*** 13.468* 9.557
(0.338) (2.528) (6.563) (7.102) (0.398) (2.597) (7.212) (10.698)
0.307 1.562 ‐1.009 ‐13.414 0.903** 0.941 0.299 ‐48.421**
(0.396) (2.642) (8.419) (13.034) (0.450) (3.446) (8.806) (22.390)
1.214*** 13.471*** 36.980*** 43.227*** 1.258*** 14.379*** 29.846*** 58.990***
(0.290) (3.385) (6.338) (12.823) (0.404) (3.341) (7.769) (17.815)
Estimator FE logit FE Tobit Panel Tobit FE logit FE Tobit Panel Tobit
Time dummies 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year 5‐year
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 488 716 716 716 328 716 716 716
Notes: 
(1) Std. errors in parantheses.  Robust Std. errors in column (2) and (6)
(2) ***,**,* denote significance on the 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(3) A constant is included in all estimations.
days_delayed_cens_FY
(4) Same control variables as in standard specification included in all columns.
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Abstract
Do voters hold politicians accountable for bad governance? Using a unique panel data
set on late budgets in US state governments, we investigate whether voters react to bad scal
governance by penalizing political actors involved in the budgetary process at election day.
We nd that legislatures face signicant negative electoral consequences of not nishing a
budget on time, while governors are penalized only under unied governments. In general,
electoral penalties are larger where clarity of responsibility, a¤ected by divided government,
supermajority requirements and seat share margins, is higher, consistent with models of
retrospective voting.
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Good government is [...] more than a forum for competing viewpoints or a sounding
board for complaints; it actually gets things done. Robert D. Putnam, Making
Democracy Work, p. 63.
It is everybodys fault - every single elected and appointed o¢ cial in Indianapolis -
and voters ought to consider kicking every one of them out just to drive the message
home: The budget is the most important job you have. It is unbelievable that you
let the regular session end without approving one. It is unconscionable that you are
still bungling it in the special session and risking shutting the state down June 30.
Editorial, The News-Sentinel, Fort Wayne, IN, June 23, 1994.
Why is our legislature so unbelievably incompetent? One of their biggest, and
arguably most important, jobs is to pass a budget. They cant even do that. I am
so utterly disappointed in my state. It makes me sick to my stomach. Dannyin
comments on New York Timeswebsite, May 4, 2010.
1 Introduction
Good governance has in the last twenty years emerged as a catchphrase for the principles for
how well-functioning democratic governments should go about their business. Good governance
is associated with a wealth of desirable outcomes, and a large literature has investigated its
causes and correlates. One central component of good governance is good scal governance.
Fiscal governance relates to the set of rules, institutions, policy processes and internal practices
relating to the design and implementation of the government budget. If scal governance is
well-functioning, what are the forces that make it so? If scal governance is imperfect, can
voters improve on it?
The goal of this paper is to investigate empirically whether voters hold politicians account-
able for bad governance outcomes. Our measure of governance is whether the government
budget is completed in a timely fashion. Budget promptness is one of the original indicators of
institutional performance suggested by Putnam (1993). We collect data on budget deadlines
and actual budget completion dates for US state governments over a period of twenty years to
construct measures of budget lateness.
Not having a budget completed on time has very visible consequences for citizens: First,
while some states pass temporary budgets allowing state appropriations for a limited time, day-
to-day government operations are in many cases in jeopardy. In extreme cases, the government
may shut down all non-essential services or may not be able to meet its nancial obligations,
including payments to employees or state vendors and contractors. Second, the lack of a budget
has consequences for downstream budgeting at every level from state agencies to school districts,
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leading to delayed budget adoptions with resulting ine¢ ciencies. Third, state government
creditworthiness can su¤er, leading to substantial interest rate premiums (Andersen, Lassen
and Nielsen, 2010b).
We employ our measures of late budgets in an empirical investigation of whether actors in
the budgetary process, including both the executive and the legislative branches of government,
are held accountable for late budgets by voters. We carry out three sets of analyses: First, we
estimate the impact of late budgets on the vote share of the incumbent governors party in
gubernatorial elections. Second, we estimate the e¤ect on the share of lower-house seats won in
state legislative elections by the party that held control of the lower house before the election.
Both of these analyses focus on the role of late budgets in determining the relative electoral
performances of political parties in di¤erent branches of state government. In our third and
nal set of analyses, we shift our focus to the level of individual lawmakers in state legislatures.
Here we study how late budgets a¤ect the probability that incumbent lower-house legislators
are re-elected for another term. Throughout, we explore the extent to which voters assign
responsibility conditional on clarity of responsiblity (Paldam, 1991; Powell and Whitten, 1993;
Norpoth, 2001), which is a¤ected by divided government, supermajority rules, and legislative
majority status.
A large literature on retrospective voting and electoral accountability examines the extent
to which voters hold politicians accountable for policy choices and outcomes; in our context of
the US states, this literature includes studies of voter responses to public nance outcomes, e.g.
Peltzman (1992) and Lowry, Alt and Ferree (1998), and broader state level economic outcomes,
e.g. Besley and Case (1995, 2003). These studies generally explore accountability with respect
to position issues such as government policies or policy outcomes over which citizens may hold
very di¤erent views. In contrast, the quality of governance is a valence issue, as dened by
Stokes (1963, p. 372), characterized by the preferences of both parties and all voters [being]
located at a single point - the position of virtue in government.Budget timeliness, we believe,
clearly lives up to this characterization; late budgets benet no-one, while hurting many, and are
so unnecessarily counterproductive that avoiding them is in the interest of all voters, regardless
of ideological preferences.
The literature on electoral accountability and governance, interpreted here as good gov-
ernment, is not large, owing, we believe, partly to the di¢ culties involved in operationalizing
the concept of good governance for empirical analysis.1 One branch of this literature considers
voter response to scandals and charges of corruption, that is, illegal acts involving the abuse
of public o¢ ce, as one particular measure of governance. Peters and Welch (1980) show a sig-
1A large literature, including Knack (2002) examines the correlates of good governance, but this literature is
less focused on how good governance comes about in practice. A di¤erent literature, surveyed by Besley (2005),
looks at candidate quality.
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nicant voter response in the case of congressional races, a nding conrmed in other contexts
(e.g. Jacobson and Dimock, 1995, on scandals) and other countries (e.g. Ferraz and Finan
(2008) on Brazil, and Chang et al. (2010) and Nannicini et al. (2010) on Italy). However,
while corruption denitely is a major problem for government and governing, it is, if one sees
governance as a continuous variable from good to bad governance, located at one extreme. In
contrast, the vast majority of day-to-day governing in most advanced democracies takes place
in environments characterized by good, inadequate and even bad levels of governance. But
even the latter is still far away from corrupt practices.2
One study which is particularly related to the analysis presented in this paper is Binders
(2003) analysis of legislative gridlock at the level of the federal government in the US. She
studies the e¤ect of the number of legislative gridlocks, dened as the number of failed agenda
issues to the number of total agenda issues for each Congress, on the electoral fortunes of
House members, but nds no statistically signicant evidence for a relationship in a sample of
22 congresses. She concludes that [v]oters at election time hold neither the majority party nor
incumbents individually accountable for the collective policy performance of Congress.Our
results, based on our performance measure of timely budgets in state governments, are in stark
contrast to this conclusion.
We nd strong and substantial evidence that political actors who do not deliver a budget
on time are punished at the polls. While governors are punished only when part of a unied
government, legislatures are (almost) always punished. The estimated e¤ects are large: Gover-
nors in unied governments lose 9% of the vote if every budget enacted during a gubernatorial
term is late, while the majority party in the legislature loses 2-3% of its seat share in the lower
house. Our empirical evidence also suggests that voters are sophisticated in their attribution
of blame: Supermajority requirements to pass the budget make it less clear who is responsible
for budget delays, and voter reactions are weaker when such requirements are present. Also,
electoral consequences are larger the stronger is the hold on power for the majority party in
the legislature, as measured by the seat share margin to the minority party. Furthermore,
states with higher levels of social capital see voters reacting more strongly to legislative delays,
a mechanisms consistent with the Putnams (1993) hypothesis that jurisdictions with higher
levels of social capital have better governance. Finally, the electoral punishment for late bud-
gets is weaker when the economy is faltering than when it is booming, consistent with voters
allowing legislators more leeway when their task is harder.
Results on reelection rates at the level of individual legislators are consistent with these
2 Indeed, the occurence of legislative delays and late budgets considered below are not correlated with cor-
ruption convictions at the state level in the US: The number of convictions for corruption relative to population,
taken from Alt and Lassen (2010) and averaged over the period considered here, is uncorrelated with the oc-
curence of late budgets ( = :00) ; while it is in fact negatively correlated with the frequency of legislative delays
( =  :19).
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ndings, and provide further insights about the personal political costs of late budgets for state
lawmakers: majority and minority members are punished equally under divided governments,
but only majority members are punished under unied government, while minority members
are shielded from voter anger in this situation.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section denes and describes our measures of
budget lateness. Section 3 lays out our theoretical priors on the impact of late budgets on
state electoral outcomes, while section 4 describes our data and estimation methods. Results
are presented in section 5. We conclude in section 6.
2 Late budgets: Denition and data
What constitutes a late budget? In practice, budget processes vary considerably across US
states. This complicates cross-state comparisons of budget timeliness, as there is no obvious,
universal denition of when a budget is late. The answer to when a budget is late obviously
depends on two things, namely 1) the criteria for the budget process to be considered completed,
and 2) the denition of the appropriate deadline by which this completion is supposed to be
achieved. This is further complicated by the fact that the two main actors in the budget process,
the legislature and the governor, in many cases face di¤erent deadlines, and it can often be
argued that they complete their respective parts of the budget negotiations at di¤erent points
in time.
We dene a budget to be late if it is nally enacted, typically by the governor signing the
budget, after the beginning of the new scal year.3 For the case of the legislature, we dene a
legislative delay as a situation in which the budget receives nal legislative approval after the
state legislatures deadline for passing the budget. In some states, this deadline coincides with
the end of the scal year. Other states have earlier deadlines for the state legislature to pass the
budget, however. For example, many state legislatures are required by constitution or statute
to end their regular session by a certain date, and such requirements e¤ectively constitute a
deadline for all legislative activity, including passage of the budget. In our analyses below, we
use the ratio of late budgets or legislative delays to the actual number of budgets in the period
3There are a number of exceptions to this general denition: for example, if the governor vetoes the entire
budget, the legislature can in most states override the veto by some super majority vote in both chambers, and
the budget then becomes law without the governors signature; alternatively, governors may in some states let
the budget become law without signing it, simply by letting the deadline for gubernatorial vetoes run out.
Our measurement is further complicated by the fact that some states do not pass a single, all-encompassing
budget bill. Instead, their budgets consist of several individual appropriation bills. In such cases we do not
consider the budget fully enacted until the last appropriation bill for state operations has been enacted. Also,
state governments sometimes react to unexpected developments in state government nances by passing within-
scal year supplementary appropriation bills. We do not view such supplementary budget bills as part of the
budget adoption process that we are interested in, however, and we therefore restrict our attention to the budgets
as originally enacted. See Andersen et al. (2010a) for a thorough discussion of these and other related issues.
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since the previous election for the institutional actor in question.
The data for the budget enactment dates were collected from three sources: (i) State
legislatureswebsites; (ii) Archived newspaper articles; and (iii) a survey sent to state budget
o¢ cers. Some state legislatureswebsites have detailed information on the status and histories
of all bills enacted in previous legislative sessions, including the budget bill(s). However, most
state legislatures bill tracking tools only cover the most recent legislative sessions, if any.
We therefore supplemented with information from archived newspaper articles accessed via
Newslibrary.com.4 Finally, we also sent a survey to state budget o¢ cers asking them to conrm
the data we had collected ourselves as well as provide us with the information that we had not
been able to nd via any of the other sources. Out of the 48 mainland states, 19 responded to
our survey. When overlapping, the data they reported were virtually identical to the data we
collected ourselves.5
For the years 1988-2007 we have recorded 167 cases where the budget was signed into law
after the beginning of the new scal year. This amounts to 23 percent of the budgets for
which we have data. Correspondingly, 190 budgets (26%) received legislative passage after the
legislatures state-specic deadline, while 119 (17%) were nally passed by the legislature after
the beginning of the new scal year. Figures 1a and 1b show the distribution of legislative
delays and late budgets, respectively, across states for the period that we have data.
<Figures 1a and 1b about here. [state means of legislative delays and late budgets over time,
48 states]>
A majority of states have at least once experienced that the state legislature did not meet its
deadline for legislative passage of the budget, while 22 states have experienced a budget enacted
after the beginning of the new scal year in the time period considered here. New York, North
Carolina, California, Oregon and Wisconsin score high on both measures of budget lateness.
The causes of such delays are analyzed in depths in Andersen et al. (2010a).
3 Fiscal governance and voter attribution of responsibility
Our basic hypothesis is that voters dislike bad (scal) governance, here exemplied by not
having a budget in place before deadline. There are, however, good reasons to be sceptical of
nding strong and unconditional voter responses to state budget delays: First, the large number
4Newslibrary.com is an online newspaper archive that covers more than 2,500 news sources across the United
States. We also used The New York Times online archive on several occasions to access relevant news articles.
In many cases, these newspaper accounts contained additional information helpful in handling uncertain cases.
All articles used in constructing the data set is on le with the authors.
5The instructions for the survey are available from the authors upon request. Table A1 in Andersen et al.
(2010a) gives details on the source of information on late budgets for each state.
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of players involved in the budget process, ranging from the executive branch to majority as well
as minority members in both chambers of the legislature, presumably makes it hard for voters
to decipher who is to blame for a stalemate. Naturally, experienced politicians do what they can
to exploit this lack of clarity of responsibility by blaming their opponents for all mishappenings.
Second, dissatisfaction with a particular branch of government does not necessarily translate
into voting behavior. In federal US politics, the so-called "Fenno paradox" (Fenno 1978) posits
that constituents may disapprove strongly of Congress as a whole, which is a well-established
empirical fact, and yet still support their own member. Binder (2003) nds that legislative
gridlock in Congress lowers Congressional approval ratings but has no signicant impact on
actual election outcomes. She attributes this to the Fenno paradox. If a similar "paradox"
applies to state legislatures, this will work against us nding an e¤ect of state budget delays
on state election outcomes.
The problem of lack of clarity of responsibility is likely to be much more pronounced if
di¤erent branches of state government are controlled by di¤erent parties than if one party
controls the executive branch as well as the legislative branch. Lowry, Alt and Ferree (1998)
nd that voters react more strongly to state scal policy outcomes under unied government
than under divided government. We expect, noting that budget delays and late budgets are
much more likely to occur under divided government in the rst place (Andersen et al. 2010a),
a similar pattern for voter responses to late state budgets. Furthermore, clarity of responsibility
in the legislature is also likely to be greater when the majority party has a considerable margin
in the number of seats held relative to the minority party; owing to comparatively limited party
discipline in US political system, a simple majority does not always guarantee the ability to pass
a budget due to the possibility of defections. On the other hand, supermajority requirements
to pass the budget, present in a handful of states, gives power to the minority party and is
therefore likely to dilute clarity of responsibility even under a unied government.
Finally, late budgets are more likely when the economy is weak. As shown by Andersen
et al. (2010a), increasing unemployment is a strong predictor of both legislative delays and
late budgets. To the extent that voters recognize or simply believe that reaching an agreement
on the budget is harder when the economy is faltering, we would expect a weaker electoral
response to delayed budgets when unemployment is increasing, while voters would react more
strongly to budget delays when the economy is strong and the impasse can be attributed largely
to political maneuverings.
As described above, governors and legislatures often operate under di¤erent deadlines; this
is likely to have consequences for voter responses. In many states, legislatures have a deadline
for passing the budget well before the new scal year, and we expect that voters focus on
whether the legislature passes the budget relative to this deadline, as also exemplied by the
editorial cited in the introduction. The governors deadline, in contrast, is the beginning of the
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new scal year; in general, governors, while typically formulating the initial budget proposal,
have to wait for legislative passage in order to nally sign the budget into law, possibly after a
process of (line-item) vetos or back-and-forth between the governor and the legislature. Thus,
the relevant benchmark for the governor is whether the budget is late, relative to the beginning
of the new scal year.
Finally, we also briey investigate the role of social capital. Social capital is frequently
attributed a role in assuring good governance (Putnam, 1993; Knack, 2002), and, indeed,
Andersen et al. (2010a, table 2) show that higher levels of social capital are associated with a
signicantly reduced likelihood for observing late budgets. It is less clear how high(er) levels
of social capital are actually transmitted into better governance outcomes. One such possible
channel from social capital to governance goes through retrospective voting. For example,
Ferejohn (1986) shows that retrospective voting in models of the electoral process based on
the idea of political agency breaks down under group-specic transfers; what is needed for
retrospective voting to function is some coordination or cooperation among voters on standards
for electing politicians.6 We hypothesize that higher levels of social capital imply a greater
consideration for the public good and, as a consequence, an increased willingness to engage in
aggregate retrospective voting despite the possiblity of group specic transfers. In turn, this
willingness manifests itself in larger electoral penalties for bad governance.
4 Specication and data
We study state election outcomes in the 48 continental US states. Nebraska and Mississippi are
omitted in the analyses of legislative elections, due to the unicameral, non-partisan legislature
in the former and insu¢ cient data on late budgets in the latter.7 Our data set covers the
years 1988-2007 for gubernatorial elections, 1988-2006 for legislative elections and 1988-2003
for individual legislator reelection outcomes, but lack of information on budget enactment dates
implies that the available time series is considerably shorter for some states, making our data
set an unbalanced panel. Since we always include the states history of late budgets during at
least the two years leading up to the election, the earliest elections included in our analyses are
from 1989.
6 In the parlance of the economic voting literature, sociotropic, rather than egotropic, voting is needed.
7We do have enough data for Mississippi to include it in the analysis of gubernatorial elections. This is
because our sample in this case covers 2007, for which we have late budget information for all states. Since 2007
was an election year in Mississippi, this produces one more observation, which allows us to include Mississippi
in the estimations.
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4.1 Empirical models and dependent variables
Our generic specication models the electoral support for a party or individual that held control
of a particular state government branch or o¢ ce before the election. We shall generally refer
to this party or individual as the incumbent partyor simply the incumbent.Thus, in the
party-based analyses, the term incumbentrefers to a party, and the identity of this party in
a given state in a given year depends on which branch is being analyzed: In our analyses of
gubernatorial elections, it refers to the incumbent governors party. In the analyses of lower-
house elections, it refers to the party that controlled the lower house in the legislature prior to
the election, irrespective of whether this is also the party that the governor belongs to. Finally,
in the analyses of individual state lawmakersreelection prospects, the term incumbentalways
refers to the person running for re-election.
4.1.1 Gubernatorial elections
The dependent variable in the analyses of gubernatorial elections is the vote share of the
incumbent party. The source is the Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years,
supplemented with information from the US Election Atlas (www.uselectionatlas.org). We
restrict our sample to elections in which the incumbent governor belongs to one of the two
major parties. The regressions we estimate can be written as
vote_shareit =   lateGit + 0zGit  lateGit + 0xGit + Gi + Gt + "Git
where vote_shareit is the incumbent partys share of the vote in the gubernatorial election
in state i in year t, lateGit is some measure of the states history of budget lateness since the
previous gubernatorial election, zGit is a vector of contextual variables that may inuence the
marginal e¤ect of budget delays on vote shares, and xGit is a vector of control variables. All
right-hand-side variables, including the key variable lateGit , are described below. The variables
Gi and 
G
t are state- and year xed incumbency e¤ects (as opposed to party-specic xed
e¤ects); these are included to capture permanent di¤erences in incumbency advantage across
states and nation-wide shocks to incumbent popularity, respectively. The former could be
driven by for example di¤erences in term length, organization of primary elections, size and
structure of the legislature, or media coverage of state politics, while the latter could reect
events on the national scene that change votersattitudes towards incumbents at large, such
as political scandals, national crises etc.
We estimate the model using standard panel data xed e¤ects methods. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-state serial correlation in the error term.
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4.1.2 Legislative seat shares
In the analysis of party seat shares in lower-house legislative elections, we use the seat share
after the election for the incumbent party, i.e. the party that held a majority in the lower
house before the election. Party seat shares are computed from Klarners (2007) data set on
partisan balances in state legislatures. This data set contains information on the number of
Democrats, Republicans, non-major party legislators, vacancies, and total number of seats in
state legislatures in each year between 1959 and 2007. Our approach has a small drawback
in that it relies on seat shares from the legislative session in the year following the election,
rather than on actual election results. If shifts in partisan balances occur between the time
of the election and the subsequent legislative session, due to for example legislators switching
from one party to another or being replaced with opposite-party candidates, this will lead to
measurement error in our computed seat shares. However, such shifts are infrequent.
We model the seat share obtained by the incumbent party in state i in a year t legislative
election as follows:
seat_shareit =   lateLit + 0zLit  lateLit + 0xLit + Li + Lt + "Lit
The superscripts L on the right-hand side variables reect that these variables are adapted
to legislative elections, rather than gubernatorial elections. For example, lateLit measures the
states history of budget lateness since the previous legislative election.
As explained below, the vector of control variables xLit always includes the incumbent partys
vote share in a same-year gubernatorial election. This is an endogenous variable if the error term
in the seat share equation is correlated with the error term in the equation for the concurrent
gubernatorial election. To deal with this problem we instrument the gubernatorial election
vote share with a dummy variable for whether the incumbent governor runs for re-election.
The equation for party seat shares is then estimated by the xed e¤ects 2SLS estimator.
4.1.3 Individual legislator re-election
For the analysis of individual state representativesre-election prospects, we use the ICPSR
data set on state legislative returns (Carsey et al., 2008). This data set contains information on
259,000 candidates who ran for state legislative o¢ ce from 1967 through 2003. Unfortunately,
no information is available for more recent years, which limits the size of our sample. In each
lower-house election year between 1990 and 2003 in each state, we identify all individuals in
the data set that won a seat in the lower house of the state legislature. We then track the
electoral fates of these incumbents in the next lower-house election to determine whether they
ran for re-election, and if so, whether they succeeded. In each case, the information in the data
set also allows us to determine whether the incumbent was facing a binding term limit, and
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whether the incumbent ran for the state senate instead of the lower house. For each eligible
incumbent in each year, we then code our binary dependent variable as 1 if the incumbent
was re-elected, and zero otherwise. "Eligible" here means those incumbents that were neither
term limited, nor running for the state senate.8 This produces a sample size of roughly 22,800
observations.
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, we employ the following probit model:
Pr(reelectionjit = 1jlateLit; zLit;xLit;wjit; Ii ; It ) = (lateLit +0zLjitlateLit+0xLit+0wjit+Ii+It )
where  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The subscript j denotes
the identity of an individual incumbent legislator, while the usual subscripts i and t denote state
and year, respectively. In addition to the state-level control variables included in the analyses
of legislative seat shares, we now also include some incumbent-specic characteristics in the
vector wjit. Note also that the vector of interaction variables, zjit, now contains state-level
variables as well as incumbent-specic variables (hence the subscript j).
As in the analyses of legislative seat shares, the vector xLit includes the vote share obtained by
the individual incumbents party in concurrent gubernatorial elections. We therefore estimate
the model by conditional maximum likelihood IV-probit, where the vote share in concurrent
gubernatorial elections is again instrumented with a dummy variable for whether the incumbent
governor runs for re-election.
The presence of state xed incumbency e¤ects is handled by including a full set of state
dummy variables. Note that this does not give rise to the usual incidental parameters problem
associated with probit on panel data with a xed e¤ect for each individual. The reason is that
an "individual" in our sample is an incumbent (subscript j), and not a state (subscript i). In
terms of asymptotics, we think of the number of incumbents going to innity, while keeping
the number of states (and thereby the number of parameters to be estimated) xed.
Allowing state level variables to a¤ect individual level outcomes opens up the possibility
that individual level error terms "jit are correlated within states, which can result in standard
errors being underestimated. This suggests correcting for clustering at the state level. On the
other hand, given that estimation by a probit model necessarily entails specic assumptions
about the error structure that are inconsistent with the clustering correction, we carry out our
8Note that this approach treats elections in which the incumbent did not run (unless term limited or running
for state senate) as incumbent defeats. The data set only contains entries for candidates that did actually run,
and an incumbent not running for re-election will therefore be absent in the data set in what would have been the
year of re-election. Unfortunately, the data set is for some states in some years plagued by missing observations.
Therefore, the absence of a data entry for an incumbent does not necessarily imply that the incumbent did not
run. To address this problem, we always check whether we can identify a winning candidate in the incumbents
district. If another winner is identied, we assume that the incumbent did in fact not run for re-election and
treat the election outcome as an incumbent defeat. If not, we treat it as missing information and omit it from
the analysis.
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regressions without such corrections; in practice, however, our results are largely una¤ected by
correcting for clustering in various ways.
4.2 Explanatory variables
This subsection describes the explanatory variables used in the analyses and our motives for
including them in the regressions below. More detailed descriptions of all variables, including
their sources, can be found in the data appendix.
4.2.1 Late budgets
Our main explanatory variable of interest in the analyses of gubernatorial elections is the
number of late budgets since the previous election. To allow comparisons between states
with two-year electoral cycles and states with four-year electoral cycles, and between states
with annual budget enactment and states with biennial budgeting, we normalize by the total
number of budgets enacted since the previous election.9 For legislative elections we also employ
an alternative measure, namely the (normalized) number of legislative budget delays since the
previous election, i.e. the number of times that the legislature exceeded its deadline for passage
of the budget, as described in section 2. This is arguably a more accurate indicator of the level
of gridlock in the legislature.
For both gubernatorial and legislative elections, we only include those years in which the
current incumbent party was in control. For example, if the majority in a legislative chamber
shifts from one party to the other in the middle of an electoral term, due to for instance a
legislator switching party, the relevant period over which we calculate the average number of
late budgets (or legislative delays) is from the time of the shift in partisan balance until the
next election. The reason for this is that voters are less likely to hold the current incumbent
party accountable for budget delays that occurred while another party was in charge.
4.2.2 Interaction terms
We condition the e¤ect of late budgets on a range of covariates by including interaction terms
between these covariates and our late budget variable. First, we allow di¤erent slopes for unied
vs. divided governments in the equations for both gubernatorial and legislative elections. A
unied government is here dened as a situation in which the same party controls the executive
branch as well as both chambers in the legislature. Divided government is dened as any
other combination of partisan control. We also allow for a level e¤ect of divided government
9We have also experimented with alternative time horizons. One approach is to use a dummy for whether the
most recently enacted budget was late. Another is to use number of late budgets over the two most recent years
only. The latter coincides with our preferred measure when elections take place every other year. In general,
the results do not hinge on the exact choice of time horizon.
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by including its dummy variable directly with no interaction. Second, we examine whether
supermajority requirements to pass the budget dilute the clarity of responsibility obtained
under unied government. We do this by further rening the model, allowing separate slopes
on the late budget variable for unied governments with no supermajority requirements, unied
governments with supermajority requirements, and divided governments.
Third, in the analyses of legislative elections we interact our late budget variable with
the incumbent partys margin to the minority party, dened as the di¤erence in seat shares
between the two parties. Fourth, we interact late budgets with the 12-months change in the
state unemployment rate. Fifth, we allow the impact of late budgets to depend on the level
of social capital, measured by the census response rate. As argued by Knack (2002), census
response is a public good at the state level, as census counts a¤ect federal funding and the
size of congressional delegations. Since an individuals possibility of a¤ecting such outcomes
is small, census response is [...] a reasonable proxy for socially cooperative attitudes.The
minimum value in our sample is attained by South Carolina (58 percent), while maximum
values of 75 and 76 percent are found in Minnesota, Wisconsin and Iowa.
Finally, in the analyses on individual legislatorsre-election prospects we allow budget delays
to have di¤erent e¤ects for members of the majority party in the legislature versus members
of the minority party. To conserve degrees of freedom we generally do not include all of these
interaction terms at once. Instead we take a step-by-step approach and include them one by
one in separate regressions.
4.2.3 State economic outcomes and scal policy
To capture state economic conditions we include the change in the state unemployment rate
from October in the year prior to the election to October in the year of the election. We also
control for the real growth in housing prices since the year before the election. As noted by
Wolfers (2002), housing prices is a potentially important control variable, because it captures
a forward-looking, market-based evaluation of a broad array of state characteristics that are
inuenced by government policies, such as infrastructure, job opportunities and public safety.10
To control for changes in the size of government we include the change in the ratio of state
government expenditures to GDP since the previous election. Tax increases enacted since the
previous election, measured in percent of total general fund revenue, are also included. Finally,
to control for scal balance we include the state government budget surplus in the year of
the election. The surplus is calculated as the di¤erence between general revenue and general
10We also experimented with including other state economic indicators, such as the average yearly state
ination rate and the average yearly growth rate of real state GDP per capita, both since the year of the
previous election. The estimated coe¢ cients were statistically insignicant, however, so we omit them in the
results reported here.
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expenditure and measured in percent of state GDP. Negative values of the surplus variable
correspond to a state government budget decit.
4.2.4 Incumbency advantage and persistence in voting
It is well known that incumbent candidates in US elections enjoy considerable advantages over
their challengers (see, e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2003 for a recent review). Further, voting
behavior may display a substantial amount of persistence even when the incumbent politician
(the person, not the party) does not run for re-election; that is, voters may stick with the party
they voted for in the previous election simply out of habit. To capture such e¤ects, we include
the election result in the previous election for the current incumbent party or individual. That
is, for gubernatorial elections we include the vote share of the incumbent governors party in
the previous gubernatorial election. We also include a dummy variable that takes the value one
if the incumbent governor ran for re-election, and zero otherwise. In the analyses of party seat
shares in lower-house legislative elections, we include the seat share won in the previous lower-
house election by the party that held a majority immediately prior to the current election.
Finally, in the analyses of individual legislators reelection prospects we include the current
incumbents share of the district vote in the previous election.11
4.2.5 Coattails and national events
Previous studies have found state election outcomes to be a¤ected by concurrent elections for
higher o¢ ce (Chubb 1988; Alt, Lowry and Ferree 1998). To address this issue we always in-
clude the share of the major party vote in the state captured by the presidential candidate
who belongs to the same party as the incumbent party/individual. In our models of legislative
elections we also include the vote share of the incumbent party in the same-year gubernato-
rial election. In years with no gubernatorial election we replace this variable with zeros. A
dummy variable for gubernatorial election year is then included to avoid problems of shifting
the intercept in such years.12 The inclusion of gubernatorial election vote shares raises issues
of endogeneity and necessitates estimation with instrumental variables, as explained above.
Of course, voterspartisan attitudes in state elections may also be a¤ected by events on
the national scene in non-election years. To proxy for national shifts in partisan sentiments
we construct a job approval rating index for the president at the time of the state election.
The index is constructed as the percentage of respondents in nation-wide Gallup polls who
11Note that this is in none of the cases equivalent to including a lagged dependent variable. In the analyses
of vote/seat shares, the variables included coincide with the lagged dependent variables if the party currently in
control was also in control before the previous election, but this is of course not always the case.
12Similarly, we replace the presidential vote shares with zeros in years with no presidential election. The fact
that we also include a full set of time dummies renders the inclusion of a time dummy for presidential election
year superuous.
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approve of the presidents performance, minus the percentage that disapproves. We interact
this variable with a dummy variable that takes the value one if the president belongs to the
incumbent party, and minus one otherwise. The latter variable is also included directly with
no other interactions. We also control for nation-wide shocks to incumbency advantage by
including a full set of year dummies, as represented by the ts in the equations above.
4.2.6 Individual legislator characteristics
In the probit analyses of individual legislatorsreelection prospects, we include the following in-
dividual characteristics (represented in the vector wjit above): whether the incumbent belongs
to the majority party in the legislature, the number of times the incumbent has previously run
for o¢ ce, as well as the square of the latter.
5 Results
5.1 Gubernatorial elections
Results for gubernatorial elections are reported in Table 1, where each column shows results
for the e¤ect of late budgets conditioned on di¤erent (sets of) covariates. Control variables
are the same across all columns, as are the estimated e¤ects of the controls, which we briey
review before turning to the results on late budgets.
The macroeconomic control variables do not have much explanatory power. The coe¢ cient
on the change in the unemployment rate has the expected negative sign, whereas the coe¢ cient
on real growth in housing prices is surprisingly also negative. Both coe¢ cients are small and
statistically insignicant, however. The results for the scal policy variables are stronger. A
tax increase of 1 percent of general fund revenue lowers the governors partys vote share by
0.25 percentage points. Voters also strongly punish governors for budget decits but reward
them for surpluses: A 1 percentage point increase in the surplus to GDP-ratio is rewarded
with a 4-5 percentage points increase in vote share.13 These results are statistically signicant
at the ve percent level, or even lower. In contrast, we do not nd any signicant e¤ect of
increases in the size of government, as measured by the ratio of spending to GDP.
While the incumbent partys vote share in the previous election does not appear to have
any independent e¤ect on current vote shares, we do nd a strong incumbency e¤ect on vote
shares: Incumbent governors seeking re-election can expect to score 8 percentage points higher
than candidates who hope to replace a retiring governor from their own party. We nd no
direct e¤ect of divided government on incumbent party vote shares.
13 In results not reported, we allowed a di¤erent slope for positive and negative values of the surplus variable.
The data did not reject the null hypothesis of equal coe¢ cients on the decit- and surplus variables.
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National events play an important role in gubernatorial elections: Presidential coattails
are substantial and statistically signicant, with the incumbent party gaining between 0.4
and 0.5 percentage points for every 1 percentage point increase in the vote share of their
presidential candidate. Incumbents from the presidents party can generally expect to do
worse than incumbents belonging to the national opposition party, but the di¤erence is smaller
when the president enjoys high approval ratings. When the president is extremely popular
(percentage of people approving must be at least 30 points in excess of percentage of people
disapproving), incumbents from the presidents party may have an advantage.
We now turn to the variable of primary interest, the late budget variables. Column 1
presents an estimate of an unconditional e¤ect of late budgets on the incumbent partys vote
share. As we suspected, the data reveal no such unconditional e¤ect: The estimated coe¢ cient
is virtually zero and statistically insignicant. The regression presented in column 2 conditions
the e¤ect of late budgets on the partisan control of state government branches. The results
are now remarkably di¤erent: For divided governments, we nd a positive but statistically
insignicant coe¢ cient on the normalized number of late budgets. For unied governments, on
the other hand, the coe¢ cient is negative, numerically large and statistically signicant. The
point estimate suggests that if every budget enacted during a gubernatorial term period is late,
a party that controls both the executive and the legislative branch during that term can expect
a punishment from voters in the order of 9 percent of the votes in the following gubernatorial
election. With a median margin of victory of 13.1 percentage points for the gubernatorial races
in our sample, this is a very large e¤ect. The statistical uncertainty is sizeable, however: A 95
percent condence interval suggests that the e¤ect could be between 0.02 and 18.1 percent of
the votes.
In column 3 we rene the model by distinguishing between two types of unied governments:
Those that face supermajority requirements to pass the budget in the legislature, and those
that do not. We nd a noticeable di¤erence in the e¤ect of late budgets: Incumbent parties
in a unied government with no supermajority requirements are signicantly punished for
late budgets, whereas unied governments that operate under a supermajority requirement,
which strongly increases the likelihood the the opposition party has inuence, are not. The
di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level; in fact, the e¤ect of late budgets under
the latter type of unied government is statistically indistinguishable from the e¤ect under a
divided government, which is consistent with the argument that voters take into account the
institutional setting when attributing responsibility for scal governance outcomes.
[Table 1 about here]
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5.2 Legislative elections
5.2.1 Party seat shares
Table 2 shows results for our estimations of seat shares for the incumbent party in lower house
legislative elections. Starting with the control variables, we again nd no signicant e¤ect from
changes in the state unemployment rate, but the incumbent party in the legislature is more
successful when housing prices are rising. For the scal policy variables, the estimated coe¢ -
cients generally have the signs we would expect, but, in contrast to the results for gubernatorial
elections, none of them are statistically signicant. This is consistent with previous ndings
that it is primarily the governor who is held accountable for the economy (Niemi et al. 1995;
Lowry et al. 1998).
We nd a strong persistency in lower house seat shares, as can be seen from the sizeable
and highly signicant coe¢ cient on the incumbent partys seat share in the previous election.
As in gubernatorial elections, we nd a considerable inuence from presidential politics: The
president casts a long shadow, and members of his own party generally do worse in state
legislative elections unless the president enjoys very favorable approval ratings. Finally, we
nd evidence of coattails from gubernatorial elections. With a one percentage point increase in
the seat share in the legislature for every 8-10 percent of votes won in a concurrent gubernatorial
race, the e¤ect is about one third of the e¤ect from presidential elections. It is statistically
signicant at the ve percent level in 6 out of 8 regressions.14
In column 1 we include the normalized number of late budgets since the previous election
with no interactions terms. In contrast to the results for gubernatorial elections, we now in
fact nd an unconditional, negative and statistically signicant e¤ect of late budgets on the
electoral support for the incumbent party. The point estimate of the coe¢ cient on late budgets
suggests that producing a perfect recordof late budgets triggers a decline in the seat share
of the incumbent party of 2.2 percentage points. Taking statistical uncertainty into account,
the e¤ect could be between 0.2 and 4.3 percentage points.15 Unlike in the case of gubernatorial
elections, this appears to be the case no matter who controls the di¤erent branches of state
government. In particular, allowing di¤erent slope coe¢ cients under unied government and
divided government, respectively, does not suggest any di¤erence in the e¤ect of late budgets
between these two regimes, as seen in column 2. The two coe¢ cients are of similar size and the
di¤erence between them is statistically insignicant. The only di¤erence is that the coe¢ cient
for unied governments is less precisely estimated than its divided government counterpart.
In columns 3-8 we study the e¤ect of legislative budget delays on legislative election out-
14As described above, the concurrent gubernatorial vote share is instrumented by an indicator variable for
whether the governor runs for reelection; this is a strong instrument, with the rst stage F-test statistic equal
to 102.8 for the regression reported in column 3.
15As suggested by a 95 percent condence interval for the coe¢ cient on the normalized number of late budgets.
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comes. We generally nd stronger e¤ects and more precise estimates when using this variable
instead of the number of late budgets. Column 3 shows a highly signicant unconditional e¤ect
of legislative delays on the seat share of the incumbent party. The results in columns 4 and
5 elaborate on this point: Voters appear to hold the majority party in the lower house of the
legislature accountable for delays in the legislative budget process, no matter whether that
party has unied control over state government or not. In column 5, the numerically smaller
coe¢ cient for unied governments that operate under a supermajority requirement to pass the
budget suggests that voters do respond less aggressively when such requirements are present,
but the di¤erence to the coe¢ cient for unied government without supermajority requirements
is statistically insignicant.
In column 6 we allow the impact of such delays to depend on the incumbent partys seat
share margin to the minority party. The resulting coe¢ cient on the interaction term between
legislative delays and the seat share margin is negative and statistically signicant at the 10
percent level. Thus, the larger the majority party is relative to the minority party, the stronger
are the consequences for its electoral support when it fails to deliver a state budget within the
intended time frame. This is consistent with the clarity-of-responsibility hypothesis, but also
with other hypotheses, as we shall explain in the next section.
In column 7 we investigate a frequently mentioned cause of good governance: Social capital.
We interact legislative budget delays with our social capital measure: The nal response rate
in the 2000 Census. The results show that a state with the minimum level of social capital,
which in our sample corresponds to a census response rate of 58 percent, sees no response at
all to late budgets, while legislatures in states with maximum social capital see support for the
incumbent party decreasing by 5.1 percentage points. Consistent with such a penalty, Andersen
et al. (2010a) nd that late budgets do indeed occur signicantly less frequently in states with
high social capital.
Finally, column 8 examines whether voter responses to legislative budget delays depend
on the shape of the state economy, as measured by the change in the state unemployment
rate. The results indicate that voter responses to legislative delays are sharper when the
economy is gaining momentum but milder when it is slowing down. This is consistent with
the interpretation that voters perceive a weak economy as a valid excuse for failing to pass a
budget in time, while no such excuse exists when the economy is strong.16
[Table 2 about here]
16 In regressions not reported we allowed a di¤erent interaction e¤ect depending on whether the change in the
unemployment rate was positive or negative. The results revealed no signicant di¤erence, but the standard
errors on the interaction terms were somewhat higher than in the specication presented here.
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5.2.2 Individual incumbent reelection prospects
The results in the previous section showed that the majority party in the lower house of the
legislature loses seats after a legislative term plagued by late budgets. From the point of
view of political parties, this means that late budgets hurt the party currently holding power.
The minority party, on the other hand, is actually likely to gain from budgetary delays. It
is tempting to extend this conclusion to individual majority- and minority party members in
the legislature. The results on seat shares are consistent with two widely di¤erent stories for
individual legislators, however: First, the results could indicate that voters react to legislative
budget delays by exclusively punishing those politicians perceived as responsible for them,
namely the members of the ruling majority party. The larger the majority party is compared
to the minority party, the clearer is the placement of responsibility, and the harsher will the
punishment for the majority party be.
Second, an alternative theory is that voters hold all incumbent legislators equally account-
able for budget delays, regardless of their partisan a¢ liation. Budget delays then trigger an
anti-incumbent reaction from voters, implying fewer incumbent reelections. And since the cur-
rent majority party has more incumbents than the minority party to begin with, they can
expect to face a larger number of incumbent defeats. If the ousted incumbents are replaced by
candidates from the opposite party, this leads to a rise in the seat share of the minority party
at the expense of the majority party. Moreover, the e¤ect on seat shares will be increasing in
the initial margin between the majority party and the minority party, not because of greater
clarity of responsibility, but merely due to an arithmetic fact: The more seats a party has, the
more seats can it expect to lose when voter sentiments turn anti-incumbent.17
To test which of these interpretations is appropriate, we now take a closer look on the e¤ect
of legislative budget delays on the probability of reelection for individual legislators. Table
3 shows results for a range of IV probit models. As in the previous subsections, each model
allows the e¤ect of legislative budget delays to depend on the control variables in a di¤erent
manner. A main purpose of the analyses is to examine whether legislative budget delays has the
same e¤ect on reelection prospects for all incumbents across parties. We therefore always allow
separate slope coe¢ cients on the number of delays for majority- and minority party members,
as well as separate interaction e¤ects. As usual, the set of control variables is the same in all
models.18
17These two interpretations represent two extreme models of voter behavior. Of course, the true model could
be somewhere in between, implying that incumbents of all parties are held accountable to some extent, but
majority party members more so than minority party members.
18 In principle, the impact of all control variables could also be di¤erent for majority party members vs.
minority party members. In results not reported, we estimated a model with separate coe¢ cients on all control
variables. We then tested the null hypotheses of equal coe¢ cients for all variables, separately as well as jointly.
The null was only rejected for one control variable, namely divided government. We therefore allow separate
coe¢ cients on divided government for majority- and minority members in the results reported here, while the
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The statistics reported in column (a) of Table 3 are the estimated probabilities that an
incumbent will earn reelection after a legislative term with no legislative budget delays. Column
(b) reports the discrete changes in this probability that follow from a change in the normalized
number of legislative budget delays from zero to one. We condition this e¤ect on various
combinations of the control variables. The statistics in column (c) are the di¤erences between
the changes in probability reported in column (b) for di¤erent values of the control variables,
i.e. the di¤erence of di¤erences, or the interaction e¤ects between legislative budget delays and
control variables of particular interest. For all of the estimated models, a full set of parameter
estimates can be found in appendix Table A.2.
In model (1) we condition the e¤ect of legislative budget delays on only one characteristic,
namely whether the incumbent belongs to the majority party or minority party in the legisla-
ture. We nd that the probability of reelection for a majority party incumbent falls by about
5 percentage points when all state budgets enacted since the previous election were delayed,
down from a 79% reelection probability when none were delayed. The e¤ect is highly statis-
tically signicant. For members of the minority party, the estimated e¤ect is roughly half as
large, and signicant at the 10 percent level. Note, however, that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the e¤ect is equally strong for both types of incumbents.
Model (2) renes these results by conditioning not only on the partisan a¢ liation of the
incumbent, but also on whether the state government is under unied or divided control.
This reveals an important di¤erence in the consequences of budget delays for members of the
minority party: Under divided government, there is a strong negative e¤ect on the probability
of reelection, which in terms of magnitude is equal to the e¤ect for members of the majority
party. Under unied government, on the other hand, minority party incumbents are shielded
from the e¤ects of legislative budget delays. In contrast, the consequences for majority party
incumbents are now harsher.19
Model (3) sheds further light on this issue by distinguishing unied governments that oper-
ate under a supermajority requirement to pass the budget from unied governments that are
not constrained by such a requirement. The results broadly conrm our priors. For majority
party members who do not face a supermajority requirement, we now nd that the impact
of legislative budget delays on their reelection probabilities is signicantly stronger under uni-
ed government than under divided government. Most notably, the e¤ect of delays is entirely
di¤erent in legislatures with a supermajority requirement. If anything, majority party mem-
coe¢ cients on the economic and scal variables are restricted to be equal for all incumbents.
19The estimated e¤ect for majority party incumbents is stronger under unied government than under divided
government, as we would expect, but the di¤erence is not statistically signicant, as can be seen from the
di¤erence-of-di¤erence statistic in column (c). On the other hand, the di¤erence-of-di¤erence between the
e¤ects for majority party members and minority members under unied government (not reported in Table 3)
is strongly signicant (p-value < 0.01). Also not reported in Table 3 is the result that state legislators running
for the state senate are also signicantly penalized for being in a legislature producing late budgets.
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bers appear to gain from delays in such states, but the statistical uncertainty of this e¤ect is
considerable.
Turning to model (4), we now focus on the interaction between budget delays and the
relative sizes of the parties in the legislature. We estimate the impact of legislative budget
delays on incumbent reelection probabilities at majority party seat share margins of 3.9% and
39.5%. These numbers correspond to the sample average minus/plus one standard deviation. A
larger seat share margin does not seem to imply stronger accountability for individual majority
party members as we might have expected based on the results for party seat shares in the
previous section. In contrast, the estimated impact of budget delays is larger when the seat
share margin is 3.9% than when it is 39.5%, although the di¤erence is statistically insignicant.
For minority party members, we nd no di¤erence at all. Recall the result found in the
previous section that the larger the majority party is relative to the minority party, the more
seats does it lose after budget delays. The results here reveal that this does not reect a
stronger accountability mechanism for individual majority party incumbents, as a clarity-of-
responsibility interpretation would suggest. Rather, it most likely reects the fact that the
more seats a party has, the more seats can it expect to lose when voters hand out punishments
for legislative budget delays.
Finally, model (5) examines the interaction between legislative budget delays and the states
economic shape. Parallelling the results for party seat shares in the previous section, we nd
a signicant di¤erence between good and bad economic times when it comes to the electoral
impact of delays. If the unemployment rate has fallen 1 percentage point over the 12 months
leading up to the election, we nd strong impacts of budget delays on the reelection proba-
bilities for both majority- and minority party members. The point estimates suggest drops
in the reelection rates of 8 percentage points and 4.4 percentage points, respectively. If the
unemployment rate has risen 1 percentage point, on the other hand, the estimated e¤ects are
negligible and statistically insignicant for both majority- and minority party members.
[Table 3 about here]
5.3 Robustness issues
The results presented in tables 1 to 3 are robust to a number of di¤erent denitions of variables
and empirical specications. In the analyses, we have used the proportion of late budgets since
the last election. If we use the proportion of late budgets from the two most recent years, the
results are essentially unchanged; if we consider only the most recent budget, the coe¢ cients
continue to be signicant but are slightly smaller. This makes sense, we believe, as voters are
likely to be more dissatised with a situation of permanent delays than with an occasional late
budget.
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We also explore whether there are systematic di¤erences between states that have and never
have experienced legislative delays or late budgets. Restricting the sample to states that have
experienced delays at some point in the period we consider, we nd unchanged results for the
analyses based on legislatures and individual legislators, suggesting that identication comes
from variations within this group of states. In the case of gubernatorial elections, the estimated
e¤ect of late budgets under unied governments increases, but the estimated standard error
also increases, such that the e¤ect just ceases to be signicant.
Dropping individual high-prole states such as New York or California (or both), or special
cases such as Louisiana with its unique primary runo¤ system, makes no di¤erence to results;
similarly, dropping states with biennial budgeting leaves results una¤ected.
Throughout, we have not considered the partisan make-up of the electorate, partly as this
is likely to be endogenous with respect to partisan government performance. If, however, we
control for self-declared partisan or ideological identication, using data from Wright et al.
(n.d.) up to 2003, all estimated coe¤cients on delays increase, some substantially, and continue
to be signicant.20
6 Conclusion
Using a unique measure of budgetary delays in US state governments, we nd strong and clear
evidence that voters hold elected politicians accountable for bad scal governance in the form of
late budgets, controlling for budget outcomes as well as a wide variety of individual, legislature-
level and state-level control variables. While the major part of the literature on electoral
accountability and good governance has focused on electoral penalties due to corruption, one
of our contributions is to show that voters hold political actors accountable also for less extreme
realizations of bad governance, which, arguably, occurs more often than corrupt behavior.
We nd that governors are punished for late budgets only under unied governments and
that legislatures overall are punished for legislative budget delays under both unied and di-
vided government. Consistent with voter responses being conditional on clarity of responsiblity
individual members of the majority party in the legislature face stronger punishments under
unied government than under divided government. Minority party members are held ac-
countable for delays under divided government, with magnitudes equal to those observed for
majority party members. Our analyses also point to a dilemma for members of the legisla-
tive minority: While the minority party in the legislature gains in terms of seat shares from
legislative delays, individual minority members are penalized. This is probably due to over-
all voter fatigue towards the legislature following legislative budget delays, with new minority
20The Wright, Erikson and McIver data is a collection, based on a CBS/NYT national survey, of partisan
(Republican, Independent, Democrat) and ideological (Liberal, Moderate, Conservative) identication.
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party members replacing the unpopular incumbents. Thus, for state legislators with personal
political ambitions, obstructing the budget process appears to be a bad recipe for success.
Looking at the overall pattern of results, one intriguing nding is that the available evi-
dence suggests an asymmetric attribution of blame: Governors are subjected to an electoral
penalty only under unied government, while legislatures are always held accountable. This
can reect di¤erences in state constitutions and customs regarding who is thought to have the
main responsbility for the budget. Furthermore, governors may be more adept at the blame
game that sometimes follows failures to nish a budget on time. In on-going research, we
are investigating the possilibities for measuring the assignment of popular blame, based on job
approval ratings and newspaper accounts of late budget.
If we combine the results obtained here with results on the causes of late budgets as iden-
tied by Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen (2010a), we nd strong evidence that political actors
recognize voter responses: States with higher degrees of social capital punish legislatures more
for legislative budget delays, and, indeed, we see fewer delays in states with higher social capital.
Voters have a harder time attributing responsiblity for late budgets under divided government
and when the economy is slowing down and this is exactly the cases where we see more late
budgets.
Understanding the electoral consequences of budget gridlcoks is key to understanding why
such gridlocks occur in the rst place. In the end, we believe that the strongest motivation
for state lawmakers to nish their business on time is the reaction of their constituents and
our results support this. If politicians are punished by voters for bad governance outcomes,
it is in their own interest to avoid such outcomes. On the other hand, if the personal costs
of bad governance are low, inferior outcomes such as budget delays are more likely to arise,
and politicians have little incentive to adopt institutional reforms that could help alleviate the
problem.
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Figure 1a: No. of budgets enacted after beginning of scal year relative to total
no. of enacted budgets, 1988-2007
Figure 1b: No. of budgets passed after legislatures deadline relative to total
no. of enacted budgets 1988-2007
Table 1. Gubernatorial election outcomes and late budgets, 1990‐2007.
(1) (2) (3)
Late budgets ‐0.02
(3.69)
Late budgets  x divided govt.  3.63  4.66
(3.49) (3.56)
Late budgets  x unified govt. ‐9.08**
(4.51)
Late budgets  x unified govt.  x no supermajority req. ‐9.97**
(4.46)
Late budgets  x unified govt . x supermajority req.  7.95
(6.45)
Divided government  0.89 ‐1.4 ‐1.18
(1.71) (2.10) (2.11)
Change in unemployment rate ‐0.08 ‐0.36 ‐0.4
(1.54) (1.50) (1.51)
Real growth in housing prices ‐0.65 ‐0.7 ‐0.72
(0.50) (0.48) (0.58)
Change in govt. spending‐to‐GDP ratio  0.54  0.62  0.76
(0.83) (0.83) (0.89)
Enacted tax changes ‐0.25** ‐0.29*** ‐0.28**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
State budget surplus  4.84***  4.13***  4.64***
(1.13) (1.01) (0.96)
Vote share in previous election  0.03  0.04  0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
incumbent governor running for re‐election  8.32***  7.92***  7.95***
(1.30) (1.28) (1.19)
Vote share in presidential election  0.51**  0.42**  0.38**
(0.20) (0.19) (0.17)
President from incumbent party ‐3.03*** ‐3.58*** ‐3.53***
(0.80) (0.81) (0.79)
Pres. from incumbent party x pres. approval rating  0.09***  0.10***  0.10***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
R‐squared 0.53 0.56 0.56
Observations 186 186 186
Vote share won by incumbent governor's party
All estimates obtained using the xtreg2 command in Stata 10. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at 
the state level. ***, **,  * denote significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A constant is included in all 
estimations. 
Table 2. Party seat shares in state legislative elections and late budgets, 1989‐2006.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Late budgets -2.24**
(1.09)
Late budgets  x divided govt. ‐2.16*
(1.17)
Late budgets  x unified govt. ‐2.49
(2.00)
Legislative delays ‐2.80*** ‐1.21 15.83 ‐2.55***
(0.77) (1.14) (10.45) (0.79)
Legislative delays  x divided govt. ‐2.73*** ‐2.67***
(0.84) (0.86)
Legislative delays  x unified govt. ‐3.00*
(1.72)
Legislative delays  x unified govt.  x no ‐3.20*
supermajority req. (1.88)
Legislative delays  x unified govt . ‐1.08
 x supermajority req. (1.93)
Legislative delays  x seat share margin ‐0.08*
to minority party (0.04)
Legislative delays  x census response ‐0.28*
rate (0.15)
Legislative delays  x change in unempl. 1.77*
rate (0.92)
Divided government ‐0.31 ‐0.36 0.01 ‐0.05 ‐0.06 ‐0.02 0 0.00
(0.66) (0.68) (0.67) (0.68) (0.68) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67)
Change in unemployment rate 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.31 ‐0.46
(0.51) (0.51) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.59)
Real growth in housing prices 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.48***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Change in govt. spending‐to‐GDP ratio ‐0.52 ‐0.52 ‐0.17 ‐0.17 ‐0.18 ‐0.23 ‐0.19 ‐0.15
(0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Enacted tax changes ‐0.07 ‐0.07 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
State budget surplus 0.03 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.23
(0.52) (0.52) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Seat share in previous election 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.56*** 0.56***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Vote share in presidential election 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.30***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
President from incumbent party ‐2.24*** ‐2.24*** ‐1.94*** ‐1.94*** ‐1.95*** ‐1.92*** ‐1.95*** ‐1.91***
(0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Pres. from incumbent party  x pres. 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
approval rating (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Vote share in gubernatorial election 0.10 0.10 0.12* 0.12* 0.12* 0.12* 0.12** 0.11*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Gubernatorial election year ‐3.63 ‐3.62 ‐4.43 ‐4.47 ‐4.41 ‐4.44 ‐4.43 ‐3.98
(3.13) (3.13) (2.98) (3.05) (3.03) (3.00) (2.97) (2.98)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st stage F‐stat. for excluded instr. 87.3 86.9 101.9 99.9 100.1 101.5 101.2 96.8
R‐squared 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45
Observations 370 370 360 360 360 360 360 360
Lower house seat share won by incumbent party
All estimates obtained using the xtivreg2 command in Stata 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **,  * denote significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A 
constant is included in all estimations. A dummy variable for whether the incumbent governor ran for re‐election is used as an instrument for the majority party's vote share in same‐
year gubernatorial elections in all columns. F‐statistics for exclusion restrictions on the instrument in the first‐stage equations are reported in the third row from the bottom.
Table 3. Reelection of incumbent state legislators and legislative budget delays, 1989‐2003.
(a) (b) (c)
Majority party member 0.791 ‐0.051***
(0.018) (0.013) ‐0.025
Minority party member 0.786 ‐0.026* (0.015)
(0.019) (0.014)
Majority party member, divided govt. 0.793 ‐0.043***
(0.018) (0.014)   0.029
Majority party member, unified govt. 0.793 ‐0.073*** (0.026)
(0.019) (0.024)
Minority party member, divided govt. 0.778 ‐0.046***
(0.019) (0.016) ‐0.077***
Minority party member, unified govt. 0.775   0.031 (0.029)
(0.020) (0.025)
Majority party member, divided govt. 0.794 ‐0.041***
(0.018) (0.014)   0.048*
Majority party member, unified govt., 0.794 ‐0.089*** (0.027)
no supermajority req. (0.019) (0.025) ‐0.186***
Majority party member, unified govt., 0.794   0.097* (0.055)
supermajority req. (0.019) (0.050)
Minority party member, divided govt. 0.779 ‐0.044***
(0.019) (0.016)  ‐0.080***
Minority party member, unified govt., 0.775   0.036 (0.029)
no supermajority req. (0.020) (0.025)   0.061
Minority party member, unified govt., 0.775  ‐0.025 (0.085)
supermajority req. (0.020) (0.083)
Majority party member, seat share 0.792 ‐0.065***
margin to minority party = 3.9 %‐points (0.018) (0.017) ‐0.029
Majority party member, seat share 0.792 ‐0.036** (0.022)
margin to minority party = 39.5 %‐points (0.018) (0.017)
Minority party member, seat share 0.786 ‐0.026
margin to minority party = 3.9 %‐points (0.019) (0.017)   0.002
Minority party member, seat share 0.786  ‐0.027 (0.027)
margin to minority party = 39.5 %‐points (0.019) (0.022)
Majority party member, change in  0.750  ‐0.018
unemployment rate = +1 %‐point (0.023) (0.019)   0.062**
Majority party member, change in  0.815 ‐0.080*** (0.026)
unemployment rate = ‐1 %‐point (0.018) (0.018)
Minority party member, change in  0.744 ‐0.005
unemployment rate = +1 %‐point (0.023) (0.021)   0.039
Minority party member, change in  0.810 ‐0.044** (0.029)
unemployment rate = ‐1 %‐point (0.019) (0.019)
Change in probability 
when ∆Legislative delays 
= 1
Difference of         
difference
The statistics in each model are based on the IV probit estimates reported in the column with the corresponding number in appendix table A2. Column 
(a) shows the predicted probability of reelection when the normalized number of legislative budget delays is zero. Unless specifically noted, all 
probabilities are evaluated for a hypothetical incumbent legislator who belongs to the same party as the president, serves in a unified government, in 
a year with both presidential and gubernatorial elections and average support for the incumbent's party in both of these elections. All continuous 
control variables are evaluated at their sample averages. State‐ and year fixed effects are evaluated at median estimates (corresponding to Texas and 
1996). The statistics reported in column (b) are the discrete changes in the probability of reelection when the normalized number of legislative delays 
goes from zero to one. The statistics in column (c) are the differences between the changes reported in column (b).
Probability of incumbent 
reelection when Legislative 
delays = 0
Standard errors in parentheses: ***, **,  * denote significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All standard errors are calculated by the 
delta method, using the predictnl command in Stata 10.
Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Condition
Table A1. Explanatory Variables: Definitions and Sources
Variable Description Source
Late budgets The number of budgets enacted after the end of the fiscal year 
since the previous election, relative to the total number of enacted 
budgets since the previous election
Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Legislative delays The number of budgets passed by the legislature after the 
deadline for legislative passage since the previous election, relative 
to the total number of enacted budgets since the previous election
Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Divided government Dummy variable equal to 1 if either i)  both legislative chambers 
controlled by other party than governor's, or ii)  two chambers 
controlled by different parties 
Klarner (2007)
Unified government Dummy variable equal to 1 if both chambers in the legislature 
controlled by governor's party
Klarner (2007)
Supermajority req. Dummy variable equal to 1 if a supermajority vote is required to 
pass each budget
National Conference of State 
Legislatures
Seat share margin to minority 
party
Difference between seat shares for the majority party and the 
minority party in the lower house in the state legislature
Klarner (2007)
Change in unemployment rate Change in the seasonally adjusted state unemployment rate from 
October in the year before the election to October in the year of 
the election
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Real growth in housing prices Average annual growth rate in house prices from the fourth 
quarter of the previous election year to the fourth quarter of the 
current election year, deflated by the state GDP deflator.
Federal Housing Agency state level 
repeat‐sales index (all transactions)
Change in govt. spending‐to‐GDP 
ratio
Change in the ratio of general state government expenditures to 
state GDP since the previous election year
US Census Bureau (expenditures) 
and Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(state GDP)
Enacted tax changes Net revenue effect, measured in percent of general fund revenue, 
of tax changes enacted since the previous election
National Association of State Budget 
Officers, The Fiscal Survey of States , 
various editions
State budget surplus General revenue minus general expenditure, measured in percent 
of state GDP
US Census Bureau (revenue and 
expenditure) and Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (state GDP)
State GDP State GDP in current prices Bureau of Economic Analysis
Real state GDP State GDP in real (chained 2000) prices Bureau of Economic Analysis
Inflation Average yearly percentage change in state GDP deflator since 
previous election
Bureau of Economic Analysis
Fiscal transparency Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state scores above the sample 
median on the transparency index developed in Alt, Lassen and 
Rose (2006), zero otherwise
Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006)
Table A1 (continued). Explanatory Variables: Definitions and Sources
Census response rate Final state response rate (in percent) in the 2000 Census US Census Bureau
Incumbent governor running for 
re‐election
Dummy variable equal to one if the current incumbent governor is 
running for re‐election, zero otherwise
Book of the States, various editions, 
and Wikipedia.org
Vote/seat share won in previous 
election
Gubernatorial elections: Vote share won in the previous 
gubernatorial election by the current incumbent governor's party. 
Legislative elections, seat shares: Seat share won in the previous 
legislative election by the current majority party in the lower 
house of the legislature. Legislative elections, individual legislators: 
Share of the district vote won in the previous election by the 
current incumbent legislator
Governors: Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, various years. Seat 
shares: Klarner (2007). Individual 
legislators: Carsey et al  (2008)
Vote share in presidential election Share of the major party vote in the state captured by the 
presidential candidate who belongs to the same party as the 
incumbent party/individual. Equal to zero in years with no 
presidential election
uselectionatlas.org
President from incumbent party Dummy variable that takes the value one if the incumbent 
party/individual belongs to the same party as the president, and 
minus one otherwise
Klarner (2007), Carsey et al  (2008) 
Pres. approval rating Percentage of respondents in nation‐wide Gallup polls who 
approve of the president's performance, minus the percentage 
that disapproves.  We use the Gallup poll on or around November 
1st in the year of the relevant state election
Roper Center at the University of 
Connecticut 
(http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu
/).
Vote share in gubernatorial 
election
Vote share in gubernatorial election captured by (a) the majority 
party in the legislature (seat share analyses), or (b) the incumbent 
legislator's party (individuals analyses). Equal to zero in years with 
no gubernatorial election
Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, various years
Gubernatorial election year Dummy variable equal to 1 in years with a gubernatorial election, 
zero otherwise
Book of the States, various editions.
Majority member Dummy variable equal to one if the incumbent legislator is a 
member of the majority party in the lower house in the state 
legislature, zero otherwise
Carsey et al  (2008), Klarner (2007)
Minority member  Dummy variable equal to one if the incumbent legislator is a 
member of the minority party in the lower house in the state 
legislature, zero otherwise
Carsey et al  (2008)
No. of previous campaigns Number of times the incumbent legislator has previously run for 
office in lower house state legislative elections (successful as well 
as unsuccessful runs included)
Carsey et al  (2008)
Table A2. Reeletion of incumbent state legislators and legislative budget delays, 1989‐2003, parameter estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Legislative delays  x majority member ‐0.1681*** ‐0.2201*** ‐0.1624***
(0.039) (0.056) (0.040)
Legislative delays  x minority member ‐0.0874** ‐0.0842 ‐0.0834*
(0.044) (0.060) (0.044)
Legislative delays  x majority member  ‐0.1431*** ‐0.1369***
x divided govt. (0.044) (0.044)
Legislative delays  x majority member  ‐0.2328***
x unified govt. (0.072)
Legislative delays  x minority member  ‐0.1460*** ‐0.1407***
x divided govt. (0.050) (0.050)
Legislative delays  x minority member  0.1082
x unified govt. (0.089)
Legislative delays  x majority member  ‐0.2814***
x unified govt. x no supermajority req. (0.074)
Legislative delays  x majority member  0.4129
x unified govt. x supermajority req. (0.263)
Legislative delays  x minority member  0.1263
x unified govt. x no supermajority req. (0.092)
Legislative delays  x minority member  ‐0.0824
x unified govt. x supermajority req. (0.261)
Legislative delays  x majority member  0.0025
x seat share margin to minority party (0.002)
Legislative delays  x minority member  ‐0.0001
x seat share margin to minority party (0.002)
Legislative delays  x majority member  0.1061***
x change in unempl. rate (0.040)
Legislative delays  x minority member  0.0684
x change in unempl. rate (0.047)
Member of lower house majority party 0.020 0.0602* 0.0621* 0.020 0.021
(0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
No. of previous campaigns ‐0.1186*** ‐0.1191*** ‐0.1185*** ‐0.1187*** ‐0.1195***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
No. of previous campaigns, squared  0.0053*** 0.0053*** 0.0053*** 0.0053*** 0.0053***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Divided government  x majority member  0.0207 0.0007 (0.0003) 0.0231 0.0184
(0.033) (0.039) (0.039) (0.033) (0.033)
Divided government  x minority member  ‐0.0456 0.0095 0.0118 ‐0.0451 ‐0.048
(0.039) (0.045) (0.045) (0.039) (0.039)
Incumbent reelected
Table A2 (cont'd). Reeletion of incumbent state legislators and legislative budget delays, 1989‐2003, parameter estimates.
Change in unemployment rate ‐0.0757*** ‐0.0757*** ‐0.0733*** ‐0.0783*** ‐0.1111***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024)
Real growth in housing prices ‐0.0128* ‐0.0132** ‐0.0150** ‐0.0146** ‐0.0169**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Change in govt. spending‐to‐GDP ratio 0.0226 0.0221 0.0204 0.0252 0.0141
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Enacted tax changes ‐0.0015 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0013 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0017
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
State budget surplus ‐0.0545 ‐0.0544 ‐0.0518 ‐0.0519 ‐0.0372
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Vote share won in previous election 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0068***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Vote share in presidential election 0.0069*** 0.0062*** 0.0060*** 0.0067*** 0.0069***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
President from incumbent's party ‐0.1142*** ‐0.1159*** ‐0.1179*** ‐0.1138*** ‐0.1087***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Pres. from incumbent's party  x pres. 0.0021*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0021***
approval rating (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Vote share in gubernatorial election 0.0048** 0.0047** 0.0045** 0.0050** 0.0046**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gubernatorial election year ‐0.2561** ‐0.2529** ‐0.2442** ‐0.2668** ‐0.2540**
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22759 22759 22759 22759 22759
All estimates obtained using the ivprobit  command in Stata 10. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **,  * denote significance on the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. A constant is included in all estimations. A dummy variable for whether the incumbent governor ran for re‐election is 
used as an instrument for the majority party's vote share in same‐year gubernatorial elections in all columns. The F‐statistic for an exclusion 
restriction on the instrument in the first‐stage equation is in all cases over 13,000. 
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Abstract
Budgets in the US states are often passed late. If a state budget is not in place by
the beginning of a new scal year, a range of potential economic consequences arises. We
quantify one such consequence, the e¤ect on government bond yields. Using a unique data
set on budget enactment dates, we nd robust evidence that late budgets are signicantly
associated with higher state government borrowing costs. Borrowing costs are measured
with data on bond yield spreads from the "Chubb Relative Value Survey", which is available
for 36 US states in the period 1988 to 1997. We estimate that a budget delay of 30 days has
a long run impact on the yield spread in the order of 2 basis point. States with su¢ cient
liquidity, in the form of either large reserves or a budget surplus, face small or no costs
from late budgets. On the other hand, states running an average decit face an impact of
about 9 basis points from a 30-day budget delay. During election years, the impact of late
budgets on yield spreads increases by an order of 4.
Keywords: Late Budgets; Chubb Relative Value Survey; Debt Cost; Bond Spreads; US States
JEL codes: H72; H61; H63
1 Introduction
In many US states, the negotiations of the state budget often drag on well past the beginning
of the new scal year. Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen (2010a) document that in the period 1988
We thank Jim Alt, James Poterba and Kim Rueben for sharing their data with us, Anders Oltmann for
excellent research assistance and WEST at the University of Copenhagen for funding.
to 2007, 23% of all US state budgets were enacted after the beginning of the new scal year. Of
these, 31% were more than a month late. Recent experiences with late budgets in California
and New York have highlighted the problem of budget gridlock in US states; for example, in
2009, California went 24 days into the new scal year before a new state budget was agreed on.
During this time the state was forced to issue IOUs to cover payments to local governments,
state contractors and taxpayers. In 2010, citizens in New York had to wait 125 days beyond
the scal year deadline before a new state budget was signed into law. State o¢ cials began
preparing for the states rst-ever government shutdown, as political gridlock threatened to
end the series of emergency budget bills the state relied on to stay in operation.
Without a budget in place by the beginning of the new scal year, the legal basis for
government spending is jeopardized. Among other things, this can lead to disruptions in
debt payments, and uncertainties in relation to government default can arise. As a result,
governments may see the cost of nancing their debt rise as investors demand a higher premium
for holding state debt. In this paper we exploit a unique data set on state budget enactment
dates to quantify such costs by estimating the impact of late budgets on the yield of US state
government bonds.
During the statesscal crisis of 1992, Moodys Investor Services issued a statement with
the following message: "[budget] delays are symptomatic of serious nancial imbalances", con-
tinuing, "[B]udget delays do not automatically lead to a long-term rating revision. But the
resulting pressures on a states short-term liquidity position can trigger a review".1 We expect
late budgets to a¤ect state borrowing costs through two channels, both of which are reected
in this quote: 1) A liquidity premium on state bonds: Without a budget in place, states may
not have the legal authority to make appropriations towards debt repayments. Although many
states actually have special provisions in place to avoid exactly this, and in general make debt
payments one of its rst priorities, if the budget negotiations drag on for too long, the state
might simply nd it self out of cash to spend on any provisions, including debt repayments.
The risk of this occurring increases for every day that passes by without a new budget in place.
As investors observe such late budgets, they will require a higher premium for holding state
debt. 2) A market signal : Bond market participants may not have perfect information about
the true scal position of the state government. Severe budgets delays are likely to arise when
painful adjustments are needed to secure state solvency. Thus, the inability to pass the budget
can provide a strong signal to the market about the presence of large unresolved scal imbal-
ances, and, perhaps most importantly, that the responsible politicians lack the ability to deal
with these problems in an appropriate manner. As such, it is not the immediate consequences
of the late budget itself that lead to higher borrowing costs. Rather, it is the fact that it draws
the markets attention to the states scal problems, possibly triggering changes in the states
1Quoted from The Bond Buyer, July 2, 1992 (http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-12436969.html )
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credit rating, that creates a causal link from a late budget to state borrowing costs.
Higher borrowing costs are not the only potential costs of late budgets. As discussed in
Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen (2010a), delays in state budgeting can force state governments
to withhold payments state vendors and contractors, providers of medicaid as well as school
districts and local governments, and, in some states, state government employees. This can
lead to distorted policy choices in the form of expensive short-term borrowing, cash-hoarding
or hiring freezes at state government agencies and local governments. In extreme cases, the
state government may be forced to shut down all "non-essential" services, leading to severe
disruptions in state government operations. The mere threat of a shutdown may distort op-
erations in state agencies, who must spend time and e¤ort on determining which services are
"essential" and which are not. The scope of these economic costs of late budgets is likely to
be substantial.2 They are also very di¢ cult to quantify, however. We therefore focus on the
impact on the costs of debt servicing, since we can measure these much more precisely. As
such, our estimates should merely be seen as a lower bound on the overall costs of late budgets.
Comparable cross-state market data on US state government bond spreads are unfortu-
nately not available for a su¢ ciently long time period. We therefore use the only available
source for comparable bond yields across US states; the Chubb Relative Value Survey. Previ-
ous papers have used the Chubb survey to study the e¤ect on bond spreads of scal institutions
(Poterba and Rueben (1997, 2001), Lowry and Alt (2001)), political parties (Lowry and Alt
(2001)), scal shocks (Poterba and Rueben (2001)) and debt size (Bayoumi, Goldstein and
Woglom (1995)). To our knowledge, no previous study has looked at the implication of late
budgets on yield spreads.
We use the data in the survey to estimate the impact of late budgets on government bond
yield spreads in the years from 1988 to 1997. Our sample period is limited by data availability:
Our data set on budget enactment dates (described in detail in Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen,
(2010a)) starts in 1988, while the Chubb survey ends in 1997.3 We nd that late budgets
signicantly increase state government bond yields. In terms of size, we nd that a 30-day
late budget increases the yield spread by around 2 basis points. These ndings are robust to a
hoist of other variables such as scal institutions, economic and scal variables, ideology and
credit ratings. Our estimates show that late budgets do in fact have real non-negligible costs.
Ultimately, the increase in borrowing costs associated with late budgets will lead to cuts in
government services or higher taxes.
2As noted in a New York Times editorial in the run up to a possible shutdown in 2010: "[...] A shutdown
would disrupt millions of lives, cost millions of dollars and leave state o¢ cials scrambling to operate prisons, the
State Police and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority [...]". (New York Times editorial on June 12, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/opinion/12sat1.html?hp)
3Our last observation for the Chubb survey is from January 1998, but we include this in our 1997 observation
for the bond yield spread (constructed as the average of July 1997 and January 1998, see details below).
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The paper proceeds in the following way: The next section describes our data and empirical
strategy, while section 3 presents our empirical results and quantitative assesments . Section 4
concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Dependent variable: The Chubb Relative Value Survey
As mentioned above, comparable market data on state bond yields are not readily available.
Following Poterba and Rueben (2001) and Lowry and Alt (2001) we instead use data on state
government bond yield spreads given from the "Chubb Relative Value Survey". This survey
measures the bond yield for 39 states relative to New Jersey by asking roughly 25 sell-side
bond traders to estimate the current yield, measured in basis points, on a hypothetical 20-
year general obligation bond, relative to comparable bonds issued by the state of New Jersey.4
Thus, di¤erences in yields should only reect di¤erences in perceived riskiness of the states
general obligation debt, and not di¤erences in maturity or other bond charachteristics.5 The
survey was conducted about every 6 months from July 1973 to January 1998. From 1976 to
1992, the survey was conducted in June and December.6 In 1993 it was conducted in June, and
beginning in 1994, the survey was done in January and July. Our dependent variable, Chubbi;t,
is constructed as the average of the summer (June/July) and winter (December/January)
Chubb surveys, such that Cbubb i;t reects survey answers from after the budget negotiations
in the spring of year t, but before next years budget negotiations commence. Thus, up to
and including 1992, our dependent variable is given as the average of the June and December
survey. Our 1993 observation is the average of the surveys from June 1993 and January 1994,
and our 1994 observation is the average of the surveys from July 1994 and January 1995. The
1995 to 1997 observations are constructed in a similar manner as the 1994 observation.
2.2 Econometric model and explanatory variables
Following Poterba and Rueben (2001), we can estimate state i0s spread to New Jersey (denoted
with subscript NJ) in a given year t, Ri;t  RNJ;t; as:
Ri;t  RNJ;t = F (Xi;t; Zi;t; Y i;t)  F (XNJ;t; ZNJ;t; Y NJ;t)
4States excluded from the Chubb survey are: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Nebraska, South Dakota and Wyoming. Since our data set on late budgets does not include Alaska and Hawaii,
and since our sample for Montana starts after the end of the Chubb survey, our e¤ective sample consists of a
total of 36 states (not counting New Jersey).
5See discussion of this in Poterba and Rueben (2001).
6The exact time of the survey varied slightly before 1976.
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where Xi;t is a vector of economic and scal variables that are likely to a¤ect the states
probability of paying current and future interest obligations. We include our measure of late
budgets in this category since, as argued above, late budgets are likely to increase the riskiness of
interest payments. Zi;t is a vector of state scal institutions that are likely to a¤ect government
spending and its ability to collect revenues. No carry-over rules and tax and expenditure limits
are examples of this. Y i;t proxies scal taste for debt repayment and other relevant political
variables. Linearizing the above equation, the bond spread in state i in year t; can be expressed
as:
Ri;t RNJ;t = 01 (Xi;t  XNJ;t)+
0
2 (Zi;t   ZNJ;t)+
0
3 (Yi;t   YNJ;t)+i+t+ui;t uNJ;t (1)
where j is kj1 vector of coe¢ cients and Xi;t; Zi;t and Yi;t are our observed values of Xi;t; Zi;t
and Y i;t, respectively. i is an unobserved state xed e¤ect and t measures aggregate shocks.
ui;t captures omitted variables and errors from approximation. Since bond yields display a great
deal of persistence, as noted by Lowry and Alt (2001), we also include lags of the dependent
variable, making the model a dynamic panel data model.7 Including L lags and dening
Ri;t  RNJ;t  Chubbi;t; equation (1) can be written as the following:
Chubbi;t = 1Chubbi;t 1 + :::+ LChubbi;t L + 
0
1Xi;t + 
0
2Zi;t + 
0
3Yi;t + i + t + "i;t (2)
where we use that t  t  
0
1XNJ;t  
0
2ZNJ;t  
0
3YNJ;t  uNJ;t is constant across i in year t.
We choose a value of L such that the error term, "i;t; displays iid properties. We estimate this
dynamic panel data model using the GMM procedure developed in Arellano and Bond (1991),
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Bond and Blundell (1998). However, as robustness checks we
also estimate the model using the OLS and Fixed E¤ect estimators.
We now turn to the exact content of Xi;t; Zi;t and Yi;t, the vectors of explanatory variables.
For the sake of brevity, we limit ourselves to a short description of the variables here. Precise
denitions of all variables and their data sources can be found in the data appendix.
The main explanatory variables of interest are based on the late budget variableDays_latei;t,
which is taken from Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen (2010a). This variable measures the number
of days from the end of the old scal year until the new budget becomes law. Thus, if the
budget for the scal year that starts in year t is signed into law 5 days after the end of the old
scal year in state i, Days_latei;t takes the value 5. If the budget is signed into law 5 days
before the end of the old scal year, it takes the value  5. The marginal e¤ect on government
yield spreads of using another day to nish the budget is likely to change dramatically once
the scal year deadline is exceeded. To account for this, we separate Days_latei;t into two
7Using the Dicky-Fuller test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels, as proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin
(2003), we can clearly reject the presence of a unit root in our spread variable.
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variables: Days_late_negi;t; which is equal to Days_latei;t if Days_latei;t is negative, and
zero otherwise, and the corresponding variable for positive values, Days_late_posi;t. We then
expect a positive coe¢ cient on Days_late_posi;t, while the coe¢ cient on Days_late_negi;t
should be smaller, and perhaps zero.
In addition to the late budget variables we include in all estimations the following control
variables:
Economic and scal variables
An obvious control variable is the level of state government debt. We scale the debt level
relative to state GDP, because we want to measure the debt burden relative to the tax base.
The state government budget surplus in the old scal year, i.e. the scal year that ends in
year t, is another natural control. As in Lowry and Alt (2001), we therefore include a variable
that is equal to zero in case of a decit and otherwise equal to the (actual) surplus in percent
of state GDP. We also include the corresponding variable for the decit, thus allowing the
e¤ect of government net lending to di¤er depending on whether it is negative or positive. Like
Lowry and Alt, we always include an interaction between our decit variable and a dummy for
whether the state has a no carry-over rule in place.
To control for the e¤ect of business cycle uctuations we include the change in the state
unemployment rate as an explanatory variable.8 Following Poterba and Rueben (2001), we also
use the decit shock variables originally developed in Poterba (1994) to control for scal shocks.
Unlike Poterba and Rueben, however, we allow the e¤ects of revenue shocks and expenditure
shocks to di¤er by including a separate variable for each type of shock.
Government bond yields are likely to be sensitive to the liquidity position of the state gov-
ernment, and easy access to readily available funds is important for reliable debt service. We
therefore include the (projected) end-of-year balance in the states general fund and stabiliza-
tion fund as an explanatory variable in our baseline specication.9
Finally, we include the change in the states credit rating since last year as an explanatory
variable.10 We do this for two reasons: First, this may capture new information about the
states future ability to repay its debt obligations, which is known to rating agencies and
investors, but unobservable to us (the researchers). Second, the credit rating itself can have
an independent e¤ect in an uninformed market if it inuences investor sentiments, even if the
rating is not based on any fundamentals.
Political variables
Divided partisan control over the state government may potentially work as a check on new
8We include the unemployment rate in rst di¤erences, but obtain very similar results when using the level
of the unemployment rate.
9The end-of-year balance is measured in percent of proposed general fund expenditures (see data appendix
for more details).
10We use the rst di¤erence of Moodys rating, where positive values imply an improved rating.
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spending initiatives, thereby leading to lower borrowing costs. This is likely to be especially
important in the absence of strict balanced budget rules. To account for this, we include a
dummy for divided government, as well as its interaction with a dummy for no carry-over rules.
Investor sentiments may also be inuenced by the political preferences of the politicians in
charge of scal policy. As a nal control variable, we therefore include a measure of government
ideology, taken from Berry et al (1998), where a higher value is associated with more liberal
preferences.
2.3 Conditional e¤ects of late budgets
The liquidity premium and market signal channels described above both lead us to expect
that the impact of late budgets on government bond yields depends on a number of observable
characteristics. First, if a state ended the old scal year with a budget decit and only few cash
funds available in the general fund and stabilization fund, then we would expect a larger e¤ect
of late budgets through the liquidity premium channel, since such funds provide a safeguard
against the risk that the state will run out of cash during a protracted political stalemate over
a new budget. Second, a budget delay is likely to send a much more powerful signal about
politiciansinability to deal with underlying scal imbalances when it is combined with a large
decit and a low end-balance in the scal year that just ended: If politicians cant agree on an
answer to a states scal problems when they are most pressing, and when the costs of inaction
are likely to be highest, it seems unlikely that they ever will.11
A similar argument applies to the e¤ect of election years: Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen
(2010b) nd that voters punish state legislators for late budgets in the upcoming elections. It
seems plausible that this potential consequence of budget delays will assume a more prominent
place in the minds of state lawmakers in election years than in o¤-election years. If state
politicians are unable to pass a budget on time in an election year, despite the saliency of
the potential consequences in such years, it may therefore send a stronger signal to nancial
markets about the state governments ability to deal with the scal challenges facing the state.
We test these hypotheses by estimating alternative versions of (2) that include interaction
terms between our late budget variable days_late_posi;t and each of the following: The size of
the combined balance in the general fund and the budget stabilization fund at the end of the
old scal year, the government surplus in the old scal year, and a dummy for state general
election year. We then expect negatively signed coe¢ cients on the rst two interaction terms,
and a positive coe¢ cient on the interaction term involving the election year dummy.
11The lack of immediately available funds were a major factor leading to Californias decision to issue IOUs
when faced with a late budget in 2009. In New York in 2010, government workers where given furlough notices as
a way of reducing expenditures during a severe budget delay that prevented a more permanent decit-reducing
solution from being implemented. Thus late budgets seem more likely to lead to particularly disruptive outcomes
when they occur along with government decits and low government savings.
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3 Results
Table 1 shows the results from our baseline specication. Columns (1)-(3) estimate equation
(2) using the OLS, Fixed E¤ects and GMM estimators, respectively. We include four lags of
our dependent variable to account for autocorrelation in the yield spread.12 The estimated
coe¢ cients on the control variables are largely as expected. Larger debt, lower end-of-year
balances and deteriorating credit ratings all increase the yield spread, with the e¤ects being
signicant on a 1% level. Unexpected expenditure shocks also have a signicant impact on the
yield spread, but we do not nd any signicant e¤ect from shocks to state revenue. Nor do we
nd any signicant e¤ects from yearly changes in the state unemployment rate.
The impact of the state governments scal balance in the old scal year depends strongly
on whether this balance is positive or negative: Higher surpluses do not seem to a¤ect yield
spreads. Decits, on the other hand, have a strong impact. This is only true for states that
allow decits to be carried over to the next scal year, however: States that have a no-carry-
over law in place see no e¤ect on the yield spread from decits, as can be seen by the negative
coe¢ cient on Gov_deficit_no_carryi;t; which is signicant and similar in magnitude to the
coe¢ cient on Gov_deficiti;t.13
More liberal government seem to pay a higher yield spread, but the e¤ect is only borderline
signicant. Finally, having divided government seems to lower the yield spread in states that
do not have a no-carry over law in place, whereas states with strict no-carry over laws see no
e¤ect of divided government.
We now turn to our main variables of interests; Days_late_negi;t and Days_late_posi;t.
The coe¢ cients on both variables are positive, implying that longer negotiations over the budget
are associated with higher yield spreads. The coe¢ cient on Days_late_posi;t is, as expected,
highly statistically signicant, and much larger than the coe¢ cient onDays_late_negi;t, which
is very close to zero. We interpret these results as evidence in favor of our priors: Taking an
extra day to nish the budget does not a¤ect investorsrequirements for state government bond
yields as long as the scal year deadline is not exceeded. Once across the deadline, however,
further delays in the budget process lead to signicantly higher borrowing costs. We discuss
the quantitative impact below.
[Table 1 about here]
12We also tried including a fth lag, but this was never signicant. Our results are not sensitive to the exact
number of lags. Testing for autocorrelation in all our GMM estimations revealed no signs of second order or
higher autocorrelation, which suggests that the GMM procedure is indeed valid. Note that our sample size is not
reduced when introducing more lags of the dependent variable, since we have data for the yield spread available
well before 1988.
13Using the OLS estimator we actually obtain a positive and signicant coe¢ cient on Gov_surplusi;t. We
cannot explain this counter intuituve result, but note that controlling for xed e¤ects renders the coe¢ cient
insignicant.
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Next, we move on to include interaction terms between our late budget variable and the
variables discussed in the previous section. Table 2 shows the results.14 We start by interacting
Days_late_posi;t with the size of the end-of-year balance in the old scal year. The coe¢ cient
on Days_late_posi;t is positive and signicant at a 1% level and almost twice as large as
compared to the estimate from column (3) in Table 1. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term
with the end-of-year balance is negative and also highly signicant. Thus, larger end-of-year
balances in the general fund and budget stabilization fund mute the impact of late budgets
on state government borrowing costs. A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on the sizes of
the estimated coe¢ cients suggests that late budgets only cause yield spreads to rise in states
where fund reserves amount to less than 2% of general fund expenditures. This applies to
approximately a third of the observations in our sample.
In column (2) we interact Days_late_posi;t with the old scal years government surplus
(relative to state GDP).15 The coe¢ cient on Days_late_posi;t is positive, large and signicant,
while the coe¢ cient on the interaction term with the government surplus is negative and highly
signicant. Thus, late budgets have a smaller e¤ect on government yield spreads if they are
accompanied by a su¢ ciently large surplus, but severe if accompanied by a decit: At a decit
of 1% of general state government spending, the impact of a budget delays is almost three
times larger than when the last scal year ended in balance (Gov_spli;t = 0). In column (3),
we include both interactions terms simultaneously. The coe¢ cients on the interactions terms
decrease slightly compared to columns (1) and (2), but they are both still negative and highly
signicant.
In column (4), we interact Days_late_posi;t with a dummy for gubernatorial election year.
We nd that the marginal impact of late budgets in non-election years is around the same as
what we found in our baseline specication in Table 1. In contrast, the e¤ect is about four
times larger in election years.16
To sum up, the results found here broadly conrm our hypotheses about the conditional
e¤ects of late budgets on government bond yield spreads: The avalability of previously ac-
cumulated reserves dampen the impact of late budgets on state government borrowing costs,
while scal imbalances and the proximity of upcoming elections magnify it.
[Table 2 about here]
14As in the analyses above, the coe¢ cient on Days_late_negi;t is very small in all cases, so for simplicity
we impose a zero restriction on it in the analyses presented in this section. Relaxing this restriction does not
change the results for the interaction terms involving Days_late_posi;t.
15We do not separate surpluses from decits here. Decits thus appear as negative values.
16As shown in column (5) of Table 2, including all three interaction terms simultaneously does not alter the
estimated coe¢ cients much compared to when we include them separately, and all coe¢ cients are signicant on
a 1% level.
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3.1 Quantifying the E¤ect of Late Budgets
How large are the e¤ects of late budgets on state government borrowing costs? In the following,
we use our estimates from the previous section to calculate the impact on yield spreads of a
hypothetical 30-day budget delay. While delays of this length are in most states not your
everyday news, they do occur: Of the 266 budget adoption processes in our sample, 79 were
delayed beyond the beginning of the new scal year, and 23 of those by 30 days or more.
Using our baseline estimates of the coe¢ cient on Days_late_posi;t from Table 1, we see
that that the immediate impact of a 30-day delay is about 1 basis point. That is, for every
10,000 dollars of debt issued, the state must now pay an extra dollar in interest. Taking the
persistence in the yield spread into account, we can calculate a "long run" impact on total
interest payments. To do this, we consider a thought experiment in which a state issues new
debt (or renances existing debt) for a xed amount each year. In this situation, the total e¤ect
of a late budget, measured in basis points and summed over all future years, can be calculated
by multiplying the immediate impact with the long run impact factors reported in the bottom
of tables 1 and 2. Our baseline estimates in Table 1 thus suggest that the total long run impact
of a 30-day late budget is in the range of 2 basis points (when using the lower bound estimates
given by the GMM and Within estimators) and 5 basis points (using the upper bound estimate
given by the OLS estimator).17
These results suggest that the e¤ect of late budgets, although statistically signicant, is
only of moderate economic importance. However, the estimates in Table 1 reect unconditional
average e¤ects across all observations in our sample. As shown in Table 2, the impact of late
budgets di¤ers substantially depending on the economic and political circumstances under
which they occur. In a state where scal reserves are approaching zero, our results indicate an
immediate impact of 1.4 basis points following a 30-day delay, and a long run impact of 4.2 basis
points. Similarly, conditioning on the size of the budget decit in the old scal year reveals
a substantial variation in the e¤ect of a 30-day delay: For a state than ran a decit equal to
0.34% of state GDP (the average decit among all decits in our sample), we nd immediate-
and long run impacts of 3 and 9 basis points, respectively, while the corresponding numbers
are 1.8 and 5.6 basis points for a state with a balanced budget, and 0.7 and 1.9 basis points
for states with a surplus equal to 0.37% of state GDP (the sample average of all surpluses).
Furthermore, the results in column (4) of Table 2 suggest that the impact of a 30-day late
budget is more than 4 times larger in election years than in non-election years (the long run
17Assume that the state needs to nance a xed amount X , where X is measured in ten thousands of dollars.
A 1-day late budget in year t then gives rise to extra interest costs worth LX for debt issued in year t, 1LX
for debt issued in year t+ 1, (21 + 2)LX for year t+ 2, etc., where L is the coe¤cient on Days_late_posi;t
and i is the coe¢ cient on the i0th lag of the dependent variable. Applying the formula for an innite geometric
series then gives us a long run impact of (1   1   :::   L) 1L, where the rst term represents the long run
impact factor reported in Table 1 and Table 2.
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impact rising from 2.3 to 9.4 basis points). Finally, the coe¢ cient estimates in column (5),
where we include all interaction terms simultaneously, show that a 30-day delay has a long run
impact of 14.2 basis points when we condition on an end-of-year balance at zero, a decit at
0.34% of GDP, and a gubernatorial election coming up.18
Whether these numbers are "small" or "large" is not obvious. In comparison, the average
spread to New Jersey in our sample is 8.5 basis points with a standard deviation of 15 basis
points. One way to assess the magnitude of the impact of late budgets is to compare it to
the impact of other economic factors. Imagine a state (with does not have a no-carry-over
requirement) ending its scal year with a budget decit equal to 0.34% of state GDP (the
sample average) and a timely adopted budget for the new scal year. In this situation, going
from an on-time budget to a 30-day delay has the same impact on the yield spread as a
three-fold increase of the decit, or as a 14% unexpected increase in general fund expenditures
(as measured by the decit shock variable Exp_shocki;t).19 Thus, when it comes to the
impact on state government borrowing costs, lengthy delays in the budget adoption process
are comparable to sizeable, adverse scal shocks.
3.2 Robustness Analyses
In Table 3 we consider a few robustness issues. Columns (1) to (3) replicate Table 1, but with
Days_late_posi;t and Days_late_negi;t, our variables of primary interest, replaced with two
new variables, Days_delayed_posi;t and Days_delayed_negi;t. Rather than counting the
number of days from the end of the scal year until the budget is signed into law, these variables
focus on legislative budget delays by measuring the number of days from the legislatures
deadline for passing the budget until the legislature actually passes the budget in its nal
form (see Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen (2010a) for details). Using these alternative measures
does little to change our conclusions, although the estimated e¤ects of budget delays are now
somewhat smaller.
A key theme in Poterba and Rueben (2001) is how the e¤ect of scal shocks on borrowing
costs depends on state scal institutions. Our baseline estimation results reported above do
not allow for such interactions. We compensate for this in the estimations reported in Table
A1 in the appendix. Here we interact dummy variables for no carry-over rules as well as tax-
and expenditure limits (TELs) with each of the expenditure shock and revenue shock variables.
The results broadly conrm the conclusions found in Poterba and Rueben (2001): Having a no
18Using the OLS estimator instead of the GMM estimator, the corresponding number is 28.7 basis points.
19These calculations are based on the estimation results of the specication in Table 2, column (2). The
estimated coe¢ cients on Gov_deficiti;t and Exp_shocki;t (not reported in Table 2) are 4.402 and 0.207,
respectively. The implied e¤ects on yield spreads are comparable in size to those found in Lowry and Alt
(2001) and Poterba and Rueben (2001).
137
carry-over rules in place seems to neutralize the impact of expenditure shocks. The same is the
case for expenditure limits. There does not seem to be much e¤ect of expenditure limits on the
impact of revenue shocks. Tax limits seems to have a clear e¤ect on expenditure shocks but
not revenue shocks. But most importantly for our purposes, the inclusion of these interaction
terms does in no case change the sign, magnitude or statistical signicance of the late budget
variable Days_late_posi;t.
[Table 3 about here]
4 Conclusion
This paper estimates the impact of late budgets in U.S. states on state government borrowing
costs. We nd that late budgets signicantly increase the yield spread on hypothetical 20-year
general obligation bonds. Our results provide clear evidence that bond market investors view
late budgets as a reason for concern when it comes to the prospect of uninterrupted repayments
on state debt, and they strongly suggest a link between late budgets and higher state borrowing
costs.
The average long-run cost of a 30-day late budget is an increase in the yield spread in
the order of 2 basis points. The e¤ect varies greatly depending on the states economic and
political situation, however. Easy access to liquidity, for example in the form of previously
accumulated reserves, reduces investorsfear of payment disruptions in case of a late budget,
thereby lowering the premium paid for budgets delays. In contrast, the impact of a month-long
delay is much higher if the state has run out of reserves. Markets also punish late budgets
much more harshly if they occur during times of scal stress. In such times, a late budget
sends a powerful signal about politicians (lack of) ability to address scal imbalances, and
investors react more sharply. A related e¤ect is present in election years: When an election is
approaching, the personal costs to state politicians of a late budget are presumably higher, and
delays in the budget process demonstrate more clearly that politicians are incapable of reaching
scal compromises. Indeed, our results show that the reaction of bond market participants to
late budgets is 4 times stronger in election years than in non-election years.
Our estimates should be seen as a lower bound on the economic costs of late budgets.
Costs related to the disruption of state government services and payments, di¢ culties in scal
planning in state agencies and local governments, and the uncertainty facing state government
employees and citizens are likely to be substantial, but are practically impossible to measure.
With the lower bound being positive, our results provide a strong rationale for state govern-
ments to avoid lengthy delays in the budget process. And, perhaps more importantly, they
provide voters with a rationale for holding their elected politicians accountable when they fail
to deliver a state budget on time.
138
References
[1] Andersen, Asger Lau, David Dreyer Lassen and Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen, 2010a. "Late
Budgets." EPRU Working Paper Series, 2010-4, University of Copenhagen.
[2] Andersen, Asger Lau, David Dreyer Lassen and Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen, 2010b. "Fis-
cal Governance and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Late Budgets." Manuscript,
University of Copenhagen.
[3] Arellano, Manuel and Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specication for Panel Data:
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations." The Review of
Economic Studies vol. 58 No 2: 277-297.
[4] Arellano, Manuel and Olympia Bover, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable
estimation of error-components models." Journal of Econometrics, 68: 29-51.
[5] Bayoumi, Tamim, Morris Goldstein and Geo¤rey Woglom, 1995. "Do Credit Markets
Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States," Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking vol. 27(4): 1046-59.
[6] Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording and Russell L. Hanson, 1998.
"Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93." American
Journal of Political Science Vol. 42 No. 1: 327-348.
[7] Blundell, Richard and Stephen Bond, 1998. "Initial conditions and moments restrictions
in dynamic panel data models." Journal of Econometrics, 87: 115-143.
[8] Bohn, Henning and Robert P. Inman, 1996. Balanced-budget rules and public decits:
evidence from the U.S. States. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 45,
13 - 76.
[9] Im, Kyung S., M. Hashem Pesaran and Yongcheol Shin, 2003. "Testing for Unit Roots in
Heterogeneous Panels." Journal of Econometrics 115: 53-74.
[10] Lowry, Robert C., and James E. Alt , 2001. "A Visible Hand? Bond Markets, Political
Parties, Balanced Budget Laws, and State Government Debt." Economics and Politics 13
(1): 49-72.
[11] Poterba, James M., 1994. State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The E¤ects of Budgetary
Institutions and Politics.Journal of Political Economy 102: 799-821.
[12] Poterba, James M. and Kim S. Rueben, 1997. "State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S.
Municipal Bond Market," NBER Working Papers, No. 6237
139
[13] Poterba, James M. and Kim S. Reuben. 2001. Fiscal News, State Budget Rules, and
Tax-Exempt Bond Yields. Journal of Urban Economics 50: 537-562.
140
5 Appendix
[Table A1 about here]
[Table A2 about here]
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Table 1. The Effect of Late Budgets on Yields Spred on 20‐year GO Debt
(1) (2) (3)
Days_late_neg i,t 0.001 0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.011) (0.015)
Days_late_pos i,t 0.035*** 0.025** 0.026***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Unempl_change i,t 0.252 0.051 ‐0.06
(0.404) (0.484) (0.413)
Endbalance i,t ‐0.168*** ‐0.192*** ‐0.315***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.057)
D_Moodys i,t ‐5.798*** ‐6.435*** ‐6.766***
(1.509) (1.760) (1.639)
Debt i,t 0.110** 0.274 0.375***
(0.044) (0.274) (0.143)
Rev_shock i,t ‐0.038 ‐0.024 ‐0.041
(0.047) (0.053) (0.069)
Exp_shock i,t 0.196*** 0.176** 0.224***
(0.063) (0.066) (0.082)
Gov_surplus i,t 1.257** 0.528 0.603
(0.618) (0.746) (1.260)
Gov_deficit i,t 7.141*** 3.7 4.640**
(1.624) (2.492) (1.878)
Gov_deficit i,t   x No_carry i ‐8.007*** ‐5.066* ‐6.379***
(1.979) (2.607) (1.670)
Divided_gov i,t ‐0.45 ‐1.488 ‐1.721*
(0.797) (0.888) (0.919)
Divided_gov i,t  x No_carry i 0.239 0.844 1.255*
(0.487) (0.520) (0.653)
Ideology_gov i,t 0.006 0.027 0.051
(0.011) (0.018) (0.031)
No_carry i 0.073
(0.425)
Estimator OLS FE GMMSYS
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of lags of dependent variable 4 4 4
Sample 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997
Long‐run impact factor 4.957 2.686 2.925
Number of states 36 36 36
Observations 266 266 266
See Table A2 for variable description
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Yield spread vs. New Jersey on 20‐year GO debt
Standard errors reported in parentheses. Cluster adjusted standard errors used in colums (1) and (2). Robust 
standard errors used in colum (3).
GMMSYS estimates are obtained using the dependent variable lagged twice or more as instruments in the 
differenced equation. The level equation uses the lagged first difference of the dependent variable as instrument.
Table 2.  Interacting Late Budget with Endbalances, Government Surplus and Election Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Days_late_pos i,t 0.047*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.026*** 0.065***
(0.013) (0.023) (0.022) (0.009) (0.021)
Days_late_pos i,t  x  Endbalance i,t ‐0.027*** ‐0.021** ‐0.018***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
Days_late_pos i,t   x Gov_spl i,t ‐0.111*** ‐0.071** ‐0.074***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.026)
Days_late_pos i,t   x Elex i,t 0.081*** 0.068***
(0.018) (0.022)
Estimator GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of lags of dependent variable 4 4 4 4 4
Sample 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997
Long‐run impact factor 2.965 3.065 2.994 2.939 2.995
Number of states 36 36 36 36 36
Observations 266 266 266 266 266
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Same explanatory variables as in Table 1 included in all estimations. See notes in Table 1 for more details.
Yield spread vs. New Jersey on 20‐year GO debt
Table 3. Robustness: Using Legislative Delays as indicator for Late Budgets 
(1) (2) (3)
Days_delayed_neg i,t ‐0.006 0.012 0.014
(0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
Days_delayed_pos i,t 0.027*** 0.013 0.028***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Estimator OLS FE GMMSYS
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of lags of dependent variable 4 4 4
Sample 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997
Long‐run impact factor 4.899 2.709 2.918
Number of states 36 36 36
Observations 262 262 262
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
GMMSYS estimates are obtained using the dependent variable lagged twice or more as 
instruments in the differenced equation. The level equation uses the lagged first difference of 
the dependent variable as instrument.
Robust standard errors in parentheses in colums (2)‐(6). Cluster adjusted standard errors used 
in colum (1)
Same explanatory variables as in Table 1 included in all estimations. See notes in Table 1 for 
more details.
Yield spread vs. New Jersey on 20‐
year GO debt
Table A1.  The Effect Fiscal Rules on Yield Spreads
(1) (2) (3)
Days_late_neg i,t 0.004 0.005 0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Days_late_pos i,t 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.019*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Rev_shock i,t ‐0.155 ‐0.062 ‐0.045
(0.125) (0.078) (0.064)
Rev_shock i,t   x No_carry i 0.22
(0.148)
Rev_shock i,t   x Spending_limit i,t 0.167
(0.134)
Rev_shock i,t   x Revenue_limit i,t ‐0.043
(0.160)
Exp_shock i,t 0.339*** 0.251*** 0.011
(0.122) (0.089) (0.078)
Exp_shock i,t   x No_carry i ‐0.411**
(0.183)
Exp_shock i,t   x Spending_limit i,t ‐0.306
(0.198)
Exp_shock i,t   x Revenue_limit i,t 0.332***
(0.127)
Estimator GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of lags of dependent variable 4 4 4
Sample 1988‐1997 1988‐1997 1988‐1997
Long‐run impact factor 2.805 2.895 2.929
Number of states 36 36 36
Observations 266 266 266
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Yield spread vs. New Jersey on   20‐year 
GO debt
Same explanatory variables as in Table 1 included in all estimations. See notes in Table 1 for 
more details.
Table A2. Variable definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
Chubb i,t Average of summer and winter observation of the "Chubb Relative 
Value Survey", given as the surveyed yield spread on 20‐year general
obligation bond relative to New Jersey
Lowry and Alt (2001) and 
Poterba and Reuben (2001)
Days_late i,t Number of days from end of fiscal year to budget signed into law Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Days_delayed i,t Number of days from legislative deadline to legislative budget 
passage
Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Late_budget i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if budget was signed into law after end 
of fiscal year
Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Delayed_budget i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if budget was passed by legislature after 
legislative deadline
Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Days_late_pos i,t Equal to days_late i,t   x late_budget i,t Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Days_late_neg i,t Equal to days_late i,t   x (1‐late_budget i,t ) Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Days_delayed_pos i,t Equal to days_delayed i,t   x delayed_budget i,t Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Days_delayed_neg i,t Equal to days_delayed i,t   x (1‐delayed_budget i,t ) Andersen, Lassen and Nielsen 
(2010a)
Unempl_change i,t Change in unemployment rate since previous year Bureau of Labor Statistics
Gov_spl i,t General Government surplus relative to GDP US Census Bureau
Gov_surplus i,t gov_spl  if gov_spl >0, and zero otherwise US Census Bureau
Gov_deficit i,t ‐gov_spl  if gov_spl <0 and zero otherwise US Census Bureau
Debt i,t Debt at the end of fiscal year scaled relative to GDP US Census Bureau
Moodys i,t Moodys credit rating on 20‐year GO bonds, ranging from 4 to 1, 
where Aaa=4, Aa=3, A=2, Baa=1
Alt and Lowry (2001)
D_Moodys i,t Moodys i,t ‐Moodys i,t‐1 Alt and Lowry (2001)
Divided_gov i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if either i)  both legislative chambers 
controlled by other party than governor's, or ii)  two chambers 
controlled by different parties 
http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/jou
rnal_datasets/klarner.shtml
Elex i,t Dummy variable equal to 1 in years with a gubernatorial election Book of the States, various 
editions.
Population i,t State population (in millions of people) U.S. Census Bureau
GDP i,t State GDP Bureau of Economic Analysis
Endbalance i,t End‐of‐year balances in the general fund and stabilization fund, as 
projected in executive budget proposal. Measured in percent of 
proposed general fund expenditure
National Association of State 
Budget Officers: The Fiscal 
Survey of States , various editions
Ideology_gov i,t Score of government (governor and two major party delegations in 
house and senate) ideology. Ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 being the 
most conservative value and 100 the most liberal position.
Berry et al (1998)
Supermajority i Dummy variable equal to 1 if a supermajority vote is required to 
pass each budget
National Conference of State 
Legislatures
No_carry i Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state law does not allow a budget 
deficit to be carried over to the next fiscal year 
Bohn and Inman (1996)
Table A2. Variable definitions and sources (continued)
Revenue_limit i,t Dummy equal to one if a revenue limit is in place Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Spending_limit i,t Dummy equal to one if a spending limit is in place
Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Exp_shock i,t Percentage deviation of actual general fund expenditure from 
original projections, net of the effect of within‐year tax changes
Data provided by Kim Rueben. 
See Poterba and Rueben (2001)
Rev_shock i,t Percentage deviation of actual general fund revenue from original 
projections, net of the effect of within‐year tax changes
Data provided by Kim Rueben. 
See Poterba and Rueben (2001)
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Abstract
We set up a model of elections or referendums with two alternatives to study how voter
turnout and election outcomes are a¤ected by the publication of exit polls on election day.
We nd that the introduction of an exit poll inuences the incentive to vote both before
and after the poll is published, but the sign of the e¤ect is generally ambiguous. The fact
that exit polls inuence the incentive to vote before they are even published is sometimes
overlooked in the debate on their desirability. We show that this can lead to premature
conclusions about the impact of exit polls on election outcomes.
1 Introduction
On June 7 2009, Danish voters went to the polls to decide on a proposed change to the Danish
Law of Succession, the law that governs the succession to the Danish throne. The proposed
change would imply that sons would no longer have precedence over daughters in the line of
succession, establishing so-called equal primogeniture: The right of the rst-born child, whether
male or female, to be rst in line to inherit the throne.
The referendum was subject to the procedure that governs changes to the Danish constitu-
tion. In order to pass, the proposal therefore had to overcome two obstacles: One, a majority of
the votes cast in the referendum must be in favor of the proposal. And two, at least 40% of all
eligible voters must vote in favor of the proposal. In the weeks preceding the June 7 election,
there was no doubt that only the latter of these requirements had the potential to become
binding. In a Gallup poll released a week before the election, 84% of respondents indicated
that they approved of the proposal to change the law. However, only 40.2% responded that
they would actually show up at polls and vote in favor of the proposal.
We thank David Dreyer Lassen and Peter Norman Sørensen for valuable comments.
On the afternoon of the election day, TV2, a major Danish TV channel, published the
results of an exit poll, which predicted that 37.9% of all eligible voters would cast a vote
in favor of the proposal to change the law. However, during the evening the situation turned
around with pollsters reporting a considerable increase in turnout. In the end, the o¢ cial result
was that 45.1% of all eligible voters had voted in favor of the proposal, which corresponded to
85.4% of all votes cast. Thus, the proposal passed with a comfortable margin.
The discrepancy between the early exit poll and the nal result sparked a lively public
debate in the days following the referendum. The fact that voter turnout rose in the nal hours
before the polling stations closed led some observers to conclude that it was the publication
of the exit poll itself, and the prospect of the proposal failing, that got potential yes-voters to
the polling stations. Without the exit poll, the proposal would not have passed, the argument
went.1 The Social Democrats, the major opposition party, took the opportunity to propose
that Denmark follow a number of other countries in prohibiting the publication of exit polls
before polling stations are closed.2
In this paper we present a theoretical model to analyze whether and how exit polls inuence
voter turnout and outcomes in referendums or elections with two alternatives. We assume that
voting takes place over two stages. Voters can choose to vote in either stage, or to abstain.
Before stage two, an exit poll reveals how voters voted in the rst stage. Any remaining
potential voters then use this information to rene their decision rule for stage two.
The basic set-up in our model follows the seminal contributions of Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1983), and especially Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985). Voters face heterogeneous costs of par-
ticipating in the referendum. Costs are net of any direct benets of participating (e.g., from
fulllment of "civic duty") and may thus be positive or negative. Each voter knows her own
cost, but has only probabilistic knowledge about otherscosts. Thus, when the exit poll reveals
all early votes it provides a remaining potential voter with information about, loosely speaking,
how close the race is. But it also allows her to update her beliefs about the realized costs of
the other remaining voters, i.e. those that did not vote early.
We restrict attention to referendums in which the outcome is determined not only by simple
majority; one of the alternatives (typically a proposal to change a status quo) must also receive
a certain number of votes in order to beat the other. Moreover, we simplify our model by
assuming that all voters prefer the same alternative. This may appear overly restrictive, but it
1On June 9, the Danish newspaper Politiken ran a front page story under the headline Equal rights in the
Royal family were saved by exit poll. Professor Jørgen Elklit of Aarhus University was quoted for saying that
the prospect of a no made more people vote. A related article from the same day brought the following quote
from Professor Johannes Andersen of Aalborg University: It appears that 5 percent of voters changed their
behavior in the last hours. They would not have voted if they had not been made aware that votes were lacking.
(Sofavælgere piskede til valgstederne, Politiken, June 9 2009).
2Countries that prohibit publication of exit polls on election day include Germany, United Kingdom and
Norway.
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closely mimicks the situation in the Danish referendum in 2009: Since more than 80% of voters
were in favor of changing the law, it was clear that the proposal would pass if and only if at
least 40% of the electorate voted for it. In that case, the opponents of the proposal would have
no chance of getting a majority against it. This e¤ectively made their participation decision
irrelevant for the outcome of the referendum. Our simple model can also be seen as a building
block that can be used in models of exit polls in more general electoral settings. For example,
suppose that there are two alternatives and the electoral rule is simple majority. Then the
supporters of each alternative are facing a problem that is similar to the one in our model:
Taking the number of votes for the other alternative as given, they have to coordinate on beating
this number of votes. Of course, since the required turnout for each group is endogenous, the
general model becomes much more di¢ cult to analyze. However, the analysis in this paper can
be seen as one step in that direction.
We restrict our analysis of the model to cases where the number of voters is either two
or three. When there are two voters, we consider both the case where implementation of
their commonly preferred alternative requires only one of them to vote, and the case where
it requires both of them to vote. These two-voter cases are interesting because each of them
contains in isolation one of two collective action issues that are relevant in real world elections
and referendums. When only one vote is required there is a free riding problem: Each voter
prefers that the other voter bears the cost of going to the polls. When two votes are needed
free riding is not an issue, but instead there is an obvious coordination problem: Each voter
wants to vote only if the other voter also votes. In our nal case, two out of three voters need
to vote in order for their preferred alternative to be implemented. Thus, both the free riding
issue and the coordination issue are present and therefore the analysis of this case provides us
with important insights that are also likely to be relevant for real world (large) referendums
and elections.
By focusing on a small number of players, we of course avoid the famous paradox of not
voting formalized by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985). Our goal here is solely to provide an
analysis of how the publication of an exit poll inuences the incentive to vote, relative to a
situation with no exit poll, not to analyze why people vote in large elections.3
The introduction of an exit poll inuences potential votersincentive to vote both before
and after the release of the poll. For individuals who have not yet voted when the exit poll
is released, the polls e¤ect on the incentive to cast a late vote depends crucially on what it
reveals. An exit poll that reveals a close race increases the probability of being pivotal,
which stimulates late voting, while an exit poll revealing that the race is far from close does
the opposite. While this is a rather basic insight, the exit polls e¤ect on the incentive to cast
an early vote is more subtle: Intuitively, voters who face a positive participation cost may nd
3See Feddersen (2004) for a review of the literature on the paradox of not voting.
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it worthwhile to await the result of the poll before they decide whether to abstain or vote.
This wait-and-see e¤ect discourages early voting. But the exit poll may also give rise to a
rst-mover e¤ectthat stimulates early voting: By voting early, a voter may use the exit poll
actively to convince other supporters of the same alternative that victory is within reach, and
this could induce them to participate in the referendum. As a result, the exit polls e¤ect on
the incentive to vote early is generally ambiguous.
In relation to the debate on the e¤ects of exit polls, the single most important insight from
our analysis is the following: It may well happen that the incentive to vote increases after the
revelation of an exit poll. It may also happen that this higher incentive is decisive for the
outcome of the election, in the sense that the extra turnout it generates after the release of the
poll is su¢ cient to ensure that voterspreferred alternative is implemented, whereas it would
not have been implemented if voters had continued to behave as they did before the release
of the exit poll. This is essentially the situation that led some commentators, politicians, and
academics to conclude that exit polls changed the outcome of the 2009 Danish referendum.
However, our model reveals that this conclusion could well be wrong. The problem is that it is
not based on the correct counterfactual, which is what would have happened if there had been
no exit poll, not what would have happened if people continued to behave as they did before
the exit poll. Since the exit poll inuences voting behavior before as well as after its release,
these two counterfactuals are not identical. In the context of the Danish referendum, some of
the late voters who showed up at the polls only after the release of the exit poll may just have
postponed voting because of the "wait-and-see" e¤ect. And thus, they may well have voted
anyway if there had been no exit poll. If so, the outcome would have been no di¤erent in this
case.
Our paper is related to recent theoretical contributions by Goeree and Großer (2007) and
Taylor and Yildirim (2010). Both of these papers focus on the e¤ects of pre-election pub-
lic opinion polls in two-candidate majoritarian elections and reach similar conclusions: Polls
stimulate supporters of the alternative favored by a minority of the population to participate
in the election, while individuals who support the alternative favored by a majority partici-
pate less frequently when they receive information about the distribution of preferences in the
population because they free ride on the participation of other voters who support the same
alternative. The result is that polls lower the probability that the alternative favored by a
majority in the population. When it comes to expected turnout, the increase in participation
for minority voters more than compensates the lower participation frequency for majority vot-
ers, so total expected turnout goes up, resulting in higher aggregate participation costs. The
combination of higher costs and a lower probability that the majoritys favored alternative is
implented leads to the conclusion that polls lower social welfare.4
4The e¤ect of public opinion polls on turnout in the participation games of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983,
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Although related, our paper addresses a di¤erent question than the papers mentioned above:
First of all, we focus on exit polls, rather than pre-election polls. This is reected in the
fact that voters in our model have the opportunity to vote before the result of the poll is
revealed. This makes the game studied here dynamic, and it opens up for strategic interactions
among potential voters that are absent in the models of pre-election polls. Second, we do
not study purely majoritarian elections. Instead, we focus on elections in which the majority
requirement is supplemented with a requirement on the absolute number of votes for one of
the candidates. Third and nally, uncertainty in our model comes from imperfect information
about other players voting costs, while we have assumed that preferences over alternatives
are commonly known (e.g. from pre-election polls). In the pre-election poll papers mentioned
above, it is exactly opposite: Uncertainty comes from imperfect information about other voters
preferences over alternatives, while all potential voters are assumed to share a commonly known
participation cost. For the type of elections we wish to study, we believe that our approach is
the appropriate one, as explained above.
Our model is also somewhat related to the theoretical literature on sequential voting (see,
e.g., Battaglini 2004 and the references therein). This literature analyzes the aggregation of
information in exogenously given sequential voting procedures and compares it with simulta-
neous voting. Our model is distinct from this literature on several dimensions. First, the order
of voting is endogenous in our model, since all voters can vote in either period. Furthermore,
all voters know their preferred alternative with certainty, so information aggregation is not an
issue.
Throughout this paper, we present our model in the context of public referenda and exit
polls, but our framework also lends itself to alternative interpretations. The fact that all agents
prefer the same outcome means that we are e¤ectively studying a game of voluntary private
contributions to a threshold public good.5 Such games have many applications. For example,
we could translate voteswith charitable contributions in fundraising campaigns where a
certain number of contributions is required for the charity project to be carried out. The
question we then ask is how the expected number of contributions, and the likelihood that the
project is carried out, would change if campaign organizers during the campaign publicized
how many people had contributed so far. Another example is general meetings, in which
attendance is time-consuming and therefore individually costly, but where general attendance
must be above a certain level for resolutions passed in the meeting to be valid. An exit poll
1985) has also been studied experimentally by Klor and Winter (2007) and Großer and Schram (2010).
5A mechanism that provides a binary public if and only if the amount of private contributions is above a
certain threshold is known in the literature as a provision point mechanism (Bagnoli and Lipman (1989)). In
the terminology of this literature, the game studied in this paper is one of binary contributions, with no refund
in case of insu¢ cient contributions, and no rebate in case of excessive contributions. See Rapoport (1999) for a
review of the theoretical and experimental literatures on these and related types of public good games.
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would in this case correspond to a notice from the organizer revealing how many delegates had
committed to show up so far. These alternative interpretations of the model are perhaps more
suitable in that the assumption of a small number of players is less restrictive. For consistency,
we shall stick to the terminology of voting and exit polls, however.
2 The Model
We consider an election with two alternatives, A and B. The electoral rules are such that
alternative A is implemented if the number of votes for A is at least M and higher than the
number of votes for B. Otherwise alternative B is implemented. Thus, letting Vz denote the
number of votes for alternative z, the outcome is A if and only if VA  maxfM;VB + 1g.
We will only consider the special case where the number of B supporters in the population is
commonly known (from pre-election polls, for example) to be strictly smaller than M . So the
behavior of the B supporters is irrelevant and alternative A is implemented if and only if it
receives at least M votes.
The number of voters who prefer alternative A over alternative B is denoted N . They
all receive a utility of 1 if A is implemented and a utility of 0 if B is implemented. Each
voter i faces a cost ci of participating in the election. The voting costs are independent and
drawn randomly from a common distribution on R, characterized by a cumulative distribution
function F . The realized cost is private information, so that each voter knows only his own
cost. The distribution function F is known to everyone (common knowledge).
Each voter can either vote early, vote late, or abstain. If there is no exit poll then no infor-
mation is revealed during the election and the situation is obviously equivalent to simultaneous
voting. If there is an exit poll then early votes are revealed before the second stage of voting
and this is common knowledge at the beginning of the game. So we model an exit poll as
complete revelation of all early votes. This is clearly a stylized way of modelling exit polls, but
it is a reasonable starting point. Loosely speaking, by taking this extreme view of the quality
of information revealed by an exit poll, we get results on the "upper limit" of its implications.
Each of the setups (with or without exit poll) represents a private information game and
we use standard solution concepts. When there is no exit poll the game is static, so we use
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. With an exit poll the game is dynamic and we therefore use Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium. We will restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, i.e., we assume that
all agents use the same strategy in equilibrium. Furthermore, we will assume that all agents
use cut-o¤ strategies. That is, we assume that there is a critical costs level, such that an agent
i abstains if ci exceeds the critical level, and votes if it is below it.6 So in the simultaneous
6 In each of the specic cases we analyse below, it is straightforward to show that there is in fact no loss of
generality in restricting attention to decision rules of this form.
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voting game an equilibrium can simply be described by a single cut-o¤ cost c. In the exit poll
game an equilibrium can be described by
c = (c1; c

2(0); c

2(1); : : : ; c

2(M   1));
where c1 is the cut-o¤ cost in stage one and c2(n) is the cut-o¤ cost in stage two if exactly
n M   1 agents voted in stage one.
If there is no exit poll then it is easily seen that the cut-o¤ cost c is an equilibrium if and
only if it is equal to the probability of some voter being pivotal given that all other voters use
the c strategy.7 Thus c is an equilibrium precisely if
c =

N   1
M   1

F (c)M 1(1  F (c))N M : (1)
Then consider the exit poll game. We want to nd the conditions for c to be an equilibrium.
First, suppose we are in stage two and that exactly n M 1 voters voted in stage one. Agent
i can then infer that the remaining N   n   1 potential voters who did not vote in stage one
must have costs in excess of the stage one cut-o¤, c1. Then, by analogy with the no exit poll
game, c2(n) must satisfy
c2(n) =

N   n  1
M   n  1

Pr(ci  c2(n)jci > c1)M n 1
(1  Pr(ci  c2(n)jci > c1))N M :
This is equivalent to c2(n) = 0 or c2(n) > c1 and
c2(n) =

N   n  1
M   n  1

(
F (c2(n))  F (c1)
1  F (c1)
)M n 1(
1  F (c2(n))
1  F (c1)
)N M : (2)
The condition that must be satised by the stage one cut-o¤ c1 is more complicated. Con-
sider a voter i and assume that all other voters use the strategy c and that i himself will use
the stage two cut-o¤s from c if he does not vote in stage one. If i votes in stage one then his
expected utility is
Pr(V  iA M   1)  ci;
where V  iA denotes the realized nal number of votes for A from all other voters than i. His
7To see this, let V  iA denote the number of votes for A, excluding agent is vote. The expected pay-o¤ from
voting is then Pr(V  iA  M   1)   ci, while abstaining gives expected pay-o¤ Pr(V  iA  M). Voting therefore
gives weakly higher expected pay-o¤ than abstaining if and only if ci  c  Pr(V  iA = M   1). In a symmetric
equilibrium all other agents also use the same cut-o¤ strategy, and the probability that V  iA = M   1 is then
equal to the binomial expression on the right-hand side of (1).
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expected utility if he does not vote in stage one is much more complex because it depends on
whether he will vote in stage two which again depends on the number of stage one votes from
all other agents (and of course the expected utility also depends on the number of stage two
votes from other agents who does not vote in stage one). Therefore, we will not write it out in
detail, we simply note that the two expected utilities must be equal at the cut-o¤ ci = c1. In
the following section we will solve the model in several special cases and in each case we write
down explicitly the equation that determines c1.
3 Analysis
In this section we will solve the model(s) described above when (N;M) = (2; 1), (2; 2), and
(3; 2). In each (N;M)-case we will compare the no exit poll solution to the exit poll solution.
Clearly, the N = 2 cases are extremely simplistic. However, they are interesting because each
of them contain in isolation one of two collective action issues that are very relevant in real
world elections of the type we consider. WhenM = 1 there is a free riding problem: Each voter
(with a positive voting cost) wants alternative A to be implemented but prefers to stay home
while the other person votes. Obviously, the free riding problem is not present when M = 2.
In that case we instead have a coordination problem: Each voter (with a voting cost below
one) wants to vote if and only if the other person votes as well. Therefore, the N = 2 cases
provide us with valuable insights on the e¤ects of exit polls when only the free riding problem
or only the coordination problem is present. The case of N = 3, M = 2 is the simplest case in
which both problems are present. So, even though this case is obviously still very simplistic as
a model of real world elections, it takes us a substantial step in the right direction.
As described earlier, the voting cost of each voter is drawn from a common distribution on
the real axis represented by a distribution function F . We will make some assumptions about
the properties of F . First of all we will assume that F is twice di¤erentiable on [0; 1] with
F 0 > 0 and either F 00  0 or F 00  0 on this interval. The most restrictive of these assumptions
is that the second derivative of F is either non-positive or non-negative. This means that, for
example, F cannot be given by a density function f with mode in (0; 1). Furthermore, we
will assume that F (0) > 0 and F (1) < 1. This means that there is a positive probability that
a given voter will always vote (i.e., that his cost is negative) and also a positive probability
that he wil never vote (i.e., that his cost is above one). All of these assumptions are made
for existence and uniqueness purposes. In some cases they are substantially stronger than we
need, but for simplicity we keep the assumptions throughout the section.
As an example of a voting cost distribution we will use the uniform distribution on some
interval [ "L; 1+"H ], where "L; "H > 0. Such a distribution clearly satises all the assumptions
above. Note that we can write F as F (c) = F (0) + (F (1)   F (0))c for all cs in the support
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of the distribution. In fact, under the assumption of a uniform distribution we will treat the
values F (0) and F (1) (with 0 < F (0) < F (1) < 1) as parameters. When we do that it is of
course important to remember that by changing F (0) or F (1) we change the support of the
uniform distribution8. Finally, in the N = 3, M = 2 case we need to assume that F is given
by a uniform distribution to get existence and uniqueness of equilibrium when there is no exit
poll. This is necesssary to get meaningful comparisons between this situation and the exit poll
situation.
3.1 N = 2, M = 1
Equation (1), the equation that must be satised for c to be an equilibrium in the no exit poll
game, is in this case
c = 1  F (c): (3)
The function 1   F (c) is positive at c = 0, below one at c = 1, and decreasing. From these
observatons it is easily seen that there exists precisely one equilibrium c which must be in the
open interval between zero and one (note that we get this result with much weaker assumptions
on F than the ones made above). Table 1 summarizes voter turnout (i.e., the total number of
votes given) in the game with no exit poll for di¤erent combinations of participation costs.
Table 1: Turnout without exit poll when N = 2, M = 1
#Voter 1, !Voter 2 c2  c c < c2
c1  c 2 1
c < c1 1 0
Then consider the exit poll game. First consider stage two when neither voter voted before
the exit poll (otherwise stage two is obviously trivial). For c = (c1; c2(0)) to be an equilibrium,
c2(0) must satisfy
c2(0) = 1  Pr(cj  c2(0)jcj > c1):
If c2(0)  c1 then the conditional probability on the right-hand side of this equation is equal
to zero, which means that the equation cannot be satised (under the assumption that c1 < 1,
which is easily seen to be true in any equilibrium, since F (1) < 1). Thus, we must have
8"L and "H can of course be expressed in terms of F (0) and F (1) (and vice versa). By simple calculations
we get
"L =
F (0)
F (1)  F (0) and "H =
1  F (1)
F (1)  F (0) :
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c2(0) > c1 and the equation above can be written
c2(0) = 1 
F (c2(0))  F (c1)
1  F (c1)
;
or
c2(0) =
1  F (c2(0))
1  F (c1)
:
Now consider stage one. We rst claim that in equilibrium we must have c1  0. Suppose
that we had an equilibrium with c1 > 0 and consider a voter i with ci 2 (0; c1). By denition,
he would then vote in stage one. However, abstaining in stage one would actually ensure him
a higher expected payo¤. To see this, note that if no-one votes in stage one, then voter i would
vote in stage two (since ci < c1 < c2(0)) and his payo¤ would be the same as if he had voted
in stage one. But if the other voter does in fact vote in stage one (i.e., if his cost is below c1)
then alternative A would be implemented without voter i having to vote, so his payo¤ would
be strictly higher than if he had voted in stage one. From this observation we immediately
conclude that we cannot have c1 > 0 in equilibrium, so c = (c1; c2(0)) must satisfy
c1  0 and c2(0) =
1  F (c2(0))
1  F (c1)
:
A voter with ci  0 will clearly always vote, but is indi¤erent between voting early and voting
late (since it only takes one vote for A to be implemented). However, by voting early he
increases the expected utility of the other voter - he may save him a costly vote. So if we
assume that a voter who is indi¤erent with respect to his own payo¤ will take the action that
maximizes the expected payo¤ of the other voter then we must have c1 = 0. And then the
conditions for c to be an equilibrium become
c1 = 0 and c

2(0) =
1  F (c2(0))
1  F (0) : (4)
It is easy to see that there is a unique c2(0) satisfying (4), and that it must be in the
open interval between zero and one (mimick the argument for existence and uniqueness of an
equilibrium in the no exit poll situation). Furthermore, c2(0) must be strictly higher than the
no exit poll equilibrium cut-o¤, c. To see this, simply note that, since F (0) > 0, we have
1 F (c)
1 F (0) > 1  F (c) for all c 2 [0; 1], and thus the function (1  F (c))=(1  F (0)) must intersect
the diagonal at a higher cost than the function 1   F (c).9. The intuition behind this result
is straightforward: Consider the problem facing a voter i in stage two. He can infer that the
other voter does not have a negative voting cost, since he did not vote in stage one. Thus, for
9Even if c1 < 0 we get the same conclusion as long as F (c

1) > 0. However, note that the closer F (c

1) is to
zero, the closer is c2(0) to c.
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a given cut-o¤ strategy of the other voter, the probability that he votes is lower than in the no
exit poll game. This makes free-riding less attractive and voter i will therefore vote at higher
realizations of ci.
Table 2 summarizes the total number of votes for all combinations of realized voting costs
in the game with an exit poll.
Table 2: Turnout with exit poll when N = 2, M = 1
#Voter 1, !Voter 2 c2  0 0 < c2  c c < c2  c2(0) c2 > c2(0)
c1  0 2 1 1 1
0 < c1  c 1 2 2 1
c < c1  c2(0) 1 2 2 1
c1 > c2(0) 1 1 1 0
Comparing Table 1 and Table 2, we see that there is no general conclusion as to whether turnout
is higher with or without the exit poll. For example, turnout is always higher with an exit poll
when c < c1  c2(0) and c2 > 0, while it is the other way around when 0 < c1  c and c2  0.
However, note that if the realized voting cost of each candidate is positive then the anticipated
exit poll always leads to a level of turnout that is at least as high as without an exit poll and
sometimes strictly higher. Also note that the exit poll situation "dominates" the no exit poll
situation with respect to implementation of alternative A: If A is implemented without an exit
poll then it is also implemented with an exit poll and sometimes it is implemented with an exit
poll but not without it. This does not, however, mean that we have the same dominance with
respect to e¢ ciency (measured by simply aggregating the utility of the two voters). For some
combinations of strictly positive voting costs, the introduction of an exit poll leads to two votes
for A instead of one, which is obviously ine¢ cient.
So, to sum up our analysis of this case, we have seen that when there is an exit poll, only
voters with non-positive voting costs will vote in stage one. Intuitively, the anticipation of the
exit poll induces potential voters to wait and see: While there is nothing to lose from voting
late rather than early, awaiting the result of the poll can potentially allow voters to free-ride on
other supporters of alternative A who choose to vote early. Thus, the number of early votes is
likely to be lower when an exit poll is introduced. However, if nobody votes in stage one, then
voters nd free-riding less attractive in stage two, and the number of late votes is then likely
to be higher. These observations lead to the result that the introduction of an exit poll implies
that alternative A is implemented for a strictly larger set of cost realizations for the two voters.
In this sense, an exit poll mitigates the free riding problem that is the central aspect of this
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case.
3.2 N =M = 2
This case highlights another collective action problem, namely a coordination problem: For
voters with participation cost between zero and one, voting is preferable to abstaining if and
only if the other voter also participates, so that alternative A is actually implemented. A
voters probability of being pivotal in the no exit poll game is now equal to the probability that
the other voter votes. So the condition for c to be an equilibrium is
c = F (c): (5)
Since F (0) > 0, F (1) > 1, and F 0 is either non-increasing or non-decreasing in the interval
[0; 1] (we have assumed that F 00 is either non-negative or non-positive), it easily follows that
F intersects the diagonal precisely once and that this intersection happens in (0; 1). Thus we
have a unique equilibrium c 2 (0; 1) of the simultaneous (no exit poll) voting game. Voter
turnout for di¤erent combinations of participation costs are as in Table 1, except that c is now
dened as the solution to equation (5), rather than (3).
Then consider the exit poll game. In stage two, if one of the voters contributed in stage
one then the other voter knows he is pivotal. Thus he will vote if his cost is not above one,
i.e., we have c2(1) = 1. If nobody voted before the exit poll, then voters in stage two play a
game that is very similar the no exit poll game. The only di¤erence is that each voters belief
about the cost of the other voter is di¤erent, because he can infer from the stage one actions
that it must be above c1. So c2(0) must satisfy
c2(0) = Pr(c
j  c2(0)jcj > c1);
which is equivalent to
c2(0) =
Pr(c1 < cj  c2(0))
Pr(c1 > cj)
;
or
c2(0) = maxf0;
F (c2(0))  F (c1)
1  F (c1)
g: (6)
Now consider stage one. Voter is payo¤ from voting in this stage is (let j denote the other
voter)
1  Pr(cj > 1)  ci:
His payo¤ from not voting early is (assuming that j follows the strategy c and that i follows
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c in stage two)
1  Pr(cj > maxfc1; c2(0)g)  ci if ci  c2(0)
Pr(cj  c1)(1  ci) if c2(0) < ci  1
0 if ci > 1
It is easily seen that in any equilibrium we must have c1; c2(0) < 1 (since F (1) < 1). And then
it immediately follows from the expressions above that voting early dominates not voting early
for voter i if ci  c2(0). That is, if ci  c2(0), then it must also be true that ci  c1. This
means that we must have c1  c2(0), and it then follows from equation (6) that c2(0) = 0. So
we have that, in equilibrium, if neither voter votes in stage one then they will also not vote in
stage two. We also see that the equilibrium condition for c1 is
1  c1   Pr(cj > 1) = Pr(cj  c1)(1  c1);
which is equivalent to
F (1)  c1 = F (c1)(1  c1):
Solving this equation we get
c1 =
F (1)  F (c1)
1  F (c1)
:
So, summing up, c = (c1; c2(0); c2(1)) is an equilibrium if and only if
c1 =
F (1)  F (c1)
1  F (c1)
, c2(0) = 0, and c

2(1) = 1:
By standard arguments we see that there is a unique solution c1 2 (0; 1) to the rst equation,
so there is a unique equilibrium in the exit poll game.
Our next step is to compare the outcome of the exit poll situation with the outcome when
there is no exit poll. We split the analysis into two cases: c1  c and c1 < c. We shall later
present a condition on F that determines which of the two cases that is relevant.
First, consider the case c1  c. Voter turnout as a function of the realized costs of the
voters (c1 and c2) is summarized in Table 3. To ease comparisons with the game without an
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exit poll, we illustrate the corresponding voter turnouts in this game in Table 4.
Table 3: Turnout with exit poll when N =M = 2 and c1  c
#Agent 1, !Agent 2 c2  c c < c2  c1 c1 < c2  1 c2 > 1
c1  c 2 2 2 1
c < c1  c1 2 2 2 1
c1 < c1  1 2 2 0 0
c1 > 1 1 1 0 0
Table 4: Turnout without exit poll when N =M = 2 and c1  c
#Agent 1, !Agent 2 c2  c c < c2  c1 c1 < c2  1 c2 > 1
c1  c 2 1 1 1
c < c1  c1 1 0 0 0
c1 < c1  1 1 0 0 0
c1 > 1 1 0 0 0
The tables illustrate that with an exit poll the turnout is always at least as high as when
there is no exit poll (and often higher). It is also easy to see that we have an analogous
domination result with respect to the implementation of A: If A is implemented without an
exit poll, then it is also implemented with an exit poll and there are (many) combinations
of costs such that it is implemented with an exit poll but not without it. Also note that we
have domination in the opposite direction (no exit poll dominates exit poll) with respect to the
outcome that no votes are cast.
Finally, the tables show that the exit poll improves e¢ ciency (aggregate utility) for many
cost combinations. However, if c1 > 1 and c < c2  c1 (and in the symmetric situation where
c2 > 1 and c < c1  c1) then the exit poll leads to lower e¤ciency (one instead of zero votes).
So there is no domination result with respect to e¢ ciency.
Then consider the case c1 < c. Voter turnout for all combinations of participation costs is
summarized in Table 5, For each combination, the corresponding turnout in the game with no
exit poll is shown in Table 6.
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Table 5: Turnout with an exit poll when N =M = 2 and c1 < c
#Agent 1, !Agent 2 c2  c1 c1 < c2  c c < c2  1 c2 > 1
c1  c1 2 2 2 1
c1 < c1  c 2 0 0 0
c < c1  1 2 0 0 0
c1 > 1 1 0 0 0
Table 6: Turnout without an exit poll when N =M = 2 and c1 < c
#Agent 1, !Agent 2 c2  c1 c1 < c2  c c < c2  1 c2 > 1
c1  c1 2 2 1 1
c1 < c1  c 2 2 1 1
c < c1  1 1 1 0 0
c1 > 1 1 1 0 0
In this case we have that for some combinations of costs the exit polls leads to higher
turnout, for other combinations it is the other way around. So there is no domination result
with respect to turnout. The same is true with respect to implementation of A and e¢ ciency.
However, it is easy to see that, with the exit poll, the set of combinations of positive costs for
which exactly one voter votes is smaller than if there was no exit poll. So in this sense the
introduction of an exit poll leads to a decrease in "wasteful voting", which is at the heart of
the coordination problem that this simple case highlights.
As is clear from the analysis above, the conclusions about the e¤ects of an exit poll in this
case is highly dependent on whether c1  c or c1 < c. If the rst inequality holds then an exit
poll has an unambiguous positive e¤ect on the level of turnout and the implementation of A.
If the second inequality holds then the e¤ect of an exit poll on turnout and implementation of
A are ambiguous, i.e., positive for some combinations of realized voting costs and negative for
others. Therefore, it is important to nd out when we have c1  c and when it is the opposite
inequality that holds.
We rst show the following lemma.
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Lemma 1
c1 T c () c S 1 
p
1  F (1):
Proof. See the appendix.
Suppose that the distribution of voting costs is uniform on some interval containing [0; 1] such
that we can write F (c) = F (0) + (F (1)   F (0))c for c 2 [0; 1]. Then, using the lemma above,
we immediately get a condition on F (0) and F (1) which determines whether c1  c or c1 < c.
Because with the uniform distribution a straightforward calculation shows that
c =
F (0)
1  (F (1)  F (0)) :
And then, by a bit of algebra, we see that c S 1 p1  F (1) is equivalent to
F (0) S (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1)):
Finally, note that if F 00 > 0 (on [0; 1]) then F must intersect the diagonal at a lower cost than
if we had a uniform distribution with the same F (0) and F (1) values (as illustrated in Figure
1 below), which means that c must be lower when F 00 > 0 than when F 00 = 0. It then follows
from the arguments above that if
F 00  0 and F (0)  (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1))
then we have c1  c. Analogously, if
F 00  0 and F (0) > (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1))
then we have c1 < c.
Figure 1: c when F 00 < 0, F 00 = 0 and F 00 > 0
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We sum up our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (The e¤ects of an exit poll when N =M = 2)
1. If the distribution function F satises
F 00  0 (on [0; 1]) and F (0)  (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1))
then the equilibrium period one cut-o¤ cost in the exit poll game will be equal to or greater
than the equilibrium cut-o¤ cost in the no exit poll game (c1  c). This implies that an
exit poll has unambiguous positive e¤ects on the level of turnout and the implementation
of A.
2. If the distribution function F satises
F 00  0 (on [0; 1]) and F (0) > (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1))
then the equilibrium period one cut-o¤ cost in the exit poll game will be lower than the
equilibrium cut-o¤ cost in the no exit poll game (c1 < c). This implies that an exit poll
does not have an unambiguous e¤ect on the level of turnout or the implementation of
A (for some combinations of realized voting costs the e¤ect is positive, for others it is
negative). However, an exit poll has an unambiguous negative e¤ect on "wasteful voting",
i.e., there are fewer combinations of positive voting costs such that precisely one voter
votes.
Let us explore some of the intuition behind the results above. For simplicity, assume that
F 00 = 0, i.e., consider a uniform distribution of voting costs. We are especially interested in
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why c1  c if F (0) is su¢ ciently low, while we have the opposite inequality when it is not.
Therefore, we hold F (1) xed. This of course means that a change in F (0) corresponds to a
change in both the upper and lower limit of the support of the uniform cost distribution.
An exit poll inuences a voters incentive to vote early in two ways. First, the exit poll
gives rise to a rst-mover e¤ect, which stimulates early voting: If agent i votes early then he
might induce the other voter to vote as well. Intuitively, if the other player observes that player
i voted in stage one, he will know with certainty that he is pivotal in stage two, which makes
voting more attractive. Second, the exit poll produces a wait-and-see e¤ectthat discourages
early voting. This e¤ect parallels the wait-and-see e¤ect from the N = 2, M = 1 case studied
in the previous section, but now the incentive to wait and see comes from a desire to avoid
casting a costly but useless vote, and not from a desire to free-ride on the other voter. If he
abstains in stage one, agent i can then choose to vote late if and only if his vote is pivotal, i.e.
if and only if the other agent voted early.
How does the size of F (0) a¤ect the relative strengths of these two opposite e¤ects? As
F (0) gets larger it becomes less likely that the rst-mover e¤ect from an early vote will kick in.
This is because, for any c 2 (0; 1), the probability that the other voter has a cost in the interval
(c; 1) becomes lower. Therefore, it becomes less likely that an early vote from agent i will make
another agent switch from abstention to late participation. On the other hand, an increase
in F (0) makes it more attractive to wait and see in stage one, since the probability that the
other voter votes early is now higher. In total, these observations imply that as F (0) rises, not
voting in stage one becomes relatively more attractive than voting. And that explains the role
of F (0) in the results in the proposition.
The role of 1   F (1) in the results is more subtle. An increase in 1   F (1) (we now hold
F (0) xed) makes it less likely that an early vote will make the other voter vote in stage
two, thus weakening the rst-mover e¤ect. But the e¤ect on the attractiveness of waiting is
also negative because it becomes less likely that the other voter will vote early. Thus, the
relative e¤ect of a change in 1   F (1) cannot be determined from these intuitive arguments.
And indeed, it follows from the proposition that the e¤ect can go both ways (the expression
(
p
1  F (1))(1 p1  F (1)) is not monotone with respect to 1  F (1)).
We end the analysis of this case by considering the simple example where the cost distrib-
ution is given by the uniform distribution on [ "; 1 + "] for some " > 0. Thus we assume that
the probability that a voter will always vote is the same as the probability that he will never
vote, i.e., that F (0) = 1  F (1). In this case the condition
F (0)  (
p
1  F (1))(1 
p
1  F (1))
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is equivalent to
F (0) = 1  F (1)  1
4
.
So with this type of cost distribution we have that c1  c (and thus that an exit poll has an
unambiguous positive e¤ect on turnout and the implementation of A) if and only if there is at
least a fty percent chance that a given voter has a voting cost between zero and one.
3.3 N = 3, M = 2
Our nal analysis combines the insights from the previous two analyses. With three potential
voters and two votes required for implementation, the free riding problem and the coordination
problem are both relevant. A voter is now pivotal if precisely one of the other two agents votes.
Thus c is an equilibrium in the no exit poll game if (and only if) it satises
c = 2F (c)(1  F (c)):
As mentioned earlier, we will in this case assume that the distribution of voting costs is given
by a uniform distribution on some interval containing [0; 1]. So we have F (c) = F (0)+(F (1) 
F (0))c for all cs in the support of the distribution. It is easy to see that, with this assumption,
the function on the right hand side of the equilibrium equation above becomes a second order
polynomial with negative second derivative. Furthermore, note that the polynomial (we simply
refer to the variable as c) is positive at c = 0 and that its maximum value is 12 . From these
observations it follows easily that there is precisely one equilibrium c which must be in the open
interval between zero and one. It is straightforward (although a bit tedious) to solve explicitly
for the equilibrium: we simply have to nd the largest root of a second order polynomial. The
explicit solution, which is of course a function of F (0) and F (1), can be found in the appendix.
Then consider the exit poll game. In this game an equilibrium is written c = (c1; c2(0); c2(1)).
The following proposition establishes that there always exists an equilibrium. More specically,
the proposition says that that there exists an equilibrium with c2(0) = 0 and then states nec-
essary and su¢ cient equations for c = (c1; 0; c2(1)) to be an equilibrium. Note that our
assumption about a uniform cost distribution is not necessary for these results to hold (only
our general assumptions about the cost distribution are used in the proof).
Proposition 3 (Existence of exit poll equilibrium when N = 3, M = 2)
Let c1; c2(1) 2 (0; 1). c = (c1; 0; c2(1)) is an equilibrium of the exit poll game if and only if the
following two equations are satised:
c1 =
(1  F (c1))2   (1  F (c2(1)))2
F (c1)2 + (1  F (c1))2
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and
c2(1) =
1  F (c2(1))
1  F (c1)
:
There exists a solution c1; c2(1) (with c1; c2(1) 2 (0; 1)) to this pair of equations. All solutions
satisfy c1; c < c2(1).
Proof. See the appendix.
If we have an equilibrium of the exit poll game with c1  c then it is easy to check that
the turnout will be at least as high as in the no exit poll equilibrium (and sometimes higher).
Furthermore, it is also easy to check that we have the same domination result with respect to
implementation of A. On the other hand, if we have an equilibrium with c1 < c and c2(0) = 0
then there are cost realizations such that the turnout is zero in this equilibrium while it is at
least two without an exit poll (which of course means that A would have been implemented
in the absence of the poll). For example, consider a combination of costs where ci 2 (c1; c) for
all voters i. Then nobody will vote in the exit poll equilibrium while all voters would vote if
there were no exit poll. In Proposition 4 we nd a condition that guarantees the existence of
an exit poll equilibrium that dominates the no exit poll equilibrium with respect to turnout
and implementation of A. When this condition is not satised, then there exists an exit poll
equilibrium with zero turnout for some cost realizations that would give a turnout of at least
two if there were no exit poll. Finally, we also show that in any exit poll equilibrium there are
cost realizations such that the turnout is at least two while it would be zero without an exit
poll. So the no exit poll equilibrium cannot dominate an exit poll equilibrium with respect to
turnout or implementation of A (note that this holds for all equilibria of the exit poll game,
not only equilibria with c2(0) = 0).
For the proposition we need the following denition. Let c
¯2
(c) 2 (0; 1) be the unique number
given by the equation
c
¯2
(c) =
1  F (c
¯2
(c))
1  F (c) :
This is the equation for the cut-o¤ strategy c
¯2
(c) to be optimal in stage two after one vote
in stage one given that all voters used the cut-o¤ strategy c in stage one and that the other
remaining voter also uses the c
¯2
(c) strategy in stage two.
Proposition 4 (The e¤ects of an exit poll when N = 3, M = 2)
1. Suppose the following condition is satised:
(1  F (c))2   (1  F (c
¯ 2
(c)))2  c(1  c):
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Then there exists an equilibrium of the exit poll game with c1  c (and c2(0) = 0), i.e.,
an equilibrium that dominates the no exit poll equilibrium with respect to both turnout
and implementation of A.
2. Suppose that the condition from part one is not satised, i.e., that
(1  F (c))2   (1  F (c
¯ 2
(c)))2 < c(1  c):
Then there exists an equilibrium of the exit poll game with c1 < c (and c2(0) = 0). For
such an equilibrium there are cost realizations such that turnout is zero while it would be
at least two if there were no exit poll.
3. For any equilibrium of the exit poll game there exist cost realizations such that the turnout
is at least two while it would be at most one if there were no exit poll.
Proof. See the appendix.
Because of our assumption about uniform distribution of voting costs it is straightforward
to explicitly write c
¯2
(c) as a function of c:
c
¯2
(c) =
1  F (0)
1  F (0) + (F (1)  F (0))(1  c) :
And thus, given that we have already found an explicit expression for c in terms of F (0)
and F (1) we can in principle write the conditions from part one and two of Proposition 4 as
conditions on F (0) and F (1). However, the expressions on either side of the inequalities are
complicated and it seems impossible to analytically derive insights from them. So instead we
nummerically calculate each side of the inequalities. And then, treating F (0) and 1   F (1)
as parameters, we plot whether it is the condition from part one or the condition from part
two that holds. Note that we use 1   F (1) instead of F (1) as a parameter because then our
parameters are, respectively, the probability that a voter will always vote and the probability
that a voter will never vote. For any feasible combination of F (0) and 1 F (1), gure 2 below
illustrates which of the inequalities in proposition 4 is satised.
Figure 2: The e¤ects of an exit poll when N = 3, M = 2
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We see that if the probability that a voter will always vote is above (roughly) ten percent
then the condition from part two of the proposition is satised no matter what the probability
that a voter will never vote is. Similarly, if the probability that a voter will never vote is below
(roughly) thirty percent then it is also the case that the condition from part two is satised
(no matter what the value of F (0) is). So in a large region of the F (0); 1   F (1) parameter
space we can only conclude that the introduction of an exit poll can have both positive and
negative e¤ects on turnout and the implementation of A. The sign of the e¤ect depends on the
realizations of voting costs. Only in a much smaller subset of the parameter space - in which
F (0) is below ten percent and 1 F (1) is above thirty percent (see the gure for details) - can
we guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in which the introduction of an exit poll has an
unambiguous positive e¤ect on the level of turnout and the implementation of A.
The intuition behind these results is similar to the one explained in the case of N =M = 2.
A larger value of F (0) means that there is a higher probability that the other players will vote
early (not because of strategic considerations, but for example because they enjoy fullling
their civic duty). This makes it more attractive for a player with a positive participation
cost to await the result of the exit poll before going to the polls, since this may allow her to
free-ride on the other players, or at least avoid wasting a costly vote on a losing candidate. As
a result, the incentive to vote early falls. When F (0) becomes su¢ ently large, we can therefore
guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in which the exit poll lowers the incentive to vote
early (c1 < c), and where the number of voters participating may turn out lower than if there
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had been no poll.
We end our analysis with an important example. Suppose that the parameters F (0) and
1   F (1) are such that the inequality in part two of proposition 4 is satised (the light grey
shaded area in Figure 2). We then know that there exists an equilibrium with c1 < c < c2(1)
and c2(0) = 0. Assume then that the three players face cost realizations such that c1  c1,
c2 2 (c1; c), and c3 > c2(1). With this combination of costs, player 1 will vote early, player
2 will vote late, while player 3 will abstain. Alternative A is therefore implemented with
a minimal margin of victory. To the casual observer, this outcome may suggest the following
interpretation: The release of the exit poll raised the incentive to vote (since c2(1) > c1). This
led player 2, whose vote was pivotal to the outcome of the election, to cast a late vote. Without
the exit poll, alternative A would therefore not have been implemented.This interpretation
is wrong: In the absence of an exit poll, player 1 and player 2 would both have voted (since
c1; c2 < c) and the outcome of the election would in fact have been the same. The problem with
the erroneous interpretation is that it presupposes that player 2s behavior before the release
of the poll is indicative of how she would have behaved if there were no exit poll. In doing
so, it ignores that it is in fact the exit poll itself that, through the wait-and-see e¤ect, causes
player 2 to abstain in stage one.
4 Conclusion
This paper has studied the impact of exit polls in small elections with two alternatives, where
the alternative favored by a majority in the population must receive a certain number of votes
in order to win. We have shown that the introduction of an exit poll inuences the incentive to
vote both before and after the results of the poll are released. Before the exit poll is released,
potential voters may nd it worthwhile to await its result before they decide on whether to
stay home or go to the polls. That way, they may hope to free ride on other voters who
support the same alternative, or they may avoid wasting time and e¤ort on participating in
the election if their preferred alternative is bound to lose anyway. This e¤ect thus discourages
early voting. On the other hand, supporters of the alternative favored by a majority may also
use the exit poll actively to coordinate their e¤orts: By inuencing the result of the exit poll,
early voters can induce fellow supporters to vote after the result of the poll is revealed, and
this may stimulate early voting. In sum, the total e¤ect of an exit poll on the incentive to
vote early is ambiguous. Once the results of the exit poll is released, the e¤ect on remaining
potential votersincentive to participate depends on the exact information revealed by the poll.
Voting becomes more attractive if the poll reveals a close race, but less attractive if it reveals
the opposite. As a result of these opposite e¤ects, we nd that an exit polls e¤ect on voter
turnout and election outcomes is ambiguous.
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Much of the skepticism towards exit polls comes from the belief that such polls may change
the outcome of the election, a possibility that some commentators consider undemocratic.
While we certainly agree that exit polls have the potential to change election outcomes, we
also believe that the empirical case for this hypothesis is sometimes overstated. This was for
example the case, we believe, in the debate following the Danish referendum in June 2009. The
problem with this debate was that it didnt recognize the possibility that voter behavior was
inuenced by exit polls not only after, but also before the release of the rst exit poll result.
Hence, the low turnout before the release of the rst poll was interpreted as an indicator for
what would have happened later in the day, had the results of the exit poll not been published.
In reality, however, the low early turnout itself could very well be a direct consequence of the
exit poll if voters postponed voting until after the results of the poll were revealed.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
First note that the functions F (c) and F (1) F (c)1 F (c) intersects at precisely one cost c 2 (0; 1). By
solving a second order equation we get that F (c) = 1 p1  F (1).
Now suppose that c1 > c. Since
F (1) F (c)
1 F (c) is decreasing and F (c) is increasing this is
equivalent to these two functions intersecting below the 45 line, which is obviously equivalent
to F (c) < c. Further, since F is increasing and intersects the diagonal precisely once, this is
equivalent to
c = F (c) < F (c) = 1 
p
1  F (1):
Thus we have shown that
c1 > c () c < 1 
p
1  F (1):
The arguments showing that
c1 = c () c = 1 
p
1  F (1)
and
c1 < c () c > 1 
p
1  F (1)
are completely analogous. 
Equilibrium in the no exit poll game when N = 3, M = 2
CLAIM: In the N = 3, M = 2 case (where we assume that the cost distribution is uniform),
the unique equilibrium of the no exit poll game is
c =
2(F (1)  F (0))(1  2F (0))  1
4(F (1)  F (0))2
+
p
(2(F (1)  F (0))  1)2 + 8F (0)(F (1)  F (0))
4(F (1)  F (0))2 :
Proof. Remember that the equilibrium condition is
c = 2F (c)(1  F (c)):
Since the cost distribution is uniform we have F (c) = F (0) + (F (1)   F (0))c (for cs in the
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support of the distribution) and thus the equilibrium condition becomes
c = 2(F (0) + (F (1)  F (0))c)(1  F (0)  (F (1)  F (0))c);
which, by straightforward calculations, becomes
2(F (1)  F (0))2c2
+ (4F (0)(F (1)  F (0))  2(F (1)  F (0)) + 1)c
  2F (0)(1  F (0)) = 0:
The equilibrium is the positive solution to this second order equation. By solving for this
solution we get the expression from the claim. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, suppose c = (c1; 0; c2(1)) is an equilibrium of the exit poll game such that c1; c2(1) 2
(0; 1). It is easy to see that then we must have
c2(1) = Pr(c
j > c2(1)jcj > c1).
If c2(1)  c1 the probability on the right-hand side of this expression is equal to 1. But since
c2(1) < 1 we must then have
c2(1) > c

1 and c

2(1) =
1  F (c2(1))
1  F (c1)
:
To get the equation for c1, rst note that if some voter i votes in stage one then his expected
payo¤ is
1  Pr(cj > c2(1))2   ci = 1  (1  F (c2(1)))2   ci
= F (c2(1))(2  F (c2(1))  ci:
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If 0 < ci  c2(1) then his payo¤ from not voting in stage one is10
Pr(cj  c1)2 + 2Pr(cj  c1)(1  Pr(cj  c1))(1  ci)
= F (c1)
2 + 2F (c1)(1  F (c1))(1  ci):
Thus c1 must satisy
F (c2(1))(2  F (c2(1))  c1 = F (c1)2 + 2F (c1)(1  F (c1))(1  c1):
This equation is easily seen to be equivalent to
c1 =
F (c2(1))(2  F (c2(1))  F (c1)(2  F (c1))
1  2F (c1)(1  F (c1))
:
From this equation we easily get the equation from the proposition.
Then suppose that we have c1; c2(1) 2 (0; 1) such that the equations are satised (note that
the equation for c1 implies that c1 < c2(1)) . Consider the strategy c = (c1; 0; c2(1)). From
the arguments above it easily follows that c1 and c2(1) are optimal cut-o¤ costs at the history
in the game where they are used, given that the other voters use c (and, of course, given that
beliefs are updated correctly in stage two). Also, since c1 > 0, it is easy to see that c2(0) = 0
is optimal in stage two if there is no early votes. So when the equations from the proposition
are satised, c = (c1; 0; c2(1)) is indeed an equilibrium.
Next, we will show that we always have existence of a solution c1; c2(1) 2 (0; 1) to the
equations. First, for each c1 2 [0; 1] let c¯2(c1) be the unique solution to the equation
c
¯2
(c1) =
1  F (c
¯2
(c1))
1  F (c1) :
Then c
¯2
is a continuous function of c1 on [0; 1] and we have c¯2
(c1) > c1 for all c1 2 [0; 1) (note
that c
¯2
(1) = 1).
Now consider the equation
c1 =
(1  F (c1))2   (1  F (c¯2(c

1)))
2
F (c1)2 + (1  F (c1))2
:
The right hand side of this equation (considered as a function of c1 2 [0; 1]) is positive at c1 = 0,
10 If ci > c2(1) it is
Pr(cj  c2(1))2
and if ci  0 it is
Pr(cj  c1)2 + 2Pr(cj  c1)(1  Pr(cj  c1))  ci:
But since we already know that c2(1) > c

1 > 0 we do not need to consider these cases.
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zero at c1 = 1, and continuous. Thus it must intersect the diagonal at least once between zero
and one, so we have at least one solution in (0; 1) to this equation. Pick a solution c1 and let
c2(1) =c¯2
(c1). Then we have a solution to the equations from the proposition and the solution
obviously satises c1 < c2(1).
Finally, it remains to be shown that c2(1) > c. Since c = 2F (c)(1   F (c))  12 , it su¢ ces
to show that c2(1) >
1
2 . We have that c

2(1) satises
c2(1) =
1  F (c2(1))
1  F (c1)
:
Thus c2(1) is given as the intersection between the function
1  F ()
1  F (c1)
and the diagonal. This function is a straight line (because F is linear) with a negative slope,
is above one at zero, and above zero at one. So it is easy to see that its intersection with the
diagonal must happen at a cost above one half. 
Proof of Proposition 4.
1: Since c = 2F (c)(1  F (c)) = 1  F (c)2 + (1  F (c))2, the inequality can be rewritten as
c  (1  F (c))
2   (1  F (c
¯2
(c)))2
F (c)2 + (1  F (c))2 :
Consider, for a moment, the right hand side as a function on [0; 1]. At one it is equal to zero
and thus below the diagonal so (because of continuity) there must exist a c1 2 [c; 1) with
c1 =
(1  F (c1))2   (1  F (c¯2(c

1)))
2
F (c1)2 + (1  F (c1))2
:
And thus (see Proposition 3 and its proof) we have an exit poll equilibrium with c1  c (and
c2(0) = 0).
2: Analogously to above, it follows from the inequality in the proposition that there exists a
c1 2 (0; c) such that
c1 =
(1  F (c1))2   (1  F (c¯2(c

1)))
2
F (c1)2 + (1  F (c1))2
:
And thus we have an exit poll equilibrium with c1 < c (and c2(0) = 0).
3: Suppose c = (c1; c2(0); c2(1)) is an exit poll equilibrium. Analogously to the proof of propo-
sition 3 it can be shown that c2(1) > c. Any cost realization satisfying, for example, c1 < c1,
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c < c2  c2(1), and c3 > 1 would result in two votes if there is an exit poll and at most one
vote if there is not (one if c1  c, zero if c1 > c). 
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